









Defence held on 03/11/2020 in Esch-sur-Alzette 
 
to obtain the degree of 
  
 






Itzel VAZQUEZ SANDOVAL 
 
 
A MULTIFACETED FORMAL ANALYSIS OF END-TO-
END ENCRYPTED EMAIL PROTOCOLS AND 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC AUTHENTICATION ENHANCEMENTS 
 
 
Dissertation defence committee 
Dr Gabriele Lenzini, dissertation supervisor 
Associate Professor, Université du Luxembourg 
 
Dr Peter Y.A. Ryan, Chairman 
Professor, Université du Luxembourg 
 
Dr Luca Viganò, Vice Chairman 
Professor, King’s College London 
 
Dr Pascal Lafourcade 
Professor, Université Clermont Auvergne - LIMOS 
 
Dr Fabio Martinelli 
Professor, Instituto di Informatica e Telematica, Consiglio Nationale delle Ricerche 

A tí Gildita ...
con todo cariño y admiración.




Largely owing to cryptography, modern messaging tools (e.g., Signal) have reached a considerable
degree of sophistication, balancing advanced security features with high usability. This has not been
the case for email, which however, remains the most pervasive and interoperable form of digital
communication. As sensitive information (e.g., identification documents, bank statements, or the
message in the email itself) is frequently exchanged by this means, protecting the privacy of email
communications is a justified concern which has been emphasized in the last years.
A great deal of effort has gone into the development of tools and techniques for providing
email communications with privacy and security, requirements that were not originally considered.
Yet, drawbacks across several dimensions hinder the development of a global solution that would
strengthen security while maintaining the standard features that we expect from email clients.
In this thesis, we present improvements to security in email communications. Relying on formal
methods and cryptography, we design and assess security protocols and analysis techniques, and
propose enhancements to implemented approaches for end-to-end secure email communication.
In the first part, we propose a methodical process relying on code reverse engineering, which we
use to abstract the specifications of two end-to-end security protocols from a secure email solution
(called p≡p); then, we apply symbolic verification techniques to analyze such protocols with respect
to privacy and authentication properties. We also introduce a novel formal framework that enables a
system’s security analysis aimed at detecting flaws caused by possible discrepancies between the
user’s and the system’s assessment of security. Security protocols, along with user perceptions and
interaction traces, are modeled as transition systems; socio-technical security properties are defined
as formulas in computation tree logic (CTL), which can then be verified by model checking. Finally,
we propose a protocol that aims at securing a password-based authentication system designed to
detect the leakage of a password database, from a code-corruption attack.
In the second part, the insights gained by the analysis in Part I allow us to propose both, theoretical
and practical solutions for improving security and usability aspects, primarily of email communication,
but from which secure messaging solutions can benefit too. The first enhancement concerns the use
of password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols for entity authentication in peer-to-peer
decentralized settings, as a replacement for out-of-band channels; this brings provable security
to the so far empirical process, and enables the implementation of further security and usability
properties (e.g., forward secrecy, secure secret retrieval). A second idea refers to the protection
of weak passwords at rest and in transit, for which we propose a scheme based on the use of a
one-time-password; furthermore, we consider potential approaches for improving this scheme.
The hereby presented research was conducted as part of an industrial partnership between
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Email is undoubtedly a key component in modern society. With approximately 4 billion of worldwide
users1 and 306 billion of daily exchanges [173], email is no longer used only as a means of
communication; an email account acts as a digital identifier and enables access to almost every online
service: online shopping, online education, financial operations, entertainment, medical appointments,
etc.
Yet, the core protocols underlying email communication were specified, designed, and developed
in an early age of computers and networking, when the participants involved did not have trust
concerns regarding each other, and when communication links were assumed to be secure as they
were owned by official institutions2. Therefore, privacy and security requirements were not initially
considered.
As an implication, for emails received in standard settings (as it is the case with the most popular
email providers, e.g. Gmail and Yahoo) there is no actual guarantee neither that the email was sent
by the displayed sender, nor that the subject or email contents are as originally sent. Moreover, even
if the email is received as intended, the possibility of someone reading and storing the cleartext
content in transit exists.
With the extensive adoption of Internet, security risks and privacy started to be a concern. In 2013,
Edward Snowden exposed evidence of mass surveillance carried out by governmental institutions on
citizens worldwide [90]. These revelations motivated the development of novel security protocols and
software solutions with security as a central feature, which primarily aim at ensuring the authenticity
of both, the sender and the email carrier, and the confidentiality and integrity of the message, thus
preventing emails from being easily eavesdropped and falsified.
Security protocols, also known as cryptographic protocols, are sequences of steps and interac-
tions between entities, that rely on cryptography for providing different security properties in insecure
environments. Defeating the cryptographic primitives involved in a security protocol is so expensive
that usually resources are invested only to compromise the data of selected targets. However, the
correct design of protocols is difficult and subject to the introduction of errors, from their conception
until the way in which an implemented protocol is used; yet, providing strong guarantees about the
achievement of specific security goals is essential.
For that purpose, formal approaches which provide mathematical frameworks and techniques to
rigorously analyze and prove security of cryptographic primitives and protocols have been developed.
In particular, an approach by which cryptographic primitives are abstracted as elementary functions
in the model of a security protocol (symbolic model) has permitted the development of tools able to
automatically prove or contradict whether a security protocol satisfies a certain property.
This thesis is concerned with the assurance of end-to-end secure communication principally
1The world population is 7.8 billions as of August 2020.
2Ray Tomlinson sent the first electronic mail over an academic and governmental network (ARPANET) in 1971,
introducing the ‘@’ symbol to split the username and the destination domain in an email address. The current email
architecture started to be standardized in 1982 with the specification of the SMTP protocol, and its massive growth occurred
along with the popularization of the Internet in the mid 90’s.
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over email but also via messaging. We apply formal techniques and introduce new approaches to
assess and study the security of existing solutions. We also propose novel security protocols and
the application of cryptographic techniques for enhancing the security of email and advancing the
adoption of secure solutions.
1.1 Current Scene and Challenges
Mostly due to the innate ubiquity and interoperability features of email, secure email solutions
struggle in practice to provide effective protection. As a result, email communication remains largely
vulnerable to security and privacy threats [50].
Still, mature standards, protocols, techniques and tools for securing email communications
at different layers already exist. In particular, interoperable end-to-end security solutions, such
as S/MIME and OpenPGP, have been proved to provide effective privacy and security protection.
Unfortunately, these solutions and techniques suffer from a lack of adoption and sometimes of proper
implementations.
Although secure email solutions have been adopted within closed communities—e.g. enterprises,
activists—a more widespread adoption is hindered principally by barriers concerning usability factors:
major email providers (e.g. Gmail and Yahoo) provide neither support for nor smooth integration
with end-to-end secure solutions; in addition, the underlying protocols might involve burdensome
processes—e.g., key management or obtaining certificates—and might require specific knowledge—
e.g., notions of public key cryptography—and IT skills not expected from the average user [120].
These reasons, along with differences regarding priorities, requirements, and technical support
facilities that distinct types of users (enterprises, individuals, activist, journalists) have, make the
emergence of a global end-to-end private email system improbable in the current landscape. An
alternative is to implement interoperability between existing solutions, however, this solution requires
interest from all the providers and is in general expensive to achieve [50].
Thus, the ongoing panorama presents open problems and challenges in several research direc-
tions, for instance: linking communities, bootstraping and automating the achievement of security
goals (e.g. implementing privacy-by-default), implementing further secure email functionalities (e.g.
search, messages that are deleted after a specified period of time), automating key management,
protecting the content of email servers, and overcoming adoption hurdles.
Some of the previous challenges have been addressed by messaging solutions, such as the Signal
application, WhatsApp and Telegram. Hinging on cryptography, modern messaging applications are
able to offer advanced security features, ranging from end-to-end encryption to forward secrecy and
deniability. Due to these properties, along with better usability, secure messaging has often been
recommended by security experts as the go-to tool for secure communication.
However, one of the principal reasons that allow messaging solutions to achieve strong security
goals is the implementation of proprietary solutions, which lack interoperability3. In fact, strong
security goals are achieved in analogous email scenarios, i.e., proprietary solutions within restricted
environments—e.g. Tutanota4 and ProtonMail5. But in these cases, when nodes outside the
3E.g., secrecy is guaranteed among WhatsApp users, but they can only communicate with other WhatsApp users.
4Tutanota [178] is an open source, private-by-default, secure email service which, among others, offers easy usage,
end-to-end encryption and anonymous registration.
5ProtonMail [148] is a claimed usable secure email service created in 2013, which offers built-in end-to-end encryption
and state-of-the-art security features.
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controlled environment are involved in the communication (i.e., when sending an email to a user with
an account from a different provider) the offered security properties are no longer assured.
Hence, despite the success of secure messaging applications, the interoperability and openness
that email offers make it the preferred (or the only) option in many cases, and also often when
exchanges occur in official settings, involve longer messages, or attachments among others.
Secure email solutions rely on two approaches for establishing trust between two communicating
partners: centralized and decentralized. Centralized architectures rely on trusted authorities to issue
and manage certificates attesting the digital identity of users; on the contrary, in decentralized models
the users are in charge of deciding which certificates to trust, primarily based on personal interaction
at some point. Although the centralized approach has been the standard solution for some time, it
has limitations and raises privacy concerns mainly originated from relying on a central trusted party.
A recent software solution in the decentralized setting that addresses some of the usability
and interoperability issues referred to above was developed by pEp foundation6 and pEp Security
SA7. Pretty Easy Privacy (p≡p) is a software that implements several cryptographic standards in
different digital communication channels to provide end-to-end encryption on a peer-to-peer scenario
(see Section 2.8). Due to the mentioned features, we consider p≡p a tool whose study is worth
considering.
1.2 Research Questions
We were interested in identifying and tackling problems hindering the advance and adoption of
end-to-end secure email protocols and existing solutions, and in developing techniques that enable
the formal study of their security. More specifically, in this thesis we seek to answer the following
questions:
Q1: In the context of decentralized end-to-end secure email solutions, do existing implementations
provide the essential security properties that we expect from them?
Q2: Can the security of a system be affected by a human interacting with it? How could we better
understand and study those situations?
Q3: Can we define security properties that have not been (or cannot be) expressed with current
verification approaches?
Q4: What are some obstacles hindering the improvement and adoption of secure email solutions
and how can we solve them?
The relevance of answering these questions is spread across diverse domains.
Despite the central role of email in modern communication and the importance of securing it,
most of the prevalent email clients do not provide built-in security services by default, and the ones
that do, are implemented in a centralized setting, which brings a series of risks associated with
trusting a single point. Furthermore, decades of research have indicated that prominent solutions that
rely on decentralized settings (namely PGP) suffer from major usability shortcomings that hamper
their adoption.
For these reasons, having usable end-to-end secure email solutions that work in a decentralized
setting, and that can eventually find widespread adoption, is of significant importance.
6https://pep.foundation/
7https://www.pep.security/
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Among state-of-the-art deployed software products, p≡p is a potential candidate due to the
following reasons: it works in a decentralized setting, it preserves the original intentions of email
regarding interoperability and openness, it builds upon well-established cryptographic protocols and
secure email standards (OpenPGP) for providing end-to-end encryption, and more importantly, it
claims to address the main longstanding usability issues that have plagued prevailing approaches.
A way to deal with Q1 is with a formal proof of security for the cryptographic protocols under-
lying p≡p. Addressing this question requires working with implementations, which is by itself a
challenging assignment as despite the great advances made in the last years (see Section 2.9), the
formal verification of implementations is an area with fundamental open problems still being actively
researched. We need then to figure out a way, and if necessary, develop techniques for carrying out
a formal study of the security protocols involved in the implementations. These intermediate results
would contribute to enriching the set of tools available for the formal study of security protocols, and
also raise awareness about the challenges associated with such a task, as well as possible ways for
overcoming them.
We also need to be aware that humans are the ultimate users of email, and current decentralized
secure email solutions require them to perform actions, even if minimally, in the process of achieving
security goals. However, as we have repeatedly emphasized, usability is the Achilles heel of secure
email solutions.
Answering Q2 requires us to state fundamental questions residing in an intersecting area which
remains largely unexplored: socio-technical security; and come up with techniques to solve them. By
being able to reason about the influence of the user on the security of a system using techniques
rooted in mathematical grounds, one could identify vulnerabilities that are detected neither by a purely
technical analysis, nor by a user-driven study.
The study of the security from this perspective regarding the interaction with the user might
require the formulation of properties of a different nature than the cryptographic properties. This is
where the relevance of answering Q3 becomes evident. As this perspective is less explored, we need
to precisely define properties that express security notions that allow to detect security vulnerabilities
derived from users having a wrong perception of a system’s security. Along with the expected outputs
from answering Q2, this definitions would contribute to expand the formal techniques for analyzing so
called socio-technical aspects, not only of email but in general of user-oriented systems.
Finally, Q4 leaves open room for some degree of freedom, as we expect to get insights from the
answers to the previous questions that influence our view of the overall situation.
We already consider that weaknesses in security originating from users could be eliminated if we
were able to fully or partially relieve the user of tasks that they do not fully understand or that they
find difficult to do, and instead put in place cryptographic protocols to achieve the same objective.
Research on this direction promises to be an important step towards improving both, the security and
the usability aspect of end-to-end secure email.
We also find quite important securing the passwords with which users access their mailbox,
as they represent the key that opens the door to the user’s privacy. In particular, perhaps even
some readers might have found themselves in the situation of selecting a very simple password for
creating an account that they thought would be a one time use, or having a common password for
registering into “non-important” services. Looking into ways in which we could protect even those
weak passwords is another direction that we address in this thesis.
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1.3 Outline and contributions
The thesis consists of two parts and ten chapters, in which we address the previously mentioned
research questions.
Chapter 2: Background Here, we provide contextual and theoretical background on topics relevant
for the thesis. We review elementary cryptographic concepts. We include a brief overview of protocols
for securing different aspects of email communication—e.g. the content of the message or the
transport channel—and of decentralized versus PKI architectures. We also discuss factors that
lead to greater advances in securing messaging than in securing email—e.g. synchronicity versus
asynchronicity, interoperability of solutions, and the user’s expectations. Another section is dedicated
to introducing the industrial partner’s software, p≡p. Finally, we provide an introduction to formal
verification of secure systems from an all-inclusive perspective—e.g., verification of implementations,
verified compilers, etc.
Chapter 3: A Hidden Requirement: Extracting Specifications of Security Protocols (Q1) The
lack of specifications and in general of documentation for implemented security protocols is a frequent
early obstacle in the analysis of deployed security protocols (e.g. [52]) which nonetheless must be
sorted out in order to obtain unambiguous specifications, fundamental for any formal study of such
protocols. In this chapter we present a methodical approach based on software reverse engineering,
for obtaining precise specifications from open source code and scarce documentation. The technique
considers the following assumptions: (i) open source code in C available, (ii) non-executable code, (iii)
unknown specifications of the protocol, and (iv) unavailability or scarcity of documentation. To provide
insight into the capabilities and limitations of existing reverse engineering tools, we systematize
state-of-the-art tools relevant for each step of the approach. The contributions in this chapter are
based on the publication [185].
After these preliminary chapters, the thesis is structured in two parts:
Part I. Formal methods for the analysis of security protocols and ceremonies This part is
devoted to the analysis of security protocols and ceremonies, which extend security protocols by
including the human in the models, via formal methods. More specifically, we apply known techniques
and propose new ones to study protocols that aim at securing different aspects of email, from different
perspectives.
Chapter 4: Formal Verification of Security Protocols An introductory chapter to symbolic formal
analysis. We briefly introduce the research area, along with the formalism (applied Pi calculus) and
tool (ProVerif) used in this thesis.
Chapter 5: The Honeywords System under a Code-corrupted Login Server (Q4) We begin by
considering a broader problem which constitutes an independent area of research: ubiquitous access
to mailboxes granted via a password. We develop upon the Honeywords system, a password-based
authentication system designed to detect unauthorized logging attempts derived from a passwords
database compromise. A Honeywords system consists of a login server providing the user with an
interface to access the system, and a secure server which stores each password together with a
set of indistinguishable decoy words, such that, an attacker stealing the passwords database and
retrieving the words therein would still need to guess which of them is the password. An incorrect
choice would reveal the leak. The research deals with making the system secure even in the presence
of a code-corrupted login server.
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This chapter is based on the publication [84] and its extended version [85].
Chapter 6: Security Analysis of p≡ p Protocols (Q1) We move onto protocols that achieve
private end-to-end communication. We present a formal security analysis of the p≡p protocols for
key distribution and trust establishment, with respect to authentication and privacy goals and under
a Dolev-Yao threat model. The abstractions that we present as Message Sequence Charts (MSC)
constitute the first detailed technical documentation of such protocols and were delivered to and then
validated by the industrial partner. The analysis verifies the claims of p≡p with respect to essential
security guarantees and the correct assignment of privacy ratings to messages; however, we discuss
limitations of the analysis and how it could be extended in several directions. We also sketch the
proof of a relevant algorithm in the implementation.
The results in this chapter were published in [184].
Chapter 7: A Socio-technical Security Analysis Framework (Q2,Q3) A follow-up direction of the
analysis in Chapter 6 emerges from speculating if and how the user experience affects the impression
that users acquire of a system with which they interact. In particular, defining security properties that
consider such user impressions allows investigating possible scenarios of misalignment between
the factual security of a system and how secure the user perceives that system to be. For instance,
we introduce the property “false sense of insecurity” to capture situations in which a secure system
injects uncertainty in users, and its analogous “false sense of security”. Both of these situations
leave room for attacks. In this chapter, we propose a formal framework for reasoning about such
socio-technical discrepancies. The resulting models can be automatically verified using existing
model checkers. We exemplify the approach by analyzing this socio-technical notion of security within
p≡p and discuss how the presented approach provides a broader understanding of a system’s
security.
This chapter is largely based on our results in [168].
Part II. Improvements to secure email and secure messaging The security analysis in Part I
reveals potential areas for development in the p≡p protocols; we identified that secure email and
secure messaging solutions would benefit as well from improvements in those areas. In this part
we elaborate on ideas for relaxing the security assumptions that depend on users and propose
improvements in various directions.
Chapter 8: Protecting Weak Passwords in Password-based Authentication (Q4) Here, reflect-
ing on the reality of how users choose passwords, we propose a password-based authentication
protocol, which combined with a One-Time-Password (OTP) device, aims at strengthening the secu-
rity of weak passwords at login and also in storage by hampering the execution of offline dictionary
attacks. Similar to the protocol introduced for code-corruption of the Honeywords System, the core
idea relies on masking the passwords with a random value extracted from the OTP. We analyze
further theoretical limitations of the approach derived from the entropy of the OTP value, and propose
an idea to overcome such shortcomings.
The ideas discussed in this chapter are inspired by the content published in [186], however, here
we have revised the main ideas and added contributions which have not been published.
Chapter 9: Automating Entity Authentication from Low-entropy Secrets (Q4) We revise the
entity authentication process in decentralized end-to-end encrypted email and secure messaging,
which allows users to determine whether they are exchanging messages with the intended peer. Here,
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we propose a cryptographic solution based on password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE), for
allowing users to authenticate each other via shared low-entropy secrets—e.g., memorable words—
without the need for a public key infrastructure or a trusted third party. By minimizing the impact of
human error, this approach provides stronger security guarantees than prevailing techniques that
rely on out-of-band fingerprint verification, and enables additional and entirely new cryptographic
functionalities in email. Moreover, PAKE establishes a base for automation and further improvements
in several other aspects of secure email. The solution can be adapted for secure messaging solutions.
This chapter is largely based on the contributions published in [183] and we are currently working
on an extended version.
Chapter 10: Conclusions In the last chapter we bring together overall conclusions regarding
security protocols for email but also regarding the assessment of p≡ p. We also discuss open
problems and future directions in this area of research.
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2BACKGROUND
Due to its ubiquitous deployment, securing the whole email environment requires considering
problems in multiple dimensions, among them, the need for securing architectures, security in
each layer of the Internet models (e.g., transport and application layer in the OSI model), usability
issues, adoption obstacles and also social engineering attacks.
This thesis largely focuses on the assurance of end-to-end private communication along with
the proof of association of a message with the owning entity. In this regard, email systems should
essentially fulfill the three elementary security properties, all of which are required to effectively
guarantee secure private communications1:
Confidentiality (secrecy) prevents the unauthorized acquisition of information by making the content
of a message incomprehensible to everyone except to the intended recipient.
Integrity guarantees the receiver of a message from a genuine sender that such a message has not
been altered in transit.
Authentication guarantees the recipient of a message that such a message comes from the claimed
sender.
Cryptographic protocols are the fundamental element allowing the achievement of such properties.
However, before getting into details, we provide some context for how the exchange of messages
takes place in an email system, and the security of the communication channels.
2.1 Email Architecture and Communication Protocols
The basic architecture of an email system is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Email clients allow users to
compose, read, send messages and manage their inbox. Mail servers manage users’ mailboxes—i.e.,
the server’s storage space allocated per user for the received emails—and deliver email messages
between users.
Typically, three standard communication protocols are involved in the exchange of emails: Simple
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [108], Post Office Protocol (POP) [130] and Internet Mail Access
Protocol (IMAP) [58]. When an email is sent, the sender’s client uses SMTP—or alternatively HTTP(S)
if the client is web-based—to submit the message to the mail server of the corresponding provider.
The sender’s mail server locates the receiver’s mail server using the domain name system (DNS),
and then executes SMTP2 to transfer the message accordingly. Finally, the client of the receiver
executes POP3 (the current version) or IMAP to retrieve the message from the corresponding mail
server—or HTTP(S) in the case of webmail.
SMTP, POP and IMAP are part of the application layer of the Internet Protocol Suite (TCP/IP),
which includes protocols and interface methods used by hosts to exchange application data over
1There is a slight difference between the notions of privacy and secrecy which is rather at the conceptual level. Privacy
refers to the individual’s right to share specific information only with intended people, free from the observation of anyone
else. Secrecy concerns the intentional concealment of information from others’ simple observation or analysis.
2In order to address security requirements, the version of SMTP used to submit a message from client to server differs
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Figure 2.1: Email architecture and communication protocols simplified for a sender and a receiver.
network connections established by lower level protocols. One of such protocols is the well-known
TLS, usually implemented for establishing secure channels between clients and mail servers.
Sanchez et al. [120] report a detailed security analysis of these protocols and provide technical
and organizational recommendations to mitigate the privacy and security risks of email communica-
tions more effectively.
2.2 Threats and Vulnerabilities
The main vulnerabilities of email systems reside in their intrinsic lack of confidentiality, which
permits emails (along with attached files) to be accessed by unauthorized third parties who can
gain access to sensitive information, and in the lack of integrity and authentication, by which identity
impersonation and tampering of email content are feasible.
A common impersonation attack is known as man-in-the-middle (MITM). In this attack, an
adversary manages to intercept and possibly alter email messages between sender and receiver
while the legitimate participants still believe to be directly communicating with each other. Other
well-known threats affecting different weaknesses of email include malware, spam, social engineering
attacks (e.g. phishing), and massive eavesdropping.
We can also categorize attacks as per the infrastructure of email systems.
Compromise of server to server communication. The communication between mail servers
is considered the most vulnerable element of the email system [120], given that it takes place through
the Internet. In general, the identity of the SMTP servers (mail servers) is not mutually authenticated
and the emails in transit are assumed to have originated from a genuine source.
The lack of a confidential communication channel allows a passive adversary to eavesdrop on
the messages in transit. The lack of authentication allows spoofing, e.g., an adversary can deliver a
prepared message to an SMTP server, pretending to be another SMTP server.
Compromise of client to server communication. In the absence of a channel implementing
SSL or TLS (e.g. a public Wi-Fi hotspot), an adversary can learn the messages when they are
retrieved from the server (via for instance IMAP), and furthermore learn a username and password
submitted, hence fully compromising the user’s account. This can be achieved for instance using
a sniffer, which is a program that monitors and analyzes traffic passing over (part of) a network. A
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sniffer can decode, according to the corresponding specifications, the data of the packets captured
and consequently show the values of various fields in the packet.
Compromise of email data storage By compromising the mail server, an adversary gets access
to all the users’ emails. This attack can be executed either remotely or locally—for instance by a
malicious administrator. Furthermore, if the password database of the server gets compromised, the
attacker would be able to fully impersonate legitimate users, sending emails from their identities and
reading all their emails.
2.3 Protocols for Securing Email
While email providers usually focus on preventing spam, filtering malware, and stopping passive
eavesdropping, several cryptographic (a.k.a security) protocols and tools have been proposed to
ensure the authenticity of the participants in the communication (users and mail servers), and the
confidentiality and integrity of the messages.
Some of these protocols have the purpose of securing the transport of the communication by
implementing secure channels to transmit the messages; this is the case of TLS. In turn, end-to-end
security protocols focus on protecting the content of the messages themselves all the way from the
sender to the receiver, regardless of the communication channel.
As stated in the Introduction, in this thesis we focus on the second category, i.e., end-to-end
security protocols. Next, we review some fundamental cryptographic concepts underlying security
protocols for end-to-end private communication in email and messaging. We intend this to be a brief
overview, interested readers can refer to standard books on cryptography, such as [106, 127], for
further details on the topic.
2.4 Cryptographic Background
Encryption schemes enable two parties to communicate confidentially over insecure channels,
where an adversary can eavesdrop on the communication. As confidentiality is essential for privacy,
encryption is typically at the core of security protocols achieving privacy.
While encryption schemes provide secrecy for the messages, they do not provide guarantees
on the identity of the sender. Moreover, encrypted messages could be tampered by specific attacks
without the honest parties noticing the modification—e.g. when malleable encryption schemes,
such as ElGamal, or unauthenticated modes of encryption are used. To protect from MITM attacks,
protocols that guarantee integrity and authentication must be implemented.
In modern cryptography, encryption techniques are typically classified according to the concepts
of symmetric (private-key) and asymmetric (public-key) cryptography.
2.4.1 Private-key cryptography
In this setting, the sender and the receiver share a key k which is known to no one else and which
they agree on before the communication that they wish to secure.
Encryption. A symmetric encryption scheme consists of three algorithms: key generation, encryp-
tion and decryption. Given a sender and a receiver, the sender uses k to encrypt a message m, also
known as plaintext, thus obtaining c, a ciphertext which is transmitted to the receiver. Then, the
receiver recovers the original m from the received ciphertext by decrypting c using k.
Symmetric encryption schemes satisfy the correctness requirement: Deck(Enck(m)) = m, where
m is the original plaintext and Enc and Dec are respectively encryption and decryption algorithms
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that take k as an input parameter. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)[166] is the current
standard for symmetric encryption schemes.
Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Message authentication codes allow to detect if a re-
ceived message has been modified in transit or did not originate from the intended party.
A MAC consists of a key generation algorithm, a tag generation algorithm Mac and a verification
algorithm. The sender computes a tag t using the message m and the shared key k, i.e., t = Mack(m),
and then sends (m, t) to the receiver. Upon reception, the second party runs the verification algorithm
that takes as input k, m and t, to determine whether t is a valid tag of m.
Private-key cryptography has two important disadvantages. First, users have to share a different
key with each peer, which demands complex key management schemes. Second, two users need to
find a secure way for establishing a secret key, which turns out to be challenging for parties who have
never interacted before the communication or those whose single communication channel is the one
that they want to secure.
2.4.2 Public-key cryptography
To deal with the issues affecting symmetric cryptography, Diffie and Hellman [64] introduced in
1976 the notion of public key cryptography, proposing fundamental and revolutionary ideas that set
the ground for moving cryptography into the public domain.
Public-key cryptography enables two parties to communicate privately without having agreed on
any secret information in advance. In this setting, each user has two different mathematically related
keys: a public key which can be (as the name suggests) publicly disclosed, and a private key which
must remain secret and whose computation from the public key is computationally intractable.
Encryption. A sender uses the public key of the receiver pk to encrypt a message, generating the
corresponding ciphertext c. The receiver then uses the own private key sk to recover the original
message by decrypting c.
Asymmetric encryption schemes satisfy the correctness requirement: Decsk(Encpk(m)) = m,
where m is the original plaintext and Enc and Dec are respectively encryption and decryption
algorithms that take the public and private key as input respectively.
One of the most well-known and widely used asymmetric encryption schemes is the RSA
cryptosystem [154], by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman.
Digital signatures. Similar to MACs, digital signatures are schemes for demonstrating that a
message comes from a legitimate sender and that it was not altered while in transit, but here in
addition, the sender cannot deny having sent the message.
In a signature scheme, the signer uses the owned private key sk (here called a signing key) to
generate a tag—the signature—computed over a cryptographic hash of the message (we introduce
hash functions later in this section). The corresponding public key pk acts as a verification key,
allowing anyone who knows it to verify that a signed message was issued by the sender and that it
has not been modified from the original.
Besides the primary difference regarding that digital signatures are asymmetric crypto schemes,
whereas message authentication code (MAC)s are in the symmetric setting, a difference between
digital signatures and MACs resides in the properties of non-repudiation vs deniability. Roughly,
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digital signatures achieve non-repudiation, as the holder of a signing key cannot claim not having
issued a signed message, assuming that the secret key has not been compromised. Contrariwise, in
MACs all the parties sharing the secret key could have issued such signature, and thus, they only
protect the integrity of the messages. Depending on the intention, one or the other scheme might be
preferred; for instance, messaging solutions aim at emulating face-to-face private conversations, thus
they seek for deniability, while in email usually non-repudiation is the option, for instance to certify
that messages were issued by official sources.
2.4.3 Key exchange protocols
Along with public-key cryptography, Diffie and Hellman proposed secure interactive protocols
that allow two parties to jointly derive a secret key k using information that can be exchanged over a
public communication channel, and from which an adversary cannot benefit to derive k. These are
known as key exchange protocols and enable the use of private-key schemes bootstrapped by the
use of public-key ones; more specifically, the derived k can be used as a symmetric key to encrypt
and authenticate subsequent communication between the two parties involved.
The security of most of the widely used key exchange protocols depends crucially on the difficulty
of the underlying mathematical problem used to derive the shared key. In particular, the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange is based on the conjectured difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over a finite field
with a prime number of elements [64]. Note however that this protocol is susceptible to MITM attacks,
since it does not consider authentication of the parties involved in the exchange.
The Diffie–Hellman protocol introduced the idea of using asymmetric techniques, along with
number-theoretic hard problems, to address the key distribution problem. Indeed, closely related
variants of such a protocol remain at the core of standardized key-exchange protocols resilient to
MITM attacks, such as TLS.
2.4.4 Cryptographic hash functions
A hash function H takes as input a string s of arbitrary length and outputs a short fixed-length
string H(s), also known as a digest. Cryptographic hash functions are typically expected to have
three properties:
• Collision resistance: it is infeasible for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm to
find two values x and y such that x 6= y and H(x) = H(y). Informally, this property avoids the
mapping of two different inputs to the same digest3.
• Second-preimage resistance (weak collision resistance): given a uniformly distributed value x
it is infeasible for a PPT adversary to find a value y such that y 6= x and H(y) = H(x).
• Preimage resistance: given a uniformly distributed value y, it is infeasible for a PPT algorithm
to find a value s such that H(s) = y. This property indicates that H is a one-way function, i.e., it
is infeasible to be inverted.
By these definitions, collision resistant hash functions are also second preimage resistant; and
hash functions that are second preimage resistant are also preimage resistant.
Hash functions are particularly important for authentication, for instance, they are used in digital
signatures and in message authentication codes (MACs). Another frequent use concerns the
generation of checksums for verifying integrity of data.
3Note that if the hash function is defined for input strings shorter than the output length (i.e., the domain is smaller than
the range), collision-resistance can be trivially satisfied.
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2.5 Privacy and Authentication in Secure Email
2.5.1 Securing the communication channel
Based on symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, TLS is at the core of modern communications
securing the channel that transports the exchanges, independently of protocols used by applications.
In short, the client and the server first engage in a handshake protocol in order to agree on an
encryption algorithm and on the symmetric key (recommended to be of at least 256 bit-long) that
will be used for the rest of the exchanges in the session. The generation and the exchange of the
key are typically achieved via asymmetric cryptography, with some variation of a Diffie-Hellman key
exchange. The resulting session key is used for symmetric encryption of the data transmitted by one
party, and for decryption of the data received at the other end. Once the session is over, the session
key is discarded.
2.5.2 End-to-end security
Protocols for end-to-end security aim at maintaining the content of a message itself confidential
even if the email is intercepted in transit, and to make unauthorized alterations detectable by the end
points of the conversation (i.e., the users). These goals are respectively achieved by end-to-end
encryption, in which an email message is encrypted at the sender’s device before being released to
the network and it can only be decrypted by the holder of the decryption key after being retrieved
by the email client, and entity (a.k.a. identity) authentication, a process by which a user verifies the
identity of the communication party to ensure that it corresponds to the intended peer, in order to
prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
In the context of secure email, entity authentication is achieved via key validation (a.k.a. key
verification or key authentication), which asserts that a certain public key belongs to a specific
individual. A basic problem lies on how to disseminate or how to find public keys, and more
importantly, how to validate the obtained keys [50].
Various approaches have been developed to tackle this problem, which follow either a centralized—
e.g. certificate directories, trusted public key servers—or a decentralized trust model—e.g., web of
trust, fingerprint comparisons.
A centralized public key infrastructure (PKI) relies exclusively on certificate authorities (CAs) to
issue and manage certificates for keys. A public-key certificate is a digital document that contains
the name of the user and the corresponding authorized public key (along with additional information
about the key), signed using the key of the CA. Users can get the public keys of others directly (but
not exclusively) from the central authorities and validate the certificates using the public key of the
CA to check that they have a valid signature.
A main drawback of this approach is the inherent requirement for trusted entities, which turns
the latter into target of attacks. For instance, a famous CA attack on DigiNotar, a Dutch certificate
authority, resulted in the compromise of thousands of Gmail accounts in Iran as a result of a fraudulent
wildcard certificate issued for Google on behalf of the CA [66]; furthermore, DigiNotar went bankrupt
after the incident. Moreover, governments and authorities can exhaust legal means to ask server
owners to hand over stored data, such as decryption keys, violating the privacy of users.
In a decentralized (peer-to-peer) setting, users directly verify that a public key received via a
key distribution or a key exchange protocol belongs to the intended real-world entity, without the
intervention of a third party. As opposed to centralized settings, in this approach, there is not a single
party whose compromise would affect the security of the whole system.
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An approach for implementing a decentralized PKI is the use of public ledgers, which are publicly
verifiable logs of keys certificates. The fact that ledgers can be audited by anyone makes it possible
to detect certificates that have been mistakenly or maliciously issued by a certificate authority (CA),
exposing in consequence the malicious certificate authorities too. Although the underlying idea still
considers the use of certificates and a PKI, the trustworthiness of the CAs can be determined based
on publicly verifiable evidence. Examples of this approach are Certificate Transparency [113], a
ledger system for web certificates based on the use of a Merkle hash tree, and ARPKI [19], which is
resilient against an adversary capable of compromising a determined number of entities at any time
and whose security properties have been formally verified.
Note that, regardless of the trust model, the approaches mainly rely on central repositories
for storing keys, to ease their distribution among users. However, public-key servers used by
decentralized approaches differ from PKIs. In a PKI, the trust relies on one or various central
authorities who certify the keys, while public-key servers are just repositories aimed at supporting the
dissemination of keys, but where the authenticity of the content has no guarantees and instead, is
achieved by other methods.
End-to-end email security allows to effectively mitigate a wider variety of threats than protocols
securing the transport of the messages (e.g. identity spoofing). However, unlike in the latter,
end-to-end solutions require human intervention (even if minimally) for tasks that are not always
straightforward, such as the installation of specific software, and as previously mentioned, the
distribution and verification of cryptographic keys.
Those reasons are at the core of usability and scalability issues present in secure email solutions;
as a result these approaches have faced limited adoption [50].
2.6 Securing Email
We consider three relevant approaches for securing email. Clark et al. elaborate on these
approaches in [50], where they also provide an analysis of issues hindering further advances in
securing email.
Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) Born in the late 1980s, PEM was the first completely architected
and operational end-to-end secure email system, whose primary goals included confidentiality, data
origin authentication, connectionless integrity, non-repudiation with proof of origin, and transparency
to providers and to SMTP.
In particular, PEM defined file formats for storing and sending cryptographic keys and certificates,
that were adopted by later solutions. This approach also identified and solved some of the difficul-
ties still challenging secure email solutions, such as interoperability, hierarchical trust, certificate’s
validation and revocation, and anonymity.
Arguably, due to its slow evolution for Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) and to the
dependence on a hierarchical public key infrastructure (PKI) with a single root CA, which was never
deployed, PEM did not enjoy wide adoption.
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) S/MIME [177] is a standard for public
key encryption and signing of MIME data. Unlike in PEM, the trust model of S/MIME is based on
certificates generally issued and managed (e.g. revoked) by independent third-party CAs (certified by
centralized root CAs), therefore, internal communication of institutions fits in with this standard, as
typically each organization acts as a trusted root for its own certificates.
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Commercial solutions such as Microsoft Outlook and IBM Notes have an embedded implementa-
tion of the standard, which improves usability; these solutions are mostly adopted by enterprises and
governments who usually have support teams to deal with configuration tasks and users assistance.
A drawback of this approach is the difficulty for users to decide which CAs to trust, and interoper-
ability between key management servers. S/MIME has also limited adoption by individual users as
they must execute all the key management task themselves (create own key pairs and certificates,
search for the correct public key of a recipient, etc).
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) OpenPGP [89] is arguably the most widely used email encryption
standard. Derived from the PGP software, released in 1991 by Phil Zimmerman [196], the standard
proposes the use of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography plus data compression to encrypt
communication, and digital signatures for message authentication and integrity. OpenPGP includes
also methods to protect data at rest, such as passwords or backups. Open source implementations
include GnuPG (a.k.a GPG) [172] and Sequoia-PGP [189], the latter currently under development.
In this case, the trust model is implemented via a web of trust. The rough idea is that each user
creates and publishes their own public key to public key servers; the authenticity of these keys is
asserted by other individuals who have validated them in a trustworthy way. A popular way for doing
this is at so called key signing parties; for this event, the public keys (and the associated fingerprints)
of all the participants are distributed to them in advance, so that during the event, each fingerprint in
the list is presented to the audience who can verify that it is correct. Then, the owner of each key
presents an adequate proof of identity to certify the ownership. After the party, the assistants digitally
sign the public keys that they have trusted as a result of the previous process, thus forming a chain of
certifications [196].
Note that although in the web of trust model there is no dependence on trusted authorities
(anyone can certify others’ keys), the discovery and construction of certificate chains is supported by
public key servers, to store certificates and respond to key searches.
As in the case of the previous approaches, severe usability drawbacks have been identified in
PGP (e.g. [191]), principally, the need for users to understand at least general cryptographic concepts
regarding public key cryptography—which inevitably narrows down the scope of the audience—and
the need for verifying the ownership of public keys. Furthermore, the key authentication process
described above clearly has scalability issues, although it is a good non-commercial solution for small
closed groups.
2.7 Secure Email vs Secure Messaging
Despite the constant efforts put in securing email, secure email solutions have not reached the
degree of maturity and adoption that secure messaging solutions present. Because of that, using the
latter has been recommended by security experts and activists when privacy in the communication
is relevant4. However, email and messaging were conceived for different purposes and although
nowadays there is an overlap in functionalities, user’s expectations from each of them differ.
We discuss some of the differences next.
Synchronous vs asynchronous communication. Initially, instant messaging solutions required
both communicating parties to be online for the messages to be delivered (e.g. AOL Instant Messen-
ger); due to this requirement, the communication was synchronous—i.e., in real-time or “at the same
4E.g. cites in https://signal.org/
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time”. Messaging solutions have considerably evolved in such a way that current applications permit
the delivery of messages to users that are offline, thus emulating the asynchronicity of email.
The main functionalities provided by messaging solutions are inspired by face-to-face conver-
sations; for instance we can see a “typing” status when a peer is replying (somehow emulating
the presence of the peer), and users can immediately see the messages received (as opposed to
the need of opening an email to have access to the content). In addition, users can hold several
simultaneous conversations.
The use of email fits asynchronous communication, where users do not expect an immediate
answer or an answer at all. Typical uses of email include formal conversations, sending long texts and
file sharing. Among the expected functionalities are easy archiving and organization of messages
and files, and search over previous messages and attachments.
Email is also preferred for ubiquitous communication, while in messaging, the exchanges tend to
be among people that have met each other (although not necessarily). The interoperability of email is
another differentiating factor; as opposed to messaging, where both parties must be registered to
the same service, email is an open system, where an email address is all that is required to send a
message to anyone regardless of the provider.
Security and usability Two protocols are at the core of end-to-end encryption. While PGP was
designed for asynchronous, high-latency email communications, Off-the-record Messaging (OTR)
[42], a protocol originally published in 2004 for providing end-to-end encryption, deniability and
authentication, was designed for low-latency messaging environments (we elaborate on the OTR
protocol in Chapter 9). Both protocols have also different security goals, but while security in both
contexts reaches comparable levels, usability is a determining factor that has favored messaging
solutions.
In this regard, secure messaging and email share two long-standing challenges, namely entity
authentication and key management (e.g., see [157]). Mainly due to the use of closed architectures,
messaging solutions have managed to automate key management tasks. Presumably, this is the
main reason behind the successful adoption of such solutions, since the automation allows security
to be embedded by default, unnoticeable to users, who are not required to perform tasks in order to
have encryption, and require minimal intervention for entity authentication. As we saw in previous
sections, this is not the case for secure email solutions.
2.8 Pretty Easy Privacy
As previously mentioned, we conducted this research in the context of a partnership with pEp
Security SA. In consequence, throughout this thesis we consider p≡p, their software solution, as a
case study.
Pretty Easy Privacy (p≡p) is a software solution that offers end-to-end privacy-by-default in
digital written communications (e.g. email clients). The software is intended for a general audience,
therefore, it was designed considering functionality and usability features, such as interoperability,
minimal configuration required, accessibility, and simple usage.
A valuable aspect of p≡p is the focus on usable security; the solution builds upon well-established
cryptographic protocols and secure email standards to provide confidentiality via end-to-end encryp-
tion, and largely automates tasks that would require specific knowledge from non-expert users, e.g.,
key management. As such, the key contributions of p≡p include:
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Figure 2.2: p≡p for Android and Outlook (from https://www.pep.security).
• Automatic generation of a user’s key pair, key management and key discovery of user and
contact’s keys.
• A function to calculate so called trustwords (words in a natural language) from fingerprints,
intended to ease out-of-band authentication.
• An algorithm to determine the highest privacy rating that can be assigned to a message from/for
a specific partner, and the corresponding interface to inform the user about such a rating.
• Whenever possible, automatic end-to-end encryption of messages (opportunistic encryption).
• A protocol for the synchronization of keys among multiple devices of the same user, to make
encryption and decryption of messages possible in all of them (still under development).
2.8.1 Architecture of p≡p
The architecture of p≡p consists of three layers: Engine, Adapter and Application (Figure 2.3).
The Engine layer implements the logic and core functionalities of the system; the core component is
pEpEngine, where cryptographic functionalities are implemented upon existing standards for secure
end-to-end encrypted communications (e.g., OpenPGP, S/MIME) and well-known implementations
of such standards (e.g., GnuPG); pEpEngine is written in C99 and is released as an open source
library.
Adapters for interoperability of pEpEngine with different programming languages (e.g. Python
and ObjC) and the corresponding user interfaces, are implemented in the Adapter and Application
layers respectively.
Figure 2.3: Overview of p≡p’s architecture.
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Distribution specifications. Each installation of p≡p creates a local database of contacts, to
manage cryptographic keys and privacy ratings. Additionally, it creates a database from which the
trustwords for mutual authentication are retrieved; the trustwords database contains the exact same
data in all the distributions.
For key distribution and storage, p≡p relies on a fully decentralized model; private and public
keys are generated locally, and securely stored in the devices relying on GnuPG5. No p≡p central
servers are needed for the distribution of messages either, since p≡p acts as a service on top
of email services, and thus, the email exchanges are managed by the email providers. A detailed
description of p≡p can be found in [32].
The p≡p software is distributed as a mobile application or as plugins for desktop installations of
some existing email clients, such as Outlook and Enigmail. Although p≡p has already been released
for several platforms and the main functionalities of the product are implemented, the software is
still under active development. Current developments include coverage for other platforms (e.g. iOS,
macOS, browser add-ons), and synchronization between devices.
2.8.2 Privacy-by-default
The development of p≡p is in agreement with two principles introduced as regulations in the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [75].
Privacy-by-design: privacy must be approached from the earliest stages (design) and throughout
the complete development life-cycle of a service or product—not just in reaction to breaches.
Privacy-by-default: by default, personal data should be processed with the highest privacy protec-
tion settings—regarding the amount of data collected, the scope of their processing, the period
of their storage and their accessibility—so that it becomes the user’s choice what information to
make accessible for others.
In this case, privacy-by-default is achieved via trust-on-first-use, opportunistic encryption and
out-of-band (OOB) authentication: upon installation, p≡p generates a public-private key pair and
automatically stores and manages contacts. The public key of a user is attached to outgoing emails
when a key of the recipient has not been stored. Received keys are automatically stored for future
use (trust-on-first-use) and outgoing emails are automatically encrypted when a public key of the
intended receiver is available (opportunistic encryption).
For the entity authentication process, p≡p introduces the so called trustwords, which are natural
language words that users have to compare via an out-of-band channel—e.g., in person, video-call.
This approach requires neither a PKI nor a trusted third party (TTP).
2.8.3 p≡p Trustwords
Keys in p≡ p are identified by the full fingerprint of the public key. Manual key-fingerprint
comparison is a well-established method for entity authentication; yet, the approach has been shown
to perform poorly for the intended goal (e.g., [60]). As a solution, in addition to the hexadecimal
representation, PGP allows fingerprints to appear as a series of so-called “biometric words”, which
are phonetically different English aimed at simplifying the comparison for humans and to make it less
prone to misunderstandings [102].
Trustwords in p≡p follow the same idea; they are natural language words mapping hexadecimal
strings intended to allow two peers to authenticate each other after having exchanged public keys
5https://www.gnupg.org/
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Figure 2.4: Trustwords (from https://www.pep.security).
in an opportunistic manner. In short, such hexadecimal strings represent a combined fingerprint
obtained by applying an XOR operation to the fingerprints associated to the public keys being
authenticated. Each block of 4 hex characters of the combined fingerprint is mapped to a word in
a predefined trustwords dictionary. For instance, the extract F482 E952 2F48 618B 31DC 5428
could be mapped to kite temporal brother juice situation broken.
The main differences with the “biometric words” are the availability of trustwords in different
languages, which improves the security for non-English speakers, and the use of longer words, which
allows the creation of a larger trustwords dictionary in which the likelihood of phonetic collisions
among the elements is decreased. Considerations regarding the number of words in the dictionaries
and the length of the words themselves are further discussed in [31].
2.8.4 Trust Rating and Visual Indicators
According to the security of the communication channel, the cryptographic settings available
and some criteria regarding the key, p≡p assigns a numeric privacy (or trust) rating per message.
To inform users of this rating, the assigned number is first mapped into one of four user-friendly
categories, and then displayed in the message along with a colored icon which mimics the semantics
of a traffic light [124]. The user ratings are described in Table 2.1.
General design choices and principles of p≡p are detailed in [32].
2.9 Formal Verification of Secure Systems
Security and correctness of systems are typically assured by meticulous functional testing and
by the application of good development practices. However, although these pragmatic approaches
ensure the correct behavior of systems, they lack mathematical foundations and a formalism for
describing processes, expressing properties and proving theorems that concern the security of such
systems.
As security protocols are at the core of most of the current distributed communication systems, to
achieve secure communications and secure information processing, proofs of security are fundamen-
tal in all the stages of the development process (design, implementation, compilation, etc.) to ensure
specific guarantees, or to detect flaws in a protocol.
In fact, implementations of security protocols that aim to comply with certification standards for
Information Technology Security6 must be built upon a formally verified design to achieve the highest
6E.g., the “Evaluation Criteria for Information Technology Security” (ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009). https://www.iso.org/
standard/50341.html
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RATING DESCRIPTION MESSAGE FOR-
MAT
MISTRUSTED The system has evidence of the communication partner not being







Encryption/decryption of a message cannot be properly executed.
E.g., when the recipient does not use any secure email solution, or
does not have cryptographic keys (unsecure), or the message has
no recipient yet, hence, the privacy level cannot be determined
(unknown).
Plaintext
SECURE The user has a valid public key for the recipient, however the key
has not been authenticated.
Encrypted and
signed
TRUSTED The user has the public key of the recipient and both peers have
authenticated their respective keys.
Encrypted and
signed
Table 2.1: p≡p trust ratings
certification levels (EAL7, EAL7+) [81], which however, in practice are only awarded to applications
controlling high-risk situations.
A proof of security for the design of a protocol guarantees that the theoretical model grants the
proven properties in the presence of a specific adversary; however, flaws may still be introduced
when the protocol is implemented or furthermore, at compilation time. Therefore, ideally end-user
applications should be formally verified, but security proofs of implementations are very challenging.
Two main approaches prevail for attaining a verified implementation; in both, we start from an
informal description of the protocol and then, either
a) build a formal model in a language FL accepted by a verifier; then, iteratively verify and refine
the model, assisted by automatic tools. When the model satisfies the required properties,
generate the corresponding source code in a programming language P; or
b) program the protocol directly in P and then, from the existing source code generate a formal
model in FL, based on predefined rules. FL can be used as input for a verifier.
The first approach is the ideal as per good practices in software development, because errors are
detected in early stages. Such an approach can be implemented for instance using F*, a relatively
recent programming language aimed at program verification based on dependent types, which uses
an SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) solver as a reasoning engine. Code in other languages, such
as OCaml, C and WASM can be extracted once a program has been successfully verified; this allows
to have running applications with verified security. F* is for instance being used for building a verified
replacement for the whole HTTPS stack in the Project Everest [152].
The second approach is suitable for already existing implementations; relevant work on this
approach includes [8], [6] and [187].
The use of verified compilers complements the formal verification at the source code level (e.g.
by program proof or model checking). As the term suggests, a verified compiler has been proved
to be exempt from miscompilation issues. The corresponding proof of correctness guarantees that
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the produced executable code behaves as specified by the semantics of the source code, hence,
properties formally verified on the source code automatically hold for the compiled executable. A
relevant verified compiler for the C programming language is CompCert [115], which is largely
programmed in Coq.
In this thesis, we focus on the verification of theoretical models, i.e., designs of protocols. The
main reason behind is that, by considering the study of p≡p’s design instead of the implementation,
we can apply techniques from a mature area of research, namely symbolic verification (for which
provide a more detailed introduction in Chapter 4), while being able to focus in exploring further
problems related to securing email communications.
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3A HIDDEN REQUIREMENT: EXTRACTING
SPECIFICATIONS OF SECURITY
PROTOCOLS
Implementation of cryptographic algorithms has for long time been known to be a delicate and
complex task. As the security of systems highly depends on such components, a recommended
practice is to make use of cryptographic libraries that have been proved secure (e.g. [147, 197]) or
those whose continued successful use serves as evidence of their robustness (e.g. [28]).
Nowadays, we can find cryptographic libraries for many popular languages such as Java, Phython
and C (see [192]). Implementations in the latter prevail largely due to the efficient runtime performance
of programs in C—given that C is a relatively low-level programming language with simple data
structures, the translation of source into machine code is quite straightforward—which is a valuable
feature considering that cryptographic functions involve mathematical operations inherently expensive
for the CPU [72].
Yet, the subset of existing cryptographic libraries that have been proven secure via mathematical-
based techniques is very limited; hence, more than increasing the number of new implementations,
we believe important to prove secure those already in use.
To analyze cryptographic protocols implemented in libraries we require a clear definition of the
protocol’s logic, along with the parties involved, the messages exchanged and the cryptographic
primitives used. Ideally, software producers should offer insights on their solutions; however, it is
rather common to encounter that documentation is missing, outdated or even restricted—e.g. for
proprietary solutions as in the case of WhatsApp.
Non-adherence to good development practices or the adherence to specific software development
methodologies are some of the causes behind the lack of documentation. In agile methods, for
instance, one of the principles states: “Working software over comprehensive documentation” [23].
The documents to be generated (if any) are usually determined by the needs and experience of each
development team; in fact, even commented code could be considered as documentation.
Therefore, to understand a piece of source code, analysts often resort to software reverse
engineering (RE)1, a technique for scrutinizing a system with the purpose of representing it at higher
levels of abstraction. The characteristics of the software to be reversed limit the approaches and
tools that can be applied, and the kind of diagrams that can be retrieved.
Today, there are stable and good-performing tools for automating the creation of diagrams—
mostly compliant with the UML/ISO standard for modeling systems—from code. Motivated by the
need to understand how a system works, such RE tools usually take as input a running application.
However, this input does not always exist. As previously discussed, security protocols are often
encapsulated in libraries without executable files.
1Remark that in the context of security protocols’ analysis, RE frequently refers to reversing executable binaries or
programs to source code, for instance through system-monitoring tools, disassemblers, debuggers and decompilers. Here,
we refer to RE at the code level, i.e., reversing source code to a conceptual model.
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When we started studying p≡p, there was relevant technical documentation, neither of the
protocols implemented nor of the source code. User manuals and a white paper [79] were available,
but technical documentation consisted mainly on comments in the code. Still, such specifications
were essential for studying the protocols presented on this thesis.
The content of this chapter results from our experience towards defining an abstraction of the
security protocols implemented in p≡p. We present a methodical approach that combines the use
of existing RE tools with manual tasks, for obtaining a concrete high-level definition of a security
protocol whose core algorithms are services provided by a library. As the steps are independent of
the implementation, this approach is generic enough to be applied to any C library.
The technique that we propose is based on software reverse engineering and undertakes the
following assumptions: (i) open source code in C available, (ii) unknown specifications of the protocol,
(iii) unavailability or scarcity of documentation, and (iv) inaccessibility to any application requesting
the library’s services to fully set up the protocol.
We also intend this chapter to bring insights on the state-of-the-art, capabilities, and limitations
of existent RE tools. As a result of surveying, selecting, and experimenting with tools that could be
appropriate for our specific problem, in Section 3.2 we compile a list of state-of-the-art tools relevant
for each step of the approach.
3.1 Retrieving a Protocol from a Library in C
We started by searching for an automatic tool fulfilling all of the following requirements: performing
RE of code without an executable file, supporting the language C, and being capable to generate
at least one kind of interaction diagram (e.g., sequence, message). Our quest included internet
searches, IT blogs and forums, academic papers, and informal consultations with experienced
software developers and architects working in industry. We considered both, commercial and non-
commercial tools, although for the last ones we only tested the demo versions, which in general
provide full features for a limited period of time.
Despite the search scope, we did not find a tool meeting all of the constraints, thus, we devised
a streamline process where we combine different tools (see Table 3.1) to increasingly extract and
gather pieces of information until there is enough knowledge for abstracting a model of the protocols.
The process has five steps.
Step (1): Extract the API specification of the library
Input: Compiled Libraries Output: The APIs
Libraries offer functionalities through well-defined application programming interfaces(APIs),
which are the access point to the services provided. This encapsulation of code eases, among others,
modularity, portability, and extension of functionality.
The first step to get an overview of the services that a library provides—and possibly a hunch of
what they do according to their names—is to export the API specification from the compiled binary.
A couple of tools for performing this step are DLL EXPORT VIEWER [165] for dll files or the regular
export option for jar files. An MS-DOS command-line option is dumpbin <dll_file>.
Once we learn the (names of the) functionalities that can be invoked, the next goal is to understand
what exactly they do, what are their constituent steps and how the protocol’s components interact
when calling them. Interaction diagrams are particularly suitable to capture this behavior as they
show sequences of messages sent among components of a system (e.g., files, hardware), including
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passed parameter values and events occurring in between [70]. Unfortunately, since a library does
not run by itself, there is no easy way to gather this information.
An intuitive solution would be to implement a simple application with the purpose of invoking
functions from the library; the resulting executable file could then serve as input for existing RE tools
to automatically generate the corresponding diagrams. However, the problem becomes circular:
having no documentation, we do not know how to invoke the functions and, moreover, we do not
know yet what they do.
Note also that, although in general open source code compilation is feasible, this task is not
necessarily easy; take for instance projects that depend on several third-party libraries, require
hierarchical compilations, or need additional tasks that prevent to automate the process.
The next steps aim at understanding how the library works.
Step (2): Create an overview of the system architecture
Input: Library’s source code Output: graphs and diagrams
This step’s goal is to create a global picture of the library’s components and of the way in which
they are related. Dependency graphs and collaboration diagrams accomplish this purpose. A
convenient tool capable of automatically generating them is DOXYGEN [96], the standard tool for
creating documentation by annotating C++ sources, but it supports more programming languages, C
among them. The documentation is by default generated in HTML.
A similar tool is OOVAIDE [135], capable of generating classes and sequence diagrams. This
tool, however, was conceived for the Object Oriented approach and thus the functionality with C is
incomplete. Auxiliary documents that can be created are UML class diagrams or the analogous file
diagrams for C code [70]; they depict the relation among .c and .h files composing the implementation.
Call graphs provide another useful visualization of the dependency among functions; in call graphs
the nodes represent functions and incoming directed edges indicate that the function in such node is
called by the function on the opposite side of the edge (see Fig. 3.1).
Using the output from this step and keywords in the API functions’ names (step 1), the analyst can
identify the files and functions that contain code related to the logic of the protocol to be reversed, and
discard code irrelevant for the protocol’s description (e.g., files implementing system’s IO operations
or interaction with databases).
Step (3): Retrieve the algorithms of relevant functions
Input: Library’s source code Output: Flowcharts
Call graphs from the previous step provide already an idea of a function’s intricacy in terms of the
number of sub-functions invoked, but the order in which those sub-functions are called is missing.
The goal here is to retrieve the algorithm that an identified relevant function follows. CODE VISUAL TO
FLOWCHART (CVF) [77] converts procedural code into flowcharts and works with both, executable
and non-executable declarations. The flowchart provides an easier way to follow the workflow of an
algorithm, but since all the instructions are mapped into the diagram, it still needs to be refined by
extracting only those instructions directly concerning the main purpose of the algorithm. C programs
in particular contain a lot of low-level instructions, for instance to handle memory and pointers; code
related to exceptions handling is also irrelevant in the normal flow of a protocol. After performing this
step, the analyst has a flowchart with instructions related only to the protocol’s logic or containing
important assignments (Fig. 3.2).
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Figure 3.1: Call graph obtained by DOXYGEN for the function get_message_trustwords.
Step (4): Identify relevant calls, and group instructions
Input: Flowchart/Code Output: Flowchart/Code
At the end of step (3) we have a sketch of the algorithm performed by a function but it is still too
detailed. The objective in this step is to abstract the instructions into a higher-level conceptual model;
the representation is still a flowchart/code but instead of direct programming instructions, the content
will be in terms of tasks. For that purpose, we introduce two rules which are similar to the extract and
inline refactoring methods, used principally to reorganize code for better reuse and readability [80]:
1. Detect instructions linked to a single more general task and replace them all with a newly defined
method with a meaningful name related to the purpose of the task.
2. For each function call, review the implementation details and if they are relevant to define the
protocol, mark the function (e.g. with ‘*’) to be treated later.
These rules might be applied recursively on the functions marked in 2. It is the analyst’s duty to
determine when an adequate level of abstraction has been reached. An example of the application of
these rules is shown in Figure 3.3.
Step 4 requires navigation through the files and the code itself, thus, any IDE would be in principle
enough. We worked with VISUAL STUDIO 2015 [128]; a feature worth mentioning of this tool is the
“call hierarchy” view of a function, since observing the references to and from a function helps to
determine whether it has a principal or an auxiliary role.
Step (5): Create a diagram of the Protocol
Input: Flowcharts Output: Message Sequence Chart
At this point, the analyst has a deep understanding of the examined functions. The last step
consists in interpreting the previously obtained flowcharts to reconstruct a representation of the
protocol in an appropriate notation. There are many accepted notations; here we adopted Message
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DYNAMIC_API . . .
get_message_trustwords ( . . . ) {
/ / v e r i f y t h a t the v a r i a b l e s e x i s t
asser t ( k e y l i s t ) ;
asser t (msg ) ;
asser t ( received_by ) ;
i f ( ! ( k e y l i s t && msg && received_by ) )
r e t u r n ILLEGAL_VALUE ;
i f ( k e y l i s t == NULL) {
message ∗dst = NULL ;





Figure 3.2: Left: extract of the function get_message_trustwords for retrieving words to authenticate a peer.
Right: flowchart after removal of instructions related to parameters checking.
Before step (4)
char ∗source1 = id1−>f p r ;
char ∗source2 = id2−>f p r ;
i n t source1_len = s t r l e n ( source1 ) ;
i n t source2_len = s t r l e n ( source2 ) ;
i n t max_len ;
∗words = NULL;
∗wsize = 0;
max_len = ( source1_len > source2_len?source1_len : source2_len ) ;
char∗ XORed_fpr = ( char∗ ) ( c a l l o c (1 , max_len + 1 ) ) ;
∗(XORed_fpr + max_len ) = ’ \0 ’ ;
char∗ r e s u l t _ c u r r = XORed_fpr + max_len − 1;
char∗ source1_curr = source1 + source1_len − 1;
char∗ source2_curr = source2 + source2_len − 1;
/ / c reate a hex s t r i n g by xor ing char by char the given f i n g e r p r i n t s
whi le ( source1 <= source1_curr && source2 <= source2_curr ) {
. . .
∗ r e s u l t _ c u r r = xor_hex ;
r e s u l t _ c u r r−−; source1_curr−−; source2_curr−−;
}
. . .
/ / r e t r i e v e a l i s t o f words corresponding to the s t r i n g XORed_fpr
s ta tus = t rus twords ( session , XORed_fpr , lang , &the_words ) ;
After step (4)
XORed_fpr = c rea teSharedF ingerp r in t ( fp r_ id1 , f p r _ i d 2 )
s ta tus = t rus twords ( session , XORed_fpr , lang , &the_words ) ;
Figure 3.3: By rule 1, we create the function createSharedFingerprint to abstract the block of code, excluding
the last instruction. By 2, we leave the call to trustwords as a function.
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Figure 3.4: Extract of the MSC representation of the abstracted protocol, created with PlantUML.
Sequence Charts (MSC), defined in SDL2 which is a language for unambiguously describe the
behavior of distributed systems.
This step is completely manual since it requires the analyst not only to connect information from
the flowcharts, but also to use any domain knowledge to come up with the complete scenario of the
protocols, including the actors involved. The participants can be for instance derived from the input
parameters of the functions; similarly, calls to databases imply the existence of a repository, which
might need to be considered as an actor in the protocol model. The analyst’s domain knowledge can
come from different sources: a general notion about the intention of the protocol can be learned in
documents regarding final products that make use of the library; often implementations include test
files, which can provide examples of functions calls; user manuals can also contain hints about the
components of the protocol and their interaction.
The offer of modeling tools for MSC is vast, however, we consider more efficient the use of tools
that automatically generate diagrams from scripts, given that the scripting languages’ syntax tend to
be simple and intuitive for programmers. A good performing tool in such category is PLANTUML [141],
which supports all kinds of UML and some non-UML diagrams, and provides an online application
as well as plugins to be integrated with many different IDEs. ZENUML [138] is another tool in this
category; it has a syntax closer to C code an can be used online or as a Chrome extension, but it is
very limited in terms of the diagram that it produces as well as in the conversion to image formats.
3.2 Evaluation and Discussion
The following outcomes report our experience applying the reverse engineering method presented
in Section 3.1, for creating MSC diagrams corresponding to the protocols implemented in the core
2The Specification and Description Language (SDL): http://www.sdl-forum.org/SDL/.
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Table 3.1: Summary of RE tools reviewed in our methodology. (*)These tools do output sequence diagrams
from non-executable code but only from Object Oriented (OO) languages. Although they do not work with our
requirements, we include them as a reference.
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component of p≡ p, namely pEpEngine (introduced in Section 2.8.1), which provides the main
functionalities upon which the p≡p protocols are built—e.g., key management, encryption and trust
assignment.
The process was entirely executed by the author of this thesis, who has approximately 4 years
of professional experience in software design and development. Steps (1) and (2) can be executed
relatively fast: one day was enough to generate the documents, scan them and identify the relevant
functions, using a DLL file provided by our industrial partner. Step (3) requires the analyst to be
careful not to discard meaningful information; 1 day per function was invested in this task. Step (4)
is the most time-consuming because here is where the real understanding of a program occurs;
the analyst has to decipher the control flow statements—such as conditions and loops—and try to
reconstruct the logic behind. Reconstructing the algorithm of a function containing around 500 lines
of code took up to two weeks of work, having no previous experience using the tools—but we believe
that this time can be considerably shortened with practice and familiarity with the tools. The final
transition from step (4) to step (5) was achieved in one week. Certainly, these times are relative
and depend significantly on the complexity of the system; small files can contain very complex logic,
requiring hence longer time to be understood. The time we have reported for the work is only meant
to give a relative estimation to whoever wants to contemplate the possibility of applying this technique
in a project.
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An appropriate selection of the tool to be used at each step is important, as feeling more confident
or understanding better the output of a specific tool could improve the analyst’s performance. We
included two well-known commercial tools in this research: RATIONAL RHAPSODY FOR ARCHITECT
(RRA) [98] and ENTERPRISE ARCHITECT [169]. In general, with C libraries they do a good job for
class diagrams and flowcharts; RRA’s flowcharts are slightly the most comprehensive from all the
tools. For sequence diagrams though, both commercial tools rely on exploring execution traces from
running applications, thus, they are useless for automation in our case.
According to our experience, this method is suitable to be applied in small and medium size
projects since manual parts would become exhausting with very lengthy code. We consider
pEpEngine to be medium-big size given that it consists of approximately 70 files, from which the
longest has around 2524 lines of code while the shortest contains around 40.
The proposed technique is straightforward and suggests the use of automatic tools to perform
the main tasks; still, it unavoidably requires human interaction to connect the steps. Nonetheless,
the approach presents clear advantages over purely manual RE: at the end of each step there is
already a document concerning the source code which, in a situation where documentation is still
missing, supplies the analyst with means to promote discussion and knowledge exchange with the
development team; those intermediate diagrams also help analysts to contextualize faster their mental
process after periods of interrupted analysis (in case that they occur). Another important advantage
is that, even before starting the code inspection, the analyst has an organized and complete overview
of the library’s structure and of the relation among functions; this is beneficial to address the RE
efforts in the adequate direction. Moreover, as a result of the code inspection analysts become more
aware of the vulnerable points of the system and might detect security properties to be considered in
the analysis.
3.3 Related Tools and Approaches
The most general approach to automatically reconstruct protocol specifications aims at describing
the protocol from an application perspective and consists in observing the code at runtime to record
sequences of the executed actions. A survey by Tiwari and Prasad [174] reports on tools following
this approach. A close problem to ours is treated by Tonella et al. [175], who work on reverse
engineering code in C++; however, their algorithm relies on the number of objects instances and so it
is not directly applicable in our case, which is not object oriented.
A related technique to infer application-level protocol specifications relies on network traffic
observation. It concerns network protocols (e.g., HTTP, RPC and CIFS/SMB) implemented in any
layer of the OSI model3. The central idea is to automatically reverse engineer the protocol message
formats of an application from its network trace. This method is especially useful when a file to
execute the protocol is unavailable because it only requires a system implementing the protocol to
be running, even if such a system is not running locally. Narayan et al. [132] worked on a survey
of automatic protocol RE tools using this approach. Those tools seem to be mostly academic; a
commercial one is VISUALETHER PROTOCOL ANALYZER [76], which uses the output of Wireshark—a
network protocol analyzer—to generate sequence and call-flow diagrams.
On the research side, Avalle et al. [11] survey state-of-the-art techniques for automatically
getting security proofs of formal models closely depicting the logic of protocol implementations. They
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model
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comment extensively on work that extracts models from code to further validate widely deployed
implementations written in C (rather than libraries as in our case), limited to a subset of the language.
In particular, they conclude that approaches for model extraction do not target arbitrary legacy code,
instead they introduce some restrictions on how the code should be written, for instance by adding
annotated semantic information. A relevant technique in this realm was developed by Aizatulin et
al. [8]. To automatically generate a formal model from an implementation in C, analysts need to
add annotations on the original source code; note therefore, that they require knowledge on the C
language and to have at least a broad knowledge of the protocol.
Finally, Wikipedia offers a compilation of available tools for automatic reverse engineering into
UML diagrams [193]. Unfortunately, the information sources are poorly referenced; nonetheless, at
least the information regarding the tools mentioned in this chapter is aligned with the information
presented there.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
We realized that, although there exists mature and efficient software for reverse engineering exe-
cutable applications—mostly for the Object Oriented paradigm—current solutions for non-executable
implementations still require a lot of manual effort, which could be minimized by having access to
people knowing about the implementation or to functionality-related documents.
Adhering to the approach presented in this chapter, we abstracted specifications of the p≡p key
distribution and p≡p authentication protocols implemented in pEpEngine, along with the algorithms
of relevant functions. These models provide the base of our formal study of the protocols, which is
the subject of future chapters.
As a final note, we realized that the lack of specifications is much more common than it seems.
A considerable amount of research on formal verification of protocols reports having performed RE
related tasks in order to obtain the models used in their work (e.g. [52]). Although we presented the
method by addressing libraries in C, the underlying steps are also applicable to structure a manual
RE process or to optimize RE tasks with similar conditions. We therefore hope that this chapter
serves as support to others for reducing the time and effort invested in required tasks which are not
necessarily linked to security analysis.
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PART I
Formal methods for the analysis of
security protocols and ceremonies
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4FORMAL VERIFICATION OF SECURITY
PROTOCOLS
In this part of the thesis we focus on the formal analysis of secure email protocols. This short
chapter is aimed at providing a brief introduction to both, the area of research and the principal
technique in which we rely.
4.1 Proofs of Security: Approaches
Security protocols are a finite number of communicating processes running in parallel, that rely
on the use of cryptographic primitives for achieving various security goals in insecure environments.
Security protocols are critical components of any distributed security architecture; in particular, they
underlie current secure digital communications. However, designing distributed systems is already
error-prone; moreover, functional testing cannot be used to asses the security of a protocol as flaws
appear only in the presence of an adversary and might be caused by extremely subtle things that
testing cannot hope to detect, e.g., a mistake in the order and way in which a message is exchanged.
Yet, in a security protocol execution all the participants exchange messages through a network
typically controlled by the adversary. Thus, providing strong guarantees about the achievement of the
security goals is essential.
Two approaches have been developed for modeling security protocols within a mathematical
framework, which enables the derivation of rigorous proofs of security: the computational (or
cryptographic) approach and the symbolic (or formal methods) approach (interested readers can
refer to [38] for expanding on the topic).
Computational models typically capture the cryptographic games used for standard security
definitions in the literature (e.g. see [106] for an introduction on cryptographic schemes and proofs).
In these models, messages are represented with bitstrings, primitives are functions on bitstrings, and
the attacker is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) Turing machine. Proofs of security rely on so
called standard cryptographic assumptions, which refer to the computational hardness of solving
certain problems in number theory—such as the integer factorization problem. These proofs are
either completely manual or they require a considerable degree of interaction with dedicated tools
(e.g. CryptoVerif [35]).
Symbolic models describe the interaction among participants and the exchange of messages.
Here, messages are modeled as terms and cryptographic primitives are assumed to work as perfect
black boxes operating with those terms; the attacker is restricted to use only the primitives modeled.
Proofs of security are based on formal verification methods, which have simplified the development
of automated tools for protocol verification (e.g., ProVerif [36], Tamarin [20]).
Note that while symbolic proofs are relatively easy but at a high level of abstraction, computational
proofs provide strong security guarantees at the cost of being tedious and highly error prone.
Therefore, an area of research attempts to combine both approaches, to simplify computational
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proofs. Under additional assumptions, the goal is to prove security guarantees in the computational
model by hinging on guarantees proven in the symbolic one [54].
Given their characteristics, computational models are more suitable for security proofs related to
the cryptographic primitives involved in a protocol, such as signatures and encryption, while symbolic
models allow to seek flaws in the logic of a protocol.
Our work resides mainly in the symbolic model, given that we study security protocols built on top
of proven cryptographic primitives.
4.2 The Symbolic Model
Formal verification of security protocols has been successfully applied in diverse domains, from
the commonly cited Needham-Schroeder key transport protocol, found vulnerable to a specific
adversary almost 20 years after its publication [118], to authentication standards (e.g., [18, 57]) and
TLS 1.3 [91], to name a few. The results of this approach evidence that security protocols can be
vulnerable even without breaking the underlying cryptography.
Multiple techniques have been developed for modeling and analyzing security protocols (e.g. [46,
126, 159, 137, 2]), which are extensively covered by the literature. Some comprehensive texts on
foundations of symbolic protocol verification and related techniques include [125, 53] and references
therein.
Invariably, in order to determine whether a protocol is secure against an adversary with specific
capabilities, three elements need to be formally defined: the model of the protocol, the set of security
properties to be proved, and the threat model in which the verification is framed.
Then, rules in a deduction system usually model what an adversary can compute.
Threat model. The standard adversarial model is determined by three assumptions, introduced by
Dolev and Yao [69] in 1881:
1. Cryptography is perfect. So, for instance, a message can be decrypted only by someone
knowing the decryption key.
2. Messages are abstract terms, and thus, either the adversary learns the complete message or
nothing.
3. The network is under full control of the adversary, who can read, modify, insert, delete and
transmit messages.
Protocol model Two elements need to be considered: the messages and the actions of the
participants. There are different formalisms for this task. In this thesis, we use the applied pi calculus,
which we introduce in Section 4.4.
4.3 Security Properties
Most security properties can be classified into two categories: trace and equivalence properties.
Trace or reachability properties: they can be defined on each run of the protocol and usually are
used to ensure that unwanted behavior is not reachable (hence the name) in any of the execution
traces (possible runs) of a protocol. A property is satisfied when it holds for all traces in the
model. Weak secrecy and authentication are usually modeled as trace properties.
Equivalence or indistinguishability properties: they are defined in terms of the notion of the adver-
sary’s incapability of distinguishing two given protocols. For instance, given the models of two
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protocols: a protocol P under study, and its specification S, if an adversary interacting with
one of them cannot decide whether the interaction occurs with P or with S, then P is indistin-
guishable from S, which implies that the protocol meets the given specification. Strong secrecy
and anonymity are examples of equivalence properties. Indistinguishably is also known as
observational equivalence.
Automating proofs of equivalence properties is more difficult than automating proofs of trace
properties, since they need to be expressed in terms of relations between traces.
The properties that concern our analysis fall in the first category. For further reference on
equivalence properties, there are several sources; [47] provides an informative coverage on related
work, in addition to introducing a procedure for verifying equivalence properties
The fundamental properties that concern secure communications are related to privacy and
authentication. Informally, they refer to the following:
• Syntactic (weak) secrecy: the adversary E does not learn the content of a message s. This
is usually expressed as a trace property: a state in which the knowledge of E allows the
adversary to deduce s, is never reached.
• Strong secrecy (non-interference): an adversary E cannot detect any change in a message
s—as opposed to weak secrecy where E could have partial knowledge of a message, and yet,
not know the final value of s. Even if the content of s belongs to a publicly known set of values
(e.g., the name of candidates in an election), E cannot distinguish the particular value of s
(e.g., the vote of a person). Strong secrecy is an equivalence property.
• Authentication: generally, this property ensures two participants of a protocol that they are
interacting with the participant that they believe, i.e., a participant A runs the protocol apparently
with a participant B, if and only if B runs the protocol apparently with A. There are many variants
of this definition, we will formalize some of them in the corresponding upcoming chapters.
4.4 ProVerif and the Applied-pi Calculus
ProVerif [36] is an automatic verifier for cryptographic protocols under the Dolev-Yao model
(introduced above). The tool’s proof derivation strategy consists in abstractly representing a given
protocol by a set of Horn clauses, and then applying a resolution algorithm on those clauses, to
determine whether a given fact can be derived from the clauses.
Protocols in ProVerif are modeled in a dialect of the applied pi calculus [1], a process calculus
extended with cryptographic formalizations, which enables specifying and reasoning about security
protocols. Participants are represented as processes, whose input parameters symbolize the initial
knowledge possessed by the participant. The exchanged messages are represented by terms sent
over public or private channels. A so called equational theory allows to define an equivalence relation
over terms, cryptographic primitives, and other functions occurring in the protocol; this equations are
translated by ProVerif into inference rules for the resolution algorithm.
The core syntax of ProVerif, which we define next, largely corresponds to the applied pi calculus
language. The enriched grammar of ProVerif is fully specified in [45] and further details on the
verification process can be found in [38].
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Terms. Given the sets V and N of variables and names respectively, and F a set of function
symbols (known as a signature) each with an arity, the set of terms T (V ,N ,F ) is defined as:
M,N ::= x ∈ V | a ∈N | f (M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ F
Typically, variables represent unspecified parts of a message and can be substituted by terms,
names model channels and atomic data—e.g. keys or nonces—and functions represent cryptographic
primitives, such as encryption, decryption, and hash functions.
As a remark, terms in ProVerif are typed; while this helps to detect mistakes in the protocol
specifications, to expand the scope of detected attacks typing is not considered in the verification
process. The definition above is closer to applied pi calculus, which is untyped, however, the code
that we developed for this thesis and which is included in Appendix A, is typed.
Processes. Processes represent programs which implement the actions and interactions of the
participants in the protocol. For M,N ∈ T , the grammar of processes is as follows:
P,Q ::= 0 | out(N,M);P | in(N,x);P | P|Q | !P | newa;P |
if M then P else Q | let x = M in P else Q
Roughly, the process 0 (nil) is interpreted as a process that does nothing. The output process
(out) outputs the message M on the channel N and then executes P. The input process (in) waits
for a message on channel N, and upon reception, binds x to the input message and executes P. P|Q
is the parallel composition of P and Q. Replication (!) behaves as an infinite number of copies of P
running in parallel. The restriction process (new) creates a new private name a and then executes P,
which allows the introduction of fresh values. The conditional construct behaves as usual. Finally,
if M is a valid term, let binds x to M and then executes P; if the evaluation of M fails, then Q is
executed.
Equational theories. An equational theory E is a set of equations u = v, where u and v are terms
in T (V ,N ,F ). The equivalence relation =E is closed w.r.t. reflexivity, transitivity and substitutions.
Equational theories allow to express properties of cryptographic primitives, functions and data
structures, in the term algebra.
For instance, an equational theory defining the properties of asymmetric encryption is:
adec(aenc(m,pubKey(sk)),sk) = m
which models that, given a pair of secret and public keys (sk, pubKey(sk)), a message m encrypted
with pubKey(sk) can only be obtained by decrypting the ciphertext with sk.
Events. Events are constructs of the form event e(t).P, where e is taken from a set of function
symbols Ev 6= F . Events allow to annotate or mark important states reached by the protocol and do
not affect the protocol’s behavior; they are similar to breakpoints or flags used in software development
for debugging purposes.
Correspondence properties Correspondence properties (originally called assertions) [194] are
expressions of the form e =⇒ e1∧ ...∧ ei, with e,ei ∈ Ev. They are interpreted as: if an event e is
executed, then events e1, ...,en have been previously executed.
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An injective correspondence requires each occurrence of e to be preceded by a unique set
of occurrences of determined events. This is denoted in ProVerif as inj−event(ei), for each ei
required to have a unique instance.
Authentication and secrecy can be defined as correspondence properties, formalized as “corre-
spondences” for the applied pi calculus by Blanchet [37]. ProVerif can verify complex non-injective
and injective correspondence properties, and a limited class of equivalence properties, e.g. strong
secrecy and guessing-attack resistance in password-based protocols.
ProVerif is sound, i.e., given P the model of a protocol, if the verifier proves that a property is
satisfied in P, then that property really holds in P (the proof is correct); however, ProVerif is not
complete, which means that the tool is not able to prove all the properties that hold in a model.
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5THE HONEYWORDS SYSTEM UNDER A
CODE-CORRUPTED LOGIN SERVER
When we think about email security in general, one of the first concerns that arises refers to the
user’s access to a mailbox. As we stressed in the Preliminaries chapter, the compromise of email
data in storage, in particular of a password database, is an identified vulnerability of email systems
(and indeed more generally, of password-based authentication systems). Therefore, before looking
deeper into end-to-end security protocols, we look into a measure to protect the privacy of email from
the most outer layer: detection of illegitimate access to mailboxes.
Due to its easy-operation, scalability, compatibility and low-cost advantages, the most widely
used method for authenticating users in email services (and more generally in IT systems) is based
on passwords [41]. Many prevailing email clients, such as Gmail, have implemented two-factor
authentication; this feature is however optional to the user and the default authentication method still
requires only a password.
Password-based authentication in a client-server setting simply requires users to submit a
username and a password through an interface, which then servers check against a database of
legitimate username-password pairs, granting access if the values are found.
The security of the authentication process lies on the assumption of passwords being only known
to the corresponding users. To achieve so, passwords are expected to be transmitted over encrypted
channels (e.g. TLS), users are in charge of keeping them secret, and servers are expected to securely
store them—e.g. hashed with an appropriate function, together with some random data known as
“salt”—in a so called password file.
Yet, there are well-known ways in which adversaries can learn valid passwords, thereby, illegiti-
mately gaining “authorized” access to the system, which makes the password leakage unnoticeable.
For instance, users are prone (intentionally or not) to reveal their credentials; or password files can
be stolen from servers, and hence hashed passwords exposed to offline dictionary attacks.
Password database breaches have actually been so common in the last years, that at the
beginning of 2019, a collection of 2.2 billion unique usernames and associated passwords composed
of data from multiple previous leakages (e.g., from Dropbox, Yahoo and Linkedin) started to be freely
distributed on hacker forums and torrents[88], and other collections have followed1.
Besides the huge number of passwords exposed in each breach, an alarming aspect is the large
delay that passed between the attacks and their detection (e.g. 3 years in the case of Yahoo [133]);
and failing to detect a password compromise on time, worsens the problem as it delays the application
of countermeasures to limit the damage.
Although some systems have developed solutions to improve the detection of a password theft—
e.g. Google monitors suspicious activities and invites users to review the devices and locations from
which they have accessed their account—raising awareness on a password file compromise is more
1The increasing number of password databases compromise in the last years has motivated the creation of websites,
such as https://haveibeenpwned.com/ and https://www.avast.com/hackcheck, which allow users to verify if their
accounts have been compromised in a data breach.
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critical as the whole database of users is compromised at once.
To detect unauthorized logging attempts derived from a password file compromise, in 2013 Juels
and Rivest [101] proposed an alternative password-based authentication scheme, which they called
the Honeywords System. In this chapter, we study the security of the Honeywords System against an
active adversary who has successfully modified the code of the component that processes the login
data. This problem was left open in Juels and Rivest’s work.
After introducing the Honeywords System in Section 5.1 and formalizing the problem setting in
Section 5.2, we show in Section 5.3 an attack to the Honeywords System within the defined threat
model. Then, in Section 5.5 we describe a new cryptographic protocol that arguably removes the
weakness, which we prove secure with a formal analysis in Section 5.6. Finally, in Section 5.7 we
discuss this solution in a wider perspective.
5.1 Framework: the Honeywords System
A Honeywords System stores a user (hashed) password together with a list of decoy words,
called honeywords. The honeywords and the password together are called sweetwords and they
provide each user account with a list of possible passwords, only one of which is genuine.
Honeywords should be generated in a way that the real password remains indistinguishable from
the generated words; for instance, “redsun3” is a good honeyword for “whitemoon5”. Flatness is a
property that measures the probability of an adversary guessing which is the correct password from
the sweetwords [101, 74]. Thus, flat honeyword generation algorithms—which create words that have
the same probability to be selected as the real password—are assumed.
Since it is very unlikely for a user to type a honeyword purely by chance, any attempt to log in
with a honeyword instead of the password might be an indicator of a password file leakage, in which
case, the system flags the event and contingency actions can be taken (e.g., system administrators
are alerted, monitors are activated, user’s execution rights are reduced, etc).
Note however that the Honeywords System does not impede a password file theft nor it avoids
impersonation; an adversary who has cracked the hashed sweetwords can still succeed in guessing
the correct password of a user by random choice.
Authentication in the Honeywords System. The Honeywords System consists of (i) a computer
system that grants access to a user who enters valid login credentials, which for concreteness, we will
consider to be formed by a User Interface (U) and a Login Server (LS) that processes login requests
from U; and (ii) a hardened secure server that assists in the password verification, known as the
Honeychecker (HC).
LS keeps the password file, in which for each registered user u, there is an ordered list of hashed
sweetwords swu = [h(w1), . . . ,h(wk)], where k is the number of sweetwords fixed in the system. In
turn, HC stores cu, the index of u’s password in the list of sweetwords.
At authentication, the system runs a simple protocol, depicted in Figure 5.1: U sends a username
and a password (u,w) to LS; then, LS searches u’s sweetwords for the hashed version of w. If no
match is found, access is denied. Otherwise, the LS sends to the HC the username together with
j, the index of w; this communication occurs over a dedicated or an encrypted and authenticated
channel. The HC checks whether j corresponds to the stored index cu, in which case the access is
granted. If the test fails, the HC acts according to the implemented policy.
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if j 6=⊥ then
u, j




Figure 5.1: Honeywords System’s authentication protocol with a responsive HC
5.2 Adversary Model
Were the Honeychecker (HC) compromised, the security of the Honeywords System would
be downgraded to the level that classical authentication systems achieve, as the sole index of the
password does not have any use for an adversary E—the password file would still be needed. Several
interesting threats arise if instead we consider a compromised Login Server (LS).
Here, we focus on code corruption, which invariably involves malicious modification of a specific
piece of code, in this case, the one implementing the steps executed by LS in the authentication
protocol. To give a precise definition of the code corruption thread model that we consider, we first
introduce our assumptions.
Assumption 1. Before corrupting the compromised code of the LS, E has retrieved the sweetwords
from a password file, however E does not know which of them are passwords.
Assumption 1 follows from the original paper and reflects the capability of E to steal the password
file and retrieve the plaintext of the k sweetwords of any given user u; yet, E cannot distinguish which
one among u’s sweetwords is the password. Hence, if we call a successful login the event of a pair
(id, pwd) being granted access to the system, with id a username and pwd a candidate password,
then the probability of E having a successful login with a random guess of pwd for a fixed id is 1/k.
Note that additional factors, such as public information or knowledge of social facts about a
specific user, might be used to increase the probability of guessing the password. Here however, we
focus on general attacks, where the adversary intends to gain access with any pair of valid credentials,
without using additional information regarding a specific target.
Assumption 2. The goal of a code corruption attack is to increase the adversary’s probability of a
successful login, with respect to the probability of randomly guessing the password from the list of
sweetwords.
There are many ways in which E could modify the file that implements LS’s tasks in the authen-
tication protocol, hereafter ls.c. For instance, E could reprogram the LS to completely change its
behavior, e.g. to make it play chess2. We are not interested in such attacks as they do not help E
to increase its probability of successfully logging in. For a similar reason, we exclude attacks that
shut-down the systems or cause Denial-of-Service.
2In 2006, R. Gonggrijp did so to prove insecure a Dutch electronic voting machine.
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Another possibility is the modification of ls.c so that access is always granted, independently from
the HC’s answer; but administrators could spot this attack by analyzing login statistics. Similarly, a
back door for establishing an alternative channel between E and the LS to leak information outside
the protocol’s message flow, can eventually be detected (e.g., by monitoring the network traffic),
leading to have a safe version of the ls.c reinstalled.
Perhaps for some adversaries leaving a trail might not be a concern, as long as they manage to
log in and e.g. extract sensitive data. Here, we are concerned about a corruption that allows E to
have long-term continuous access to the system in an unnoticeable way.
More precisely, we focus on corruption of the file ls.c in such a way that LS’s behavior remains
the same from the perspective of the components with which it interacts—e.g. the HC, system
administrators and users—to avoid raising alarms that would result in restoring the original ls.c. Thus,
our threat model consists of a scenario where the LS is code corrupted as per definition 5.2.1, and
the HC is secure.
Definition 5.2.1. Let ls.c be a file in LS which implements the role of LS in the Honeywords System
authentication protocol. Code corruption of LS occurs if the adversary modifies ls.c in such a way
that LS does not change its observable behavior.
According to the previous discussion, definition 5.2.1 says that if E wants to communicate with
the corrupted LS, it must be through the same channels from which legitimate users log in, and
respecting the message flow of the honest protocol. The definition however does not prevent E from
using the knowledge obtained by cracking the password file; for instance, learned user’s IDs and
sweetwords could be hard-coded in the corrupted ls.c for further use.
Note also that E could still retrieve information from legitimate channels, for example, via the
resp message in Figure 5.1. And, as we will discuss in Section 5.3, LS communicating back to E
enables a powerful attack that breaks the original Honeywords System. Yet, strictly speaking, this
modification could be considered “visible” as, depending on the implementation, a careful user or an
administrator could spot the information leakage.
Hereafter, by default we interpret definition 5.2.1 strictly, thus excluding the possibility of this
retroactive communication; but were relevant, we also discuss what happens if we relax this constraint
in the definition and allow LS to leak information to the adversary, since this might be a strong incentive
for code corrupting the LS.
5.3 A Code-corruption Attack
For illustration purposes, consider Algorithm 1 to be the pseudo-code of ls.c, where Passwords is
the password file, sweetwu is the list of sweetwords of user u in Passwords, and H is an appropriate
hash function3.
In turn, Algorithm 2 shows a corrupted ls.c compliant with Definition 5.2.1. The attack relies on E
hard-coding a username—here eve—in ls.c, which serves as a flag to trigger malicious actions. LS
stores the first credentials successfully authenticated by the HC (16), so that in the future, every time
that eve attempts to login (5), the malicious code will load the stored credentials (6), allowing E to
3Remark that approaches to secure passwords in storage keep constantly upgrading, as computing resources become
more achievable to adversaries; withal, there is not yet an approach proven secure and dictionary attacks still succeed,
specially finding weak passwords. We expand on this topic in Chapter 8; here, we assume for simplicity that a “decent”
approach is used, such as using a password-based hashing function to mask the password together with a salt.
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Algorithm 1 Login Server Authentication
1: procedure ls.c(Passwords)
2: while TRUE do;
3: ReceiveFrom(U,(u,w));
4: j← IndexOf(H(w),sweetwu);






Algorithm 2 Code Corrupted LS
1: procedure ls.c(Passwords)
2: (u′,w′)← (⊥,⊥)
3: while TRUE do;
4: ReceiveFrom(U,(u,w));
5: if (u′ 6=⊥)∧ (u == “eve”) then
6: (u,w)← (u′,w′)
7: j← IndexOf(H(w),sweetwu);
8: if j < 0 then
9: resp← FALSE;





15: if resp == TRUE then
16: (u′,w′)← (u,w)
17: SendTo(U,resp);
log in with them regardless the submitted password. As long as the credentials are valid, E will have
access to the system. If the stored credentials become invalid (e.g., u changed password), they are
deleted (11) and a new valid pair is stored the next time that a user logs in successfully (16).
Alternatively, the corrupted file could store only the valid j (in step 16) and, in a next round, skip
the search in sweetwu (7), sending the stored j to the HC (13) (however, possible variations in the
execution time might rise the alert of a suspicious behavior in a statistical analysis). In any case, LS
gets knowledge of a user’s valid password, even though E gains access to the system without the
need to learn it.
For the attack to work, E would only need to wait a reasonable delay after corrupting ls.c, to allow
for a legitimate login attempt to have place. To verify that valid credentials have been stored, E could
try to log in with a dummy password; since the username eve is not registered, in the worst case the
access would be denied. With this attack, E raises the probability of a successful login from 1/k to 1,
as the password has been identified.
This attack is possible because LS can learn the correct w for u. Only hashing the password in
U’s side before sending it to LS would not solve the problem, since the LS can still search for the
received hash value in sweetwu, hence learning the index. Moreover, under a relaxed Definition 5.2.1,
LS can send the hash back to E , who by Assumption 1, is able to obtain the corresponding password.
5.4 Sketching a Solution
We exclude pragmatic fixes that deal with code corruption, such as regular integrity checks of
ls.c or forcing users to frequently change passwords, as they do not tackle the real weakness of the
system.
The main problem allowing the attack in the previous section seems to reside in the simultaneous
occurrence of three facts, which a solution that aims to make LS resilient to code corruption of ls.c
can prevent, by satisfying all of the following security requirements:
R1 LS should not receive usernames and (candidate) passwords in clear
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R2 LS should not be able to store a password that has been validated by the HC
R3 LS should not be able to retrieve the index of a pair of credentials that were not submitted through
the running session’s legitimate channel.
To address these requirements, we propose the following countermeasures:
(i) Shuffling sweetwu after each time that LS submits a valid password HC: this stops LS from
associating a valid password with an index;
(ii) Blinding each element in sweetwu after each time that LS submits a valid password HC: this
prevents LS from associating a valid password with a username;
(iii) Allowing LS to learn the string to be searched in sweetwu only when user u submits it, and
never in plaintext: this prevents LS from storing passwords in clear and from reusing them at
will.
Countermeasures (i) and (ii) deal with R2, while (iii) addresses R1 and partially R3. We focus
first on R2 and later on elaborate on R1 and R3.
To implement (i) and (ii) we take inspiration from re-encryption mixnets, initially proposed by
Chaum [48]. This scheme is designed to transform a list of ciphertexts c1, ...,cn (usually encrypted
with ElGamal) into another list of ciphertexts e′1, ...,e
′
n, with the same plaintexts in permuted order.
Some uses of mixnets include making email untraceable, as in the original paper, and e-voting (e.g.,
[92]).
Here, we propose the use of a one-node mixnet, played by the HC. We do not require encryption
in the strict sense given that there is no decryption associated; instead we want to blind the password
to the LS, therefore, we call this step blinding.
Shuffling consists on applying a random permutation π over the elements of a given row [w1, . . . ,wk],
thus obtaining [wπ1 , . . . ,wπk ]. After shuffling the row, the corresponding index c stored by the HC
needs to be updated to the new position π(wc).
Blinding could be implemented by modular exponentiation. At user u’s registration, HC appropriately
selects a generator g of a cyclic multiplicative subgroup G of order q, and generates a list of
sweetwords w = [w1, ...,wk]. Then, HC blinds each wi in w by applying fr0(wi) = g
r0·wi , where
r0 is an element of {1, · · · ,q− 1} sampled at random. Thus, the initial row of u in Passwords is
fr0(w) = [ fr0(w1), . . . , fr0(wk)].
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At the nth time that LS submits a valid password to HC, HC chooses a new random number rn+1 ∈










Shuffling and blinding can be implemented as an atomic block within the HC, as shown in
Figure 5.2. The idea is for HC to receive frn(w) along with each query from LS, so that the row gets
shuffled and blinded with a freshly generated rn+1; then, HC returns frn+1(w) to LS, together with the
index’s verification result.
4A more accurate notation of the elements involved in shuffling and blinding, would require the use of the subscript u
(e.g. cu, gu, fr0(wu)), to stress that the processes are user based. To lighten the notation we omit the index u, but ask the
reader to keep this distinction in mind.










Figure 5.2: Shuffling sweetwu, blinding w, and updating the index c.
Note however that, each nth time that a user u submits a password x, LS needs to calculate
frn(x) = g
rn·x before being able to search for x’s index in frn(w). For doing so, LS needs to have
received rn−1 (or grn−1) too. This means that, at the end of round n, LS knows x and rn+1, which
allows it to further query HC with this information, disregarding the user’s input.
To prevent this situation, we need to implement countermeasure (iii), for which we propose the
use of a One-Time-Password (OTP) device. We briefly justify this decision in the next section, but
readers interested only in the solution, can skip it and restart reading from Section 5.5.
OTP against code-corruption. As we saw, LS can use HC as an oracle because LS has access
to all the elements needed to generate a valid query, namely, a candidate password—which is still
in plaintext—and the exponent used for blinding. Thus, to deal with the problem we would need a
separation of duties, so that the component that can check the index, is not the same as the one that
blinds the submitted word.
A natural idea regards the addition of a component, which we call Key Register (KR), who would
store rn. At login time, KR receives (u,y) from User Interface (U) and calculates frn(y); then, KR
forwards this value to the LS, who has also received u from U. The rest of the process remains the
same except that the HC returns frn+1(w) to the LS, but rn+1 only to the KR.
This solution prevents LS from receiving passwords in plaintext; the problem now is that, if we
comply with the original Honeywords System’s design [101], the only component assumed to be
hardened secure is the HC. And considering that the LS can be corrupted but the KR cannot, would
be unjustified. So, an adversary compromising both components would once again have the power of
obtaining the blinded value of a word w, and then determining whether w is a valid password. By
exchanging the adequate information between KR and LS, E would be able to store a valid pair of
credentials for future use.
This reasoning applies to any other component that were to have a role between U and HC.
Alternative ways for implementing (iii), such as using timestamps from the U’s side as a proof of
freshness, do not work either since LS stands in the middle and can compromise those messages.
Therefore, in addition to the previous requirements, we need the U to be the only component able
to blind the password, and we need to enforce the result of such a blinding to be the value submitted
to the HC. So, the intuition suggests a “synchronization” between the U and the HC, occurring
over a channel which is controlled neither by any component of the Honeywords System nor by the
adversary, to avoid man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
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5.5 A Code-corruption Resilient Protocol (P )
The solution that we propose requires the user to posses an OTP device, which is employed to
generate a random nonce rn per use. The OTP device and the HC share the initial seed and the
algorithm to generate rn; this information enables U (e.g., the user’s browser) to blind the candidate
password using the same rn that is generated by the HC—somehow mimicking the role of the KR
described above—thereby addressing R1.
The OTP device serves as pseudo-random generator and the OTP as proof of freshness, since
this value is synchronized with the HC’s output; this serves to address R3. Here we assume an event-
based device (a.k.a. HOTP for HMAC-based One-Time Password [129]), i.e., one that generates a
new code at the press of a button, which remains valid until it is used by the application5.
Figure 5.3 describes the protocol, which for simplicity, we will denote as P . OTP(n) represents
the action of generating the nth OTP value (step 1), which U uses to compute the blinded password
frn(w), which in turn is sent to the LS along with the username u (step 2).
Then, P follows as discussed in Section 5.4: the LS searches for frn(w) in the row of user u
(step 3), which the HC has reshuffled and blinded in a previous session using the same OTP number
that U has used now to blind the password; if an index j is found, it is submitted together with the
username and u’s row of blinded sweetwords (step 4). The HC decides whether the submitted index
corresponds to the password (step 5); in affirmative case, the HC shuffles and blinds the row, and
updates the index of u, cu, according to the new order (step 6). The shuffled and blinded file is
returned to the LS (step 7), who notifies the decision to the user (step 8).
Informal Security Analysis. P satisfies R1, R2 and R3: the LS cannot observe the submitted
passwords in plaintext because it does not have rn; the shuffling and blinding processes prevent the
LS from associating, with probability more than 1/k, a blinded password with its correct index; and
even if the LS learns that a particular frn(w) is a valid password, blinding prevents LS from reusing
that string at any time, as it needs the randomness inserted by U in order to calculate the new index.
Additionally,
• even if two users choose the same password, it is unlikely that the blinding values are the
same, since the initial seeds of the OTP devices differ;
• in the case that the LS submits the correct index by chance, access will be granted once but
the LS will not be able to reuse the index, given that the HC changes cu. This situation would
actually invalidate future legitimate login attempts, as the ri from U and HC will be no longer
synchronized. While this counts as a Denial-of-Service (DoS), it is not an attack according to
Assumption 2 as it does not increase the probability of E to gain access;
• the protocol is secure under a relaxed Definition 5.2.1 too, since even if the LS sends back to
U a particular frn(w) learned to be a valid password, and E retrieves w, neither w nor frn(w)
provide enough information to gain access. The value of frn+1(w) would still be needed, which
E cannot generate without the OTP device.
In consequence, we argue that the protocol is resilient to a code-corruption of LS attack, aligned
with Definition 5.2.1, which we prove with a formal analysis in the next section.
As a remark, the actions in step 6 need to be executed atomically, otherwise and if E learns the
result of the validation before, LS could take advantage of the HC being in an inconsistent state and
5E.g. https://www.microcosm.com/products/oath-otp-authentication-tokens
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Figure 5.3: Authentication Protocol (P ) resilient to code corruption of LS
perform an attack (see Section 5.6).
Note also that the use of an event-based OTP device is a relevant assumption. Were a time-based
device used instead, E could submit an index learned to be correct, during the time-window before
the OTP gets regenerated. The time-interval for E to succeed would be limited as opposed to the
original system, but P would still be vulnerable.
5.6 Formal Security Analysis
We used ProVerif to verify the security of both, the original protocol (Figure 5.1) and P (Figure 5.3),
against the defined threat model of code corruption. The models and relevant traces obtained from
the verification are included in Appendix A.1; here, we elaborate on the modeling decisions.
5.6.1 Analysis of the Honeywords System
As we already found the original Honeywords System vulnerable to code corruption of LS, this
verification is mainly aimed at understanding how to capture the attacker model correctly—since the
default assumption of ProVerif is a Dolev-Yao attacker—and how to correctly interpret the results,
discarding attacks that do not correspond to our defined threat model.
Our protocol model consists of three processes: user, loginService and honeychecker,
representing respectively the U, the LS and the HC. The LS is an active attacker since it is able to
read and send messages from and to the HC; the channel between LS and HC is thus public. In
contrast, the channel between U and LS is private, as this communication is assumed to happen over
TLS or similarly secured channels.
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ProVerif adds all information sent in public channels to the adversary’s knowledge, hence, the
latter use of a private channel prevents the attacker from learning the submitted password at any time.
It also rules out the obvious guessing attack—which is always possible since Honeywords System is
not designed to avoid it—allowing the verifier to find other attacks related to the protocol’s flow.
Our security property expresses that, whenever the HC sends a positive answer to the LS for a
submitted pair of user and index (u, j), all of these three actions had previously occurred: (1) the
user u logged in with password p, (2) LS found p in the list of u’s sweetwords at index j, and (3) the
value stored in HC for u is equal to j. This is formulated with the correspondence:









Injectivity in the expression (inj-event) models the HC processing only once each request received
from LS, preventing interaction between LS and HC in the absence of a user, since this communication
is assumed to occur over a secure channel (see Section 5.1).
Result. As expected, the verification indicates that the property does not hold. The attack found
corresponds to the attack described in Section 5.3, and shows how once the attacker (in this case
the LS) gets a positive answer from the HC, it is able to send a new validation request to HC
using the correct index, and hence, gaining access to the system. The attack trace contradicts
injectivity, because a fresh event usrLogged(u, p) did not have place before that second request.
These observations support our model design for code-corruption and provide formal evidence that a
Honeywords System resilient to the flaw must satisfy requirements R1, R2 and R3.
5.6.2 Analysis of P
For protocol P , we model all the channels as public, to allow a corrupted LS to interact with HC
at any time and learn the inputs from U and HC. Conversely, the LS’s function that retrieves the index
of a sweetword, indexOfHw, is private, to exclude the possibility of the LS sending a random guess
to the HC, as we are not interested in that attack.
Each instance of U is initialized along with an instance of HC, with a shared seed; this represents
that both parts generate the same OTP at the beginning of a round. The HC knows as well the index
of the password in the password file. To allow LS to attempt attacks using the knowledge gained
during the run of the protocol, we model the fact that HC can be queried after the end of its role
(somehow simulating an open session).
The LS is almost as in the original protocol, except that this time it receives a blinded password
parametrized by the OTP, instead of a plain password. An index is a term determined by a blinded





where blindWord is the blinded value of w calculated with the seed n, and shuffleNblind is the
sweetwords’ row for user u shuffled and blinded with seed n.
Our equational theory relies on the checkEqual function in the HC, which returns TRUE only when
all the parameters in the indexes under comparison are equal. After a successful match, the index






Hence, after this point the evaluation of checkEqual will be false for any submitted index not obtained
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with the new seed.
We define a property analogous to the one we verified for the original Honeywords System:







indexFound( j, blindWord(p,x), shuffleNblind(u,y))
)
.
The expression states that whenever an index j is equal to the one in the HC’s database for u, then
(a) a user logged in with username u and password p, and (b) j corresponds to the index of the
blinded value of p in the sweetwords row for u. The conjunction ensures the execution of every step
in the protocol; the injectivity ensures that each is executed only once.
In addition, we introduce the property event(unreachable) to verify that LS cannot retrieve a
sweetword’s index of a word not submitted by a user; the event unreachable is triggered if the HC’s
check function returns true after shuffling and rehashing, when applied to a previously submitted
hashed password.
The model also assumes, as we stated in Section 5.5, that the shuffling, blinding and updating
instructions are executed atomically before sending the response to the LS. Failing to implement HC
in this way, leads to an attack that we explain next in the results, which proves that atomicity must in
fact be a requirement.
Results. ProVerif confirmed the properties to be TRUE in negligible time, from which we conclude
that, even knowing that a certain blindWord(p,getOTP(n)) is a valid password, LS cannot use it to
anticipate the new correct index, since it depends on the seed value possessed only by U and HC.
The analysis also proves that event unreachable is actually unreachable, which implies that LS
cannot get any advantage from using HC as an oracle, in combination with messages obtained from
previous runs with U and HC.
We also verified the need for the atomic execution of the Shuffle&Blind and the index updating
instructions. For instance, sending the response to the LS once the new u’s row is obtained but
before updating u’s index, gives place to the following attack: let HC1 and HC2 be concurrent runs of
the HC; then,
1. LS sends (u,i) to be verified
2. HC1 verifies that i is correct, computes the new row, and sends the answer to LS
3. LS submits again i, knowing that it is a correct index
4. HC2 validates that i is correct—since HC1 has not updated it—then, computes the new row,
updates and grants access
5. HC1 continues its execution and grants access as well.
5.7 Concluding Remarks and Further Directions
Summing up, in this chapter we proposed a protocol that relies on the use of one-time-passwords,
to improve the security of the original Honeywords System, when we consider the component that
processes login credentials to be compromised. We provided a formal model of a non-standard
adversary, who can steal a password file and run offline dictionary attacks, however, cannot modify
the code of the authentication protocol in a way that its behavior changes from the perspective of the
other components in the system.
Implementations of the proposed protocol P and of the original Honeywords System are reported
in our original publication [84], where we compare the performance of P with that of the original
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system, concluding that the time complexity in both is linear with respect to the number of sweetwords,
and that considering its adoption would be reasonable.
A debatable aspect is that, although the OTP device here is used as a pseudo-random generator
and not as a proof of possession, both ideas are somehow tied, as an adversary who manages to
get the device will be able to generate the next seeds used for blinding. Besides, from the user’s
perspective, the approach appears just as a regular two-factor authentication. This observation
highlights the difficulty to find implementable and effective approaches that fulfill simultaneously
requirements R1, R2 and R3.
An alternative idea worth exploring looks into homomorphic encryption, a relatively recent
research area based on public key cryptography, which allows untrusted parties to perform operations
on encrypted data [86]. Quite broadly, the intuitive idea is for the User Interface (U) and the
Honeychecker (HC) to share a key for encryption and decryption. Then, the U sends the encrypted
password to Login Server (LS), who searches for it in an encrypted row of encrypted sweetwords,
retrieving an index in encrypted form too. LS is unable to decrypt the index that it sends to HC, but the
latter can decrypt it and send the answer to LS. Note that some re-encryption of the passwords would
still be needed, so that LS cannot reuse a stored valid password. Feasibility of the implementation of
these schemes is however an aspect to take into consideration.
We also remark that code corruption might be interpreted as the LS being turned into an
active man-in-the-middle (MITM), slightly restricted in the way in which it can modify messages.
This suggests that authentication mechanisms between the U and the HC would be a solution for
circumventing this adversarial model. An idea based on the use of password-authenticated key
exchange protocols is explored in [22]. In the second part of this thesis, we research further on
authentication techniques that could also be considered as the basis of alternative solutions.
Finally, we consider code corruption to be a strong adversary, whose implementation in real
life might require substantially more effort than just stealing a password file. Still, the theoretical
setting posses an interesting problem and evidences the difficulty of finding adequate and efficient
cryptographic tools to deal with such an adversary. Furthermore, the formal verification performed in
this chapter served as a kickoff into the formal analysis of security protocols, which we will develop
further in the next chapter.
We will move now into protocols that deal with the security of the communication itself rather than
the security of the environment.
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6SECURITY ANALYSIS OF p≡p PROTOCOLS
In Chapter 2, we discussed about the importance of encryption and authentication for achieving
private secure communications in hostile environments (such as Internet). PGP was the earliest
widely adopted solution bringing those security properties to email. However, its design targets a
specific audience, assumed to understand the concept of public-key cryptography.
Attempting to reach a wider audience, recent secure email solutions tend to automate tasks that
would require average users to be familiar (at least) with basic cryptographic concepts. Such is the
case of ProtonMail [148] and Tutanota [178], which offer privacy and strong security guarantees
coupled with “easy” usage. However, a drawback of those solutions is that they work optimally in
closed environments—i.e., between clients of the same service—but when they interact with other
solutions, the security guarantees are in general not preserved. Actually, interoperability has been
identified as one of the principal open problems for secure email [50].
In addition to providing end-to-end encryption (E2EE), the p≡p software introduced in Section 2.8
offers to tackle usability and interoperability issues. Given its combination of security and usability
features, p≡p appears to be a serious private email solution with possibilities for a broader adoption.
Nevertheless, this solution lacks from a rigorous study and proofs of security of the underlying
protocols, which is the problem that we address here.
In this chapter, we present a symbolic formal analysis of the two core security protocols imple-
mented in p≡p, that lead to the achievement of authenticated private communication. We start by
defining the p≡p key distribution and the trust establishment protocols (Section 6.1), along with the
security properties that concern our analysis (Section 6.2). Then, in Section 6.3 we go into the details
of the formalization in the applied pi calculus. The results of the protocol verification with ProVerif
are reported and further analyzed in Section 6.3.4. We also discuss limitations of the analysis in
Section 6.3.5, and research directions therefrom.
6.1 Key distribution and Authentication Protocols of p≡p
The abstract protocols that we introduce in this section were created according to the approach
presented in Chapter 3. We used the last version of pEpEngine available at the moment1 (see page
18), downloaded from the open source code repository of p≡p [144], and online user manuals [146].
These models, presented in [184] as Message Sequence Charts (MSC), constitute the first detailed
technical documentation of the key distribution and authentication protocols in p≡p. Some IETF
internet drafts [31, 32, 123] released later on, have been useful to reinforce our models.
Remark that the analysis concerns the logic of the mentioned protocols, hence, the messages
that we model are exchanges occurring in cryptographic protocols rather than email exchanges. For
an overview of email protocols, readers can review Chapter 2.
In the rest of the chapter, we will use skx and pkx to refer to secret and public keys owned by
agent x, respectively. We will also use A and B to refer to honest participants and E for the malicious
agent trying to prevent the honest parties from achieving the security goals. We denote the p≡p
1https://pep.foundation/dev/repos/pEpEngine/file/b7f6df848795 (date:24-02-2018)
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instances running in A ’s and B ’s devices as pEpA and pEpB respectively.
We will also refer to the privacy rating assigned by p≡p per message and sender. These ratings
are detailed in Section 2.8.4 of Chapter 2, where we introduced p≡p.
Setting. Let A and B be two communication partners that do not share any cryptographic infor-
mation about each other—e.g. public keys. A installs p≡p from scratch in a device free of any
cryptographic material. B is already a p≡p user owning a pair of keys (skB, pkB). First, we describe
the protocol that allows A to establish end-to-end encrypted communication with B , and afterwards
the protocol for mutual authentication.
6.1.1 Public key Distribution and Encrypted Communication
So that the key distribution protocol (Fig. 6.1) can take place, when p≡p is installed, pEpA
generates a pair of keys (skA, pkA) for A (step 1). The protocol starts when A sends a message
m to B ; pEpA creates an identity for B (2) and stores his contact details (3); then, pEpA sends m in
cleartext along with pkA (4). At reception, pEpB displays m to B with the privacy rating UNSECURE
(5); additionally, pEpB creates an identity for A (6) and stores her email address and pkA (7); finally,
following the trust-on-first-use (TOFU) approach, pEpB assigns the privacy rating SECURE to A ’s
identity (8).
When B replies to A , pEpB attaches pkB to his response resp; this message is then signed with
B ’s secret key skB (9) and encrypted using pkA (10). The signed and encrypted message is sent to
A (11), and pEpB shows to B that this message is sent SECURE. At reception, pEpA decrypts B ’s
message using skA (12); then, again by TOFU, it stores pkB as the public key of B (13) and assigns
to his identity the SECURE rating (14). B ’s response is finally shown as SECURE to A . From this
point, all the messages between A and B are sent encrypted and signed with the stored keys.
Note that the identifiers created for A in pEpA and pEpB—i.e., idAA and idAB respectively— are
internal and independent for each instance, although they refer to the same entity. The same holds
for B . Also, pkA and pkB sent in steps (4) and (11) are only attached to the first communication
between A and B or whenever they are updated.
The key distribution protocol allows A to send private messages to the owner of pkB, however, it
does not guarantee that the owner is B . Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are possible, as we show
in Section 6.3.4. To establish a secure communication, A and B still need proof that they are actually
communicating with the parties they intend.
6.1.2 Authentication and p≡p Privacy Rating Assignment
Trust is established once A and B have verified that the public keys previously distributed
are owned by the intended peers. In p≡p, this mutual authentication is achieved via a so called
Handshake (Fig. 6.2), which consists in A and B comparing a list of trustwords through an assumed
to be secure out-of-band (OOB) channel, which is needed only once.
When A selects the option to perform a handshake with B (1), pEpA generates a combined
fingerprint based on applying an XOR function to the fingerprints of A and B (2). The resulting
hexadecimal string is mapped onto words in the selected language from the trustwords database
(3) and displayed to A (4). The analogous actions occur in pEpB when B selects the handshake
option. Given that the trustwords database is the same in all p≡p distributions, if pEpA and pEpB
use the same input parameters, i.e., the same public keys and thus the same fingerprints, the list of
trustwords generated by each p≡p instance must be the same (we revisit this claim in Section 6.4).
The next step is the authentication, where A and B contact each other in a way that they are

















no own keys pair
1: new skA
pkA:=publicKey(skA)
Space between A - appA




4: [emailA, pkA, text]
5: text
B receives an UNSECURE email from A
6: new idAB
7: storeId(idAB,emailA,pkA)
8: trustRating(idAB, pkA) ← SECURE
Bob knows now emailA
[emailA,resp]
Space between B - appB
9: signedText := sign({resp,pkB},skB)
10: encText := encrypt(signedText,pkA)
B sends a SECURE email to A
11: [emailB, encText]
12: {resp,pkB} = decrypt(encText,skA)
13: updateId(idBA,emailB,pkB)
14: trustRating(idBA, pkB) ← SECURE
15: resp
A receives a SECURE email from B
Text to increase space between participants
Figure 6.1: p≡p Key Distribution Protocol. The initial privacy assignment is based on TOFU.
sure to be talking with the real person—e.g., they meet in person—and compare the list of trustwords
displayed for each (5). If pEpB receives a confirmation of trustwords from B , A ’s privacy rating is set
to TRUSTED (6); we call this case a successful handshake. Conversely, in an unsuccessful handshake
B rejects the words and A ’s rating is downgraded from SECURE to MISTRUSTED (7). The analogous
occurs in A ’s device with respect to B .
The privacy rating assigned after a handshake remains for all future exchanges with the commu-
nication partner. Thus, after a successful handshake, messages between the identities involved are
always sent encrypted and signed, therefore making the communication private and authenticated.
Remark that p≡p does not force users to perform a handshake. The email messages are always
sent regardless of the security level, which is decided per message and per recipient according to the























2: combinedFpr := xorBits( fingerprint(pkA), fingerprint(pkB) )
3: [t1 .... tn] := getTrustwords(combinedFpr)
4: [t1 .... tn]
trustRating(idA) = SECURE
handshake(emailA)
combinedFpr := xorBits( fingerprint(pkA), fingerprint(pkB) )
[w1 .... wn] := getTrustwords(combinedFpr)
[w1 .... wn]
5: Compare [t1 .... tn] with [w1 .... wn] via a secure 2nd channel
Long text to increase space between both
alt
[[t1 .... tn] = [w1 .... wn]]
confirm trustwords
confirm trustwords
trustRating(idBA) ← TRUSTED 6: trustRating(idAB) ← TRUSTED
Successful handshake Successful handshake
reject trustwords
reject trustwords
trustRating(idBA) ← MISTRUSTED 7: trustRating(idAB) ← MISTRUSTED
Unsuccessful handshake Unsuccessful handshake
Space between U and t app
Figure 6.2: p≡p Handshake for mutual authentication
recipient’s data available.
Note also that the handshake is essentially a human protocol, as the actions taken by a p≡p
instance depend completely on the user’s input. Models of security protocols that consider also the
humans and their interaction with the system are known as security ceremonies [73]. We will expand
on this topic in the next chapter.
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6.2 Security Properties
Our requirements for authentication match the definition of full agreement given by Lowe in
[117]. This definition subsumes aliveness, weak agreement, non-injective agreement and injective
agreement as defined in the same reference. Broadly, full agreement requires that at the end of a
protocol run, all the essential data known by the two participants coincides; in the case that concerns
us, this data would be the public keys and the email addresses.
Definition 6.2.1 (Full agreement, from [117]). A protocol guarantees to an initiator A full agreement
with a responder B on a set of data items ds if, whenever A completes a run of the protocol, apparently
with responder B, then B has previously been running the protocol, apparently with A, and B was
acting as responder in his run, and the two agents agreed on the data values corresponding to all the
terms in ds, and each such run of A corresponds to a unique run of B. Additionally, ds contains all the
atomic data items used in the protocol run.
Here we redefine this property in the context of p≡p, and introduce informally other security
properties which also refer to the correctness of the trust level assignment.
Property 1 (Full agreement). A full agreement between A and B holds on the data set conformed
by pkA, pkB, emailA and emailB, if, whenever A completes a successful handshake with B , then:
B has previously been running the protocol with A , the identity data of A is (emailA, pkA), and the
identity data of B is (emailB, pkB). In addition, by the definition of a successful handshake, A ’s and
B ’s trustwords are equal.
Property 2 (Trust-by-handshake). Trust-by-handshake holds for B if whenever B receives a message
with privacy rating TRUSTED from A , then previously B executed a successful handhsake with A .
Property 3 (Privacy-from-trusted). Privacy-from-trusted holds for B if, whenever B receives a
message m with a privacy rating TRUSTED from A , then A sent m to B and m is encrypted with B ’s
public key.
Property 4 (Integrity-from-trusted). Integrity-from-trusted holds for B if, whenever B receives a
message m with a privacy rating TRUSTED fromA , then A sent m to B and m is signed with a valid
signature of A .
Note that “trust-by-handshake” guarantees all messages that B receives as TRUSTED to come
from a peer with whom B has successfully run the protocol; hence, when this property holds, the
definitions of “privacy-from-trusted” and “integrity-from-trusted” imply that A is rated as TRUSTED too.
Property 5 (MITM-detection). MITM-detection holds if whenever an unsuccessful handshake be-
tween A and B occurs, then A had previously registered a key for B that does not belong to him,
vice versa, or both.
Property 6 (Confidentiality). Confidentiality holds if E cannot learn the content of any message
intended to be private between A and B . This property refers to the notion of syntactic secrecy
introduced in Chapter 4.
6.3 Formal Security Analysis
Let us now formalize in the applied pi calculus all the elements. The source code for ProVerif of
the full model that we discuss here, is included in Appendix A.2.
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6.3.1 Threat Model
We start by assuming that the participants have a legitimate and correct distribution of the p≡p
software (free of implementation flaws). Now, to determine a relevant attacker model we need to
reflect about the architecture of p≡p.
To an attacker with access to the user’s device, not only the code but also the application
databases and the keys repository are available. E can thus have B trusting her by simply modifying
the corresponding record in the privacy ratings database, even if a handshake was never performed.
Modifications to the trustwords database would also result in an attack, which although not threatening
privacy, could prevent A and B from establishing a valid trusted communication as TRUSTED.
Therefore, we restrict the threat model with the following assumptions:
1. p≡p users are honest participants holding a legitimate p≡p installation in a secure device
2. The adversary cannot modify exchanges over the trustwords channel
3. The adversary has complete control over the network used to exchange emails (Dolev-Yao)
These assumptions allow E to eavesdrop, remove, and modify emails exchanged between A and
B , as well as to send them self-created messages; this includes learning their public keys exchanged
by email. E cannot however interfere with the channel used to corroborate trustwords. Recall that
this is a secondary channel (such as the phone or in-person) intended to be used only once and not
to replace the email communication channel.
6.3.2 Modeling the p≡p Protocol
We will refer to the sequential execution of the key distribution protocol and the handshake, from
Section 6.1, as the p≡p protocol.
An identity in the p≡p system is defined by a user identifier associated to an (email) address;
each identity has a key pair associated [32]. Actually, each identity can have a set of key pairs spread
across different devices, from which one is selected as the default key. In this model we disregard
details of the key management implementation, as they are not relevant for the analysis; in particular,
we assume that a user who configures p≡p in multiple devices with the same email address—and
thus, same identity—uses by default the same key pair in all of them. A formal study of the p≡p
protocol in charge of securely synchronizing secret information among devices is still ongoing work.
Then, we represent an email address as an identity of type userId, and model the identity as a
function of the secret key, id(skey) : userId. The roles A and B are represented by two processes:
senderA and receiverB. To communicate with B , A needs to know B ’s email, i.e., the identity
id(skB); in turn, B only needs to know the own id and secret key. The actions for each participant
model those in the diagrams in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. We run multiple instances of A as well as of B ,
to simulate communication with multiple peers.
For the exchange of emails we use a public channel; on the contrary, a private channel models
the trustwords’ validation channel. In order to prove confidentiality of encrypted and authenticated
communication, we introduce a private message mssg representing a message whose content is
initially unknown to the adversary E ; then, we model A sending mssg to B via the public channel
after a successful handshake between them. Since B is trusted, mssg is sent signed and encrypted,
and thus, expected to remain unreadable by E at the end of the protocol.
In agreement with the symbolic model assumption, our equational theory models a perfect
behavior of asymmetric encryption and digital signatures. These equations capture the relationships
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allowed among the cryptographic primitives involved, determining the ways in which any participant,
the attacker included, can reduce terms. Then, for M a message and SK a secret key:
adec(aenc(M,pubKey(SK)), SK) = M (1)
verifSign(sign(M,SK), pubKey(SK)) = M (2)
getMssg(sign(M,SK)) = M (3)
Equation (1) expresses that a message M encrypted with a certain public key can be decrypted
with the corresponding secret key; moreover, this is the only way to obtain M from a ciphertext since
there is no other equation involving the aenc primitive. Analogously, equation (2) returns M only if it
was signed with the secret key associated to the public key used for the verification. Equation (3)
allows the recovery of a message without verification of a digital signature and we introduce it to
model the capability of E for learning messages without the need of verifying the signature.
Additionally, we assume that users execute the comparison of trustwords correctly, i.e., they
confirm the trustwords in the system only when they match in the real world and they reject them only
in the contrary case; by modeling this, we implicitly model correctness of the trustwords generation
function. Since a PGP fingerprint is uniquely derived from a public key, we abstract fingerprints simply
as public keys. Then, for two public keys PK1, PK2, two trustwords lists W1,W2 and the trustwords
generation function trustwords:
trustwordsMatch(trustwords(PK1,PK2), trustwords(PK1,PK2)) = true
trustwordsMatch(trustwords(PK1,PK2), trustwords(PK2,PK1)) = true
otherwise trustwordsMatch(W1,W2) = false.
During its computations, E is allowed to apply all and only these primitives. Furthermore, E has
access to all the messages exchanged via the public channels and to any information declared as
public. These rules allow for instance to capture E ’s real-life capability of generating the trustwords,
which is possible because all the elements are public knowledge: the source code of the function, the
trustwords database, B ’s public key and A ’s public key.
6.3.3 Privacy and Authentication Properties of p≡p
We formalize the properties introduced in Section 6.2, as correspondence assertions and reacha-
bility properties (review these concepts on page 37). The formalization is given in terms of the events
defined in Table 6.1, where s and r represent two p≡p users.
Then, for a message m, and for all p≡p users a and b, and public keys pkA, pkB:
Full Agreement.
endHandshakeOk(a,b, pkA, pkB) =⇒ startHandshake(a,b) ∧ startHandshake(b,a)
∧ userKey(a, pkA) ∧ userKey(b, pkB)
∧ confirmTrust(a,b) ∧ confirmTrust(b,a)
This is the formalization of Property 1. As explained in 6.3.2, in our model the email address is
abstracted as the identity itself, hence, verifying that an email address is associated to an identity
(e.g. emailA belongs to a) is implicit. In contrast, we explicitly add the condition for a handshake to be
successful, which implies agreement on the trustwords.
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EVENT DESCRIPTION
attacker(m) the adversary knows the content of the message m
decryptionFails(r,s,m) r cannot decrypt a message m from a trusted peer s
endHandshakeUnsucc
text (s,r,pks,pkr)
s and r completed an unsuccessful handshake with the public keys
pks and pkr respectively
endHandshakeOk
text (s,r, pks, pkr)
s and r completed a successful handshake with the public keys pks
and pkr, respectively
receiveGreen(r,s,m) r received the message m from s as TRUSTED
confirmTrust(r,s) the peer r sets the privacy rating of s as TRUSTED after verifying via
a secure channel that their trustwords match
sendGreen(s,r,m) s sent the message m to r as TRUSTED
signVerifFails(r,s,m) r cannot verify the signature attached to m as a valid signature of s
startHandshake(s,r) s starts a handshake via a second-channel with r
userKey(s,pks) the agent s is the owner of the key pkS
Table 6.1: Events in the model of the p≡p protocol
Trust-by-handshake. receiveGreen(b,a,m) =⇒ con f irmTrust(b,a)
This formula matches exactly the definition of Property 2.
Privacy-from-trusted. For messages z and y,(






This formula is the conjunction of two correspondence assertions. The first one expresses Property
3; the second correspondence enforces the first by saying that it cannot be otherwise, i.e., when b
receives a message m from a which for any reason cannot be decrypted—e.g. m is not encrypted—
then a did not send a TRUSTED message m to b.
Integrity-from-trusted. For a message z, a secret key skA, and a public key kb,(






Analogous to the previous formula, in this one we express Property 4 and reinforce it by proving that
whenever the verification of the signature fails in message m, then a did not send m.
MITM-detection. For public keys ka and kb,
endHandshakeUnsucc(a,b,ka,kb) =⇒ (userKey(a, pkA) ∧ pkA 6= ka) ∨
(userKey(b, pkB) ∧ pkB 6= kb)
This formula matches exactly the definition of Property 5.
Confidentiality. attacker(x) is a built in predicate in ProVerif, which evaluates to TRUE if by
applying the derivation rules to the knowledge of the adversary, there exists a derivation that results
in x. Therefore, the protocol achieves confidentiality if, for a private message mssg,
¬attacker(mssg)
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6.3.4 Verification Results and Analysis
The verification was executed using ProVerif 2.0 on a standard PC (Intel i7 2.7GHz, 8GB RAM),
and the response time was immediate. We analyzed three different models: the key distribution
protocol, the handshake protocol, and the full trust establishment protocol (the p≡p protocol).
The results confirmed the vulnerability of the key distribution protocol to MITM attacks. Inherent
to public key cryptography, the weakness resides in the exchange of keys via a channel where E has
complete access. An attack proceeds as follows: E intercepts the initial message from A to B and
sends instead a new message replacing pkA with E ’s own public key, pkE ; thus, pEpB stores pkE as
the key associated to A ’s email (step (7) of Fig. 6.1). When B replies, the response is encrypted with
pkE (step (10)), and thus E can intercept and decrypt it with the corresponding secret key, obtaining
in addition pkB attached. From this point, E can send encrypted emails to B using A ’s email address
as the sender, and decrypt the responses sent by B . In an analogous way, E can have A associating
pkE to B ’s identity, to gain control on both sides of the communication.
Regarding the handshake, encryption and authentication hold since the trustwords comparison
never mismatches due to the assumptions of the peer devices being secure and of a previous key
distribution successfully executed.
Finally, the analysis of the p≡p protocol, where the key distribution is followed by a handshake,
determined that the six properties: full agreement, trust-by-handshake, privacy-from-trusted, integrity-
from-trusted, MITM-detection and confidentiality, are satisfied.
We conclude that the execution of the p≡p protocol fulfills the claimed security goals, i.e., after a
successful handshake there is no undetectable way for E to modify the exchanges between A and B ,
given that every message between them is always sent encrypted and signed with the corresponding
keys. Consequently, secrecy, authentication and integrity of the messages are preserved. These
results depend on the assumptions of p≡p residing in a secure environment, of the use of a secure
OOB channel for the trustwords comparison, and of p≡p identities uniquely associating each email
account with a key pair.
Additional findings. A side observation refers to unsuccessful handshakes; in particular to the
case where A has the correct public key of B , but B has registered an incorrect public key for A . A
handshake between A and B would fail and both partners would reject each other’s trustwords.
In the version of pEpEngine that we analyzed, by design a MISTRUSTED privacy rating could
not be reverted. This situation presumably represented an issue, since in any handshake with the
correct keys executed after a failed attempt, A was not able to trust B ’s key as she had mistrusted
this identity—the tuple (B , emailB, pkB)—before.
However, E misleading A to mistrust the intended partner resembles a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack but does not represent a threat to privacy. In any case, we discussed the issue with p≡p
developers and in recent versions they have implemented a mechanism that allows reverting this
action.
6.3.5 Limitations
The analysis focuses solely on the technical specification of the key distribution and handshake
protocols; social attacks such as impersonation or phishing are not detected. For instance, E can
create a fake email account that appears to be from A and use it to send B an email with E ’s public
key and contact details for the handshake; if B has never met A , a trustwords comparison with
E would succeed given that A and E are indeed executing the protocol; however, B thinks to be
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interacting with A . This attack is not spotted in our verification due to the secure OOB channel
assumption, by which A and B always contact the correct real entity.
The assumption of perfect cryptography implies that we consider the libraries implementing
cryptographic operations to be correct, we did not verify such implementations. Side-channel attacks
are not considered either.
6.4 The Trustwords Generation Function
Following the black box assumption in the symbolic approach, we modeled a correct function that
generates the trustwords in each p≡p client. This function is however central for the handshake since
peer-to-peer authentication is based on the trustwords shown to the user; therefore, we consider
necessary a proof of correctness and security.
Algorithm 3, from the up-to-date source code version of pEpEngine [145], shows the trustwords
function in pseudocode, where getFingerprint(·) computes a cryptographic hash hFpr(·) (usually
expressed as hexadecimal) of the public key given as input parameter; and trustwordOf(·) is a
deterministic one-to-one mapping from a hexadecimal 4-digit value into a word in natural language
(see Section 2.8.3 for details).
In fact, the original algorithm takes as input two p≡ p identities, from which it extracts the
associated key. In order to simplify the proof of correctness, here we pass already the public keys
as initial parameters to Algorithm 3. Afterwards, we discuss security vulnerabilities of the original
version, which however do not affect our correctness claims below.
Security and correctness. We want to assert that (1) if two p≡p instances, pEpA and pEpB, carry
out a trustwords generation process with the same public keys as input, then they output the same
list of words. Furthermore, (2) two identical lists of words should only be generated when the public
keys with which pEpA runs the algorithm, are the same as the input parameters used by pEpB.
For formalizing (2) we need to consider the property of the XOR operation by which a bitstring
xored with itself is equal to 0. We elaborate on this point in the proof. Then, we formalize (1) and (2)
as Claim 1 and Claim 2 respectively, and prove them considering the adversarial model described in
Section 6.3.1. Let:
• pEpA and pEpB be p≡p instances installed in secure devices;
• pkA and pkB be distinct public keys;
• pEpA store pkA as the self key and store pkB as the key of an identity obtained via a channel
controlled by the adversary;
• pEpB store pkB as the self key and store pkA as the key of an identity obtained via a channel
controlled by the adversary;
• trustwordsA and trustwordsB be the lists of trustwords returned respectively by the execution
of GET_TRUSTWORDS in pEpA and pEpB;
• getTrustwordsA(pkB,pkA) and getTrustwordsB(pkA,pkB) be predicates respectively denot-




=⇒ trustwordsA = trustwordsB.
Proof. getTrustwordsA(pkB,pkA) implies that pEpA runs GET_TRUSTWORDSA(pkB,pkA). By assump-
tion, pEpA, pEpB, pkB and pkA reside in secure devices, thus, Algorithm 3 is executed following the
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Algorithm 3 Trustwords generation
1: procedure GET_TRUSTWORDS(pk1,pk2)




6: // an empty string to store hexadecimal digits
7: xorResult← ε;
8: //bitwise XOR of both fingerprints. If the fingerprints have different length,
9: //a substring of the length of the shortest one is taken from the longest one
10: while i< length(fpr1) and i< length(fpr2) do
11: f1i← character at i of fpr1;
12: f2i← character at i of fpr2;
13: xoredChar← f1i to binary ⊕ f2i to binary;
14: xorResult← xorResult+xoredChar to hex;
15: INCREMENT i;
16: if length(fpr1) 6= length(fpr2) then
17: xorResult← xorResult+ the remainder of the longest fingerprint;
18: k← 0;
19: //an empty string to store the words obtained from the mapping
20: trustwords← ε;
21: while k< length(xorResult) do
22: //obtain the next 4 hexadecimal digits




27: + add ’0’ to complete a string of size 4;
28: //retrieve the corresponding word given in the p≡p mapping
29: w← trustwordOf(hexVal);
30: trustwords← trustwords+w+ ‘ ’;
31: k← k+4;
return trustwords;
specifications and with the given parameters.
By instructions 3 and 4, the algorithm obtains the fingerprints of pkB and pkA and uses them
to compute xorResultA = fprB⊕ fprA (line 14). Analogously, getTrustwordsB(pkA,pkB) leads to
computing xorResultB = fprA⊕ fprB. Then,
xorResultA = fprB⊕ fprA = fprA⊕ fprB = xorResultB.
From line 16 on, the algorithm operates on xorResult to deterministically compute the string of
words to return. Since xorResultA = xorResultB, then trustwordsA = trustwordsB.

Remark that Claim 1 only implies the correct trustwords generation when the legitimate algorithm
is executed. However, it does not imply mutual authentication between the owners of pkA and pkB,
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as the public keys stored in the devices are assumed to have been exchanged through an insecure
channel. For instance, pEpA could represent a device legitimately owned by E and pkA = pkE ; still,
the claim holds. Mutual authentication is achieved only after a successful handshake, which in p≡p
requires an OOB comparison.
Also, for readability we overload the⊕ operator and use it on hexadecimal strings (the fingerprints)
to denote the bitwise application of the XOR over the given values.
Claim 2.









Proof. By assumption, a genuine instance of p≡p resides in a secure device, therefore, trustwordsA
must be the output of GET_TRUSTWORDSA(x,y). By construction, y corresponds to the self public
key, thus, y = pkA. Now, since it results from the application of trustwordOf(·), by definition of the
latter, the value of trustwordsA is deterministically determined by the value of xorResultA = fprx⊕
fprA. Likewise, trustwordsB is the output of GET_TRUSTWORDSB(z, pkB) and is deterministically
determined by the value of xorResultB = fprz⊕ fprB. Then,
trustwordsA = trustwordsB
=⇒ xorResultA = xorResultB, since trustwordOf(·) is a bijection
=⇒ fprx⊕ fprA = fprz⊕ fprB by lines 10-17
=⇒ getFingerprint(x)⊕getFingerprint(pkA)
= getFingerprint(z)⊕getFingerprint(pkB) by lines 3,4
=⇒ hFpr(x)⊕hFpr(pkA) = hFpr(z)⊕hFpr(pkB) by def.
Since hFpr(pkA) and hFpr(pkB) are fixed respectively for pEpA and pEpB, the equality holds in
two cases:
1) hFpr(x) = hFpr(pkB) and hFpr(z) = hFpr(pkA)
Since hFpr(·) is a cryptographic hash function, by definition it is one-way and collision-resistant.
This implies that there ia a negligible probability of finding x 6= pkB and z 6= pkA such that the
condition above holds, as any adversarial attempt would have to be the result of a brute-force
search over the public key space, which is computationally infeasible. Hence x = pkB and
z = pkA.
Thus, GET_TRUSTWORDSA(pkB, pkA) and GET_TRUSTWORDSB(pkA, pkB) were executed, and
therefore, getTrustwordsA(pkB,pkA) ∧ getTrustwordsB(pkA,pkB) is satisfied.
2) hFpr(x) = hFpr(pkA) and hFpr(z) = hFpr(pkB)
This is the case where both sides of the equality are 0, by the definition of XOR. And
analogous to case 1, x = pkA and z = pkB, which substituting the variables, implies that
getTrustwordsA(pkA,pkA) and getTrustwordsB(pkB,pkB) are TRUE.

This proof shows that there are two ways for the lists of trustwords to be equal. Either if pEpA and
pEpB used the same input parameters (case 1), or if each of them used twice the same public key as
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input parameter (case 2). In the latter case, the list of trustwords will consist only of occurrences of
the word to which the hexadecimal value 0 is mapped.
Since Algorithm 3 takes the input parameters from data locally stored and the devices are
assumed secure, an alternative for the adversary to influence the output of the trustwords generation
consists in sending prepared identities in advance, given that these are received via an insecure
channel.
For instance, considering idA = (emailA, pkA) to be the identity of the owner of pEpA, and
idB = (emailB, pkB) the self-identity in pEpB, E could trigger case 2 by sending id1 = (emailB, pkA)
to pEpA and id2 = (emailA, pkB) to pEpB. Thus, a handshake executed in pEpA with the owner of
emailB, would fetch pkA from id1, and then run GET_TRUSTWORDS(pkA, pkA). Similarly, in pEpB
GET_TRUSTWORDS(pkB, pkB) will run.
A handshake executed with such trustwords lists will be successful, however, the communication
between the genuine owners of idA and idB will not be shown as TRUSTED, since these correct
identities were not verified. This is an attack to authentication, given that the wrong keys are trusted;
it does not compromise the privacy of the communication, as E does not learn any key that allow to
decrypt messages exchanged.
In Algorithm 3 we omitted an implementation detail by which, unless otherwise specified by the
user, only the first five words are retrieved (lines 21-31). This decision increases the chances of an
adversary to find a pre-image. We will expand on this topic in Chapter 9.
Finally, we stress the need for the software to ensure that all the distributions contain exactly
the same trustwords database, to prevent the occurrence of unsuccessful handshakes derived from
inconsistent mappings.
6.5 Concluding Remarks and Further Directions
The analysis presented through this chapter suggests several further research directions beyond
the scope of p≡p, whose study would contribute to enrich the areas of formal security analysis and
secure email.
One direction concerns the development of theoretical frameworks to enrich the insights gained
with a symbolic security analysis.
• As mentioned before, the handshake models a security ceremony, as it considers the interaction of
users, capturing the scenario in which the protocol takes place. Our model however considers only
the ideal behavior of users. An interesting follow-up refers to extending the model to characterize
users with different behaviors. A starting point could be the work by Basin et al. [16], who propose
a model of human errors in human-to-machine authentication protocols.
A related question goes slightly beyond and conjectures whether the perception of a user while
executing a security ceremony has repercussions in the overall security of the system. Defining
a scheme to reason about such aspects poses another challenge. We explore this further in
Chapter 7.
• Given the importance of the trustwords generation algorithm in the protocol, we provided a proof of
security. As in this case, a security analysis of the black box functions in a symbolic model might
be needed. Since Algorithm 3 is relatively straightforward, we provided a manual proof; however,
in the general case we believe that creating a reference implementation of core functions in an
appropriate language, such as F* (see Section 2.9), is an interesting option to automate proofs of
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security, with the additional advantage that, if flaws are found, this implementation can be refined
until the security properties are satisfied; then, F* can generate code in other languages—e.g.
Ocaml, C—to replace the faulty original function.
Another direction branches from reconsidering some of our assumptions, which are generally
shared with secure email and messaging solutions. The aim is to enhance security and usability
aspects of p≡p and secure email solutions.
• We assumed that humans carry out the trustwords comparison faithfully; yet, this might not always
be the case. Manual authentication via an OOB channel opens the possibility for users to introduce
inaccurate inputs to the system—e.g., mistrusting a trusted peer or vice-versa—which might be the
cause of security flaws. A research line to follow up invites to look into cryptographic techniques
that could replace the authentication via OOB, in order to cut down the impact of the user’s actions
in this process, relying instead in approaches with provable security. We dig into this topic in
Chapter 9.
• In the scope of usable security, understanding the causes and frequency of user’s behavior that
deviates from the expectations is also an aspect to explore. In fact, several works address related
topics (e.g., [182, 104]), including a user study on authentication ceremonies for messaging
applications.
• We also assumed that private information between devices of the same user is correctly syn-
chronized, nonetheless, the corresponding p≡p module is still under implementation. Hence, a
security analysis of the corresponding p≡p’s protocol and consequently possible improvements is
an important direction to pursue.
Finally, we consider some general topics to follow for securing email.
• State-of-the-art protocols for secure messaging in general provide stronger security guarantees
than those for email [50, 179]. We speculate whether the adoption of some of these approaches
would make sense in the context of email.
For instance, the Signal protocol [122], mixes multiple Diffie-Hellman shared keys (X3DH2) and
refreshes keys for every message exchange (double-ratchet), to provide secrecy and authentication
of message keys, and forward secrecy of messages [52]. An auxiliary central server stores all
the public keys involved, allowing an interactive exchange. The use of such a server is indeed
an important aspect to consider in the context of p≡p, since it stands against the decentralized
paradigm adopted per design.
• Another idea to consider is how to automatically inherit trust from contacts shared with peers
already trusted; a sort of an automatic web of trust. While there are many important considerations,
e.g., how to get knowledge of shared contacts without violating privacy, we believe that this could
be a direction worth studying.
We explore further some of these directions in the upcoming chapters and hope that at least
some readers find enough motivation to pursue some others.
2https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/
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7A SOCIO-TECHNICAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
FRAMEWORK
So far, we have focused on the analysis of security protocols in the presence of an adversary, which
leads to find vulnerabilities regarding the logic of the protocol. Nevertheless, security protocols
ground services meant to be used by humans (e.g., online payments, email, subscriptions, etc.),
which makes the latter key elements in the achievement of security goals.
The formalization of security protocols typically assumes an ideal user behavior, according to the
specifications, and thus their actions are excluded from the model. Yet, multiple factors influence a
deviation from such an ideal behavior: complex security-related tasks, ill-designed user interfaces,
unusable security policies, or lack of motivation/understanding to make adequate security-related
decisions [56], among others.
These situations might be the cause of security threats, coming from non-malicious users.
Therefore, considering the humans and their environment in a security analysis could help in the
detection of flaws from a socio-technical perspective, which looks at the user-system interaction.
Security ceremonies, introduced by Ellison [73], are extended security protocols where humans,
and their interaction with other nodes in the system, are explicitly included in the models. The
formal analysis of security ceremonies is however not straightforward. Considerable effort has been
devoted to developing techniques that allow to comprehensively model the behavior of users, the
human-system interaction, and subsequently the formal analysis of ceremonies and its automation
(e.g., [73, 17, 59, 100] and references therein).
Motivated by a question left open in the previous chapter, we focus on an aspect of security cere-
monies less studied in the domain of formal security verification. We are interested in understanding
whether the perception of security that users develop while interacting with a system corresponds to
the actual security of the system, and whether and how, misaligned beliefs have repercussions in the
latter.
In fact, there is evidence of inaccurate users’ beliefs having consequences on the security of
systems. For instance, a recent study [5] points out that in general users are not troubled by using
secure messaging tools without authentication; and identifies users not understanding the security
concepts alluded by tools, and the difficulty for users to directly evaluate the security provided, among
the principal obstacles for the adoption of secure communication tools.
In this chapter, we present a formal framework for modeling security ceremonies on the basis
of observed user’s interaction with a system. The models allow the inclusion of two evaluations at
particular moments in time: the values assigned by the system to specific security-related elements
and user beliefs associated to such elements. We also introduce definitions of what we call misaligned-
security properties, which express a relation between the user’s understanding of security features
and the system’s assessment of such features.
The proposed framework is suitable for automatic verification via model checking, to detect
dissimilar evaluations and to examine whether they pose a threat for the socio-technical security.
We start by contextualizing the scenario that frames this analysis; in Section 7.1.1, we briefly
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introduce a conceptual model that captures all the elements required for the formalization. In
Section 7.2, we present the formal framework and formalize misaligned-security properties; we
also discuss their analysis by the use of model checkers. Section 7.3 covers the application of
our technique for the socio-technical misaligned-security analysis of p≡p. The analysis pinpoints
potentially problematic areas that could be investigated further by conducting appropriate user studies,
which we discuss in Section 7.4. Finally, we briefly comment on how this approach could promote a
more comprehensive understanding of socio-technical system security.
7.1 Research context
Research has largely focused on the formal analysis of Human-Automation Interaction (HAI),
mostly for evaluating safety and correctness of tasks that involve human operation in automated critical
systems, such as flight controllers, infusion pumps or even medical devices’ interfaces (e.g., [61, 59,
94]). One of the objectives is detecting errors in the design of human-machine interfaces, that can
potentially decrease the system’s usability, thus preventing the human operator from achieving a
specific goal (see [39] for a review of approaches in this area).
The main interest of such approaches converges to modeling possible interactions occurring via
the user interface, and the properties typically concern correctness of the system when we consider
alternative user’s behavior. Thus, these analyses regard a technical angle.
Differing from those works, the approach proposed here focuses in defining properties that search
for security threats emerging from the user-system interaction in ideal conditions, i.e., when users
are honest participants and the implementation is correct. Hence, unlike in regular security protocol
analysis, here we do not consider an adversary model.
An example of such properties is what we denote as False-SoI (false sense of insecurity), which
is satisfied when a secure system fails to transmit the adequate degree of protection that it actually
provides; on the contrary, the property False-SoS (false sense of security) describes insecure systems
that manage to get users to feel secure, without providing proven security guarantees.
Given the nature of the analysis, we introduce the following assumptions on the systems to be
studied:
1. The implementation of the system meets the functional requirements of the technical specifica-
tions (functional correctness).
2. The security of the system is asserted by proofs of security of the underlying cryptographic
protocols.
3. Users execute only actions that are valid in the ceremony.
These assumptions rule out discrepancies derived from a faulty implementation and from users
intentionally sabotaging the system—e.g., changing system’s values by undetected means.
As a starting point, we use a diagrammatic representation of a socio-technical system, which
comprises all the elements required for our focus analysis, and which we introduce in the next section.
Remark however that the proposed formal framework does not depend on the existence of a such a
representation; all the elements to be formalized can be gathered independently.
7.1.1 Multi-layered User Journeys
A multi-layered user journey[168] (MUJ) is a visual model based on multi-layered representations
of security ceremonies [25], user journeys [71], and technical specifications of a system. This model
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captures the path followed by a user when trying to accomplish a certain goal in a system, along with
the user’s beliefs regarding specific security-related aspects of the system, experimented through the
path.
Multi-layered (concertina) models [25] of security ceremonies split a socio-technical system into
its different information and communication layers. Thus, there are layers related to the user—e.g.
to capture their behavior outside the system, and their actions in the user interface—and layers
that model system’s processes and protocols, including external nodes with which the system
interacts—e.g. cloud services.
Inspired by user journeys, which depict thoughts and emotions experienced by a user during the
process of accomplishing a goal, multi-layered user journeys extend concertina models with a user
layer that captures a user’s perceptions in relation to selected aspects.
The layers modeling the system, and claims about its security guarantees need to be gathered
from technical specifications and security analysis, respectively.
It is important to highlight that a multi-layered user journey always refers to the experience of a
particular user with a specific application and a specific goal.
Note that, even though security is nowadays at the core of most systems, users are rarely aware
or even concerned about their existence. MUJs are mainly intended to model socio-technical systems
whose aim is to provide some sort of security—e.g. secure email, secure messaging— and so,
the security goals are considered to go in parallel with the user’s goal—e.g., wanting to send an
email only to the intended recipient and unreadable to anyone else, is in line with authentication and
encryption.
7.2 Formal Approach for Aligned Sense-of-Security Analysis
We start by proposing a formalization of the multi-layered user journey. Informally, our model
represents all the possible states that a system can reach when a user performs any possible
sequence of actions to achieve a specified goal; in each state we can model the evaluations
determined by the implementation and by the user’s perception.
Then, we introduce classes of misaligned-security properties, which must be expressed in terms
of unambiguous and measurable aspects of the system. Finally, we describe how to use these
elements to execute an analysis for detecting and reasoning about existing discrepancies between
the objective and subjective security of a system, as explained before.
Perhaps with minor adaptations, this approach is suitable for detecting non-security related
misalignment in a wide variety of systems.
7.2.1 Formalization of multi-layered user journeys
Roughly, labeled transition systems (LTSs) are directed graphs used to model the evolution of
systems, where nodes distinguish states of the system and edges represent transitions among states,
triggered by actions labeling the edges [15].
To formally represent the ceremony of a user pursuing a specified goal G in a given system, we
adapt an LTS with elements for modeling knowledge concerning facts, system assignments and user
perceptions about certain aspects of the system. We call this structure an s-t (for socio-technical)
transition system.
Definition 7.2.1. An s-t transition system M is a tuple (S,Act,Prop,→, I,A,evSys,evUsr), where
• S = {s1, ...,sk} is a finite set of states
7.2 Formal Approach for Aligned Sense-of-Security Analysis 69
• Act is a finite set of action names
• Prop is a finite set of atomic propositions
• x−→⊆ S× (Act∪Cond)×S is a transition relation, where Cond is the set of propositional logic
formulas over Prop
• I ⊆ S is a set of initial states
• A = {a1, . . . ,an} is a finite set of variable names. Each ai ∈ A has a corresponding domain
Dai with a partial order defined. The value undefined (⊥) is in every Dai
• evSys,evUsr : A×S→
⋃n
i=1 Dai are evaluation functions that, in a state s j ∈ S, assign to an
ai ∈ A a value from its predefined domain Dai .
This structure can be used to formally represent a MUJ as described next.
The actions that a user can perform through the interface are elements in Act. The elements in
Prop model statements about the socio-technical context (reality), whose truth value might also be
undefined, and known or unknown by the system or by the user at any state.
The relation s1
x−→ s2 denotes a transition from s1 to s2 when action x occurs or when formula x
holds; the labels on the edges are determined by the user’s actions allowed at the corresponding state
or by statements whose satisfaction is a condition to reach the next state. S and I are determined by
the system layers of the MUJ.
To study discrepancies, we need to identify aspects of the system relevant for specifying security
properties, and either directly or indirectly measurable by both, users and the system itself. The
variables ai in A capture such aspects; since they represent different concepts, each ai has its own
domain Dai defined accordingly. In a messaging application for instance, we could select a1:“trust
level of a contact" and a2:“message’s sending mode” with Da1 = {trusted,unknown,mistrusted,⊥}
and Da2 = {encrypted,plaintext,⊥}.
Finally, the output of evSys depicts the value assigned in the system to an ai at a specific state.
The evaluation of evUsr reports the user’s perception of ai, mapped into the required Dai , that was
observed at a specific state.
Note that an invariable aspect to be evaluated concerns the achievement of the goal itself,
i.e., at each state we want to assess the system’s and the user’s evaluation regarding whether
G has been reached, if it is still in progress, or if the conditions at that state prevent its future
completion. Hereafter, we will use the variable goal ∈ A to identify this aspect, for which Dgoal =
{reached,ongoing, failed,⊥} and failed < ongoing < reached. Also, we will denote as final states
those s ∈ S in which evSys(goal,s) 6= ongoing.
7.2.2 Misaligned-security properties
Computation Tree Logic (CTL) is a branching temporal logic, originally proposed by Clarke and
Emerson [51], sufficiently expressive for the formulation of properties that consider all possible futures
from a certain point in time.
CTL formulas are interpreted over transition systems. The syntax of CTL is defined by the
following grammar over a minimal set of connectives in propositional logic, where p is in the set of
atomic propositions:
Φ ::=> | p | ¬Φ | Φ∧Φ | Eϕ | Aϕ
ϕ ::= GΦ | FΦ | XΦ | ΦUΦ
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The operators A and E are path quantifiers and G, F, X and U are state quantifiers. Intuitively, the
operators A and E respectively express properties, over all paths of a model M , and over at least
one path in M . Analogously, the operators G, X and F allow to express properties expected to hold
in all the states of a path (G), in the next state (X), or at least in a state reachable in the future (F).
The until operator, U, expresses that, at some state of the path, a property φ2 holds and in all the
previous states, φ1 is true (φ1Uφ2).
Satisfiability of CTL formulas is decided by a state-based semantics, i.e., formulas are evaluated
in a given state of a model. Then, a model M satisfies a formula φ (M |= φ) iff φ holds in every state
of the model.
CTL is a logic for which efficient and relatively simple model-checking algorithms do exist. Readers
interested in the topic might refer to standard textbooks for logic in computer sciences or model
checking (e.g. [15, 97]).
Representative misaligned-security properties
We use CTL to express the misaligned-security properties due to its interpretation of time over
a tree-like structure, where at each state, the future value of propositions is not yet determined.
The assessment of security in our scenario conforms to this interpretation, since user and system
gradually set a value to the security aspects as the former executes the ceremony to achieve the
specified goal.
Hereafter, we use asysi to denote evSys(ai,x) and a
usr
i for evUsr(ai,x), where x is the state in
which the property is being evaluated. Then, we define the following misaligned-security properties,
which can be considered each representative of a class:
Aligned-AoS At every state during the ceremony, the assessment of security that the user has
about aspect ai corresponds to the system’s evaluation of security of ai:
AG ausri = a
sys
i .
Lower-AoS There is a state in the ceremony, where the assessment of security that the user has
about aspect ai is less optimistic than the system’s evaluation of security of ai:
EF ausri < a
sys
i .
Higher-AoS There exists a state during the ceremony, where the assessment of security that the
user has about ai exceeds the system’s evaluation of security of ai:
EF ausri > a
sys
i .
Misaligned goal There exists a path where, even if the evaluation of all other aspects is aligned all











U (goalusr 6= goalsys)
)
The first three properties might provide better insights if analyzed as presented, for each ai;





i , R ∈ {<,=,>}.
As a remark, recall that the model allows cases where the user cannot determine a value for a
certain ai (ausri =⊥). For a more accurate analysis, the properties should exclude evaluations for
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which the value is unknown, and so for instance, Aligned-AoS should read as
AG (aui 6=⊥→ aui = a
sys
i ).
For readability, we omitted this check in the formulas above.
The analysis is certainly not constrained to the sole verification of the misaligned-security
properties defined in this section; introducing the comparison relation ‘≤’ for instance, already gives
different insights. Analysts might as well define properties specific for the socio-technical system in
question.
Informal interpretation of the properties
Considering an s-t transition system that models the system in question:
Aligned-AoS holds if the user always has an accurate perception about the security provided by
the system. This property represents an ideal case in which the user understands how the system
behaves in every state, and which however rarely occurs.
Lower-AoS holds if at any step of the process, the user assessed the specific ai less secure than
it was in the system. An interpretation of this property is what we introduced in Section 7.1 as “False-
SoI”: assuming that Dai = {secure, insecure}, if at some point ausri = insecure and a
sys
i = secure,
then the user perceived a degree of protection lower than what the system actually provides; this
false sense of insecurity might for instance lead the user to stop utilizing the system.
Higher-AoS is the complement of the previous, and so, it holds if at any step of the process,
the user assessed the specific ai higher than the system. The analogous interpretation for this
property is the previously mentioned “False-SoS”, with asysi = insecure and a
usr
i = secure, which
reflects an insecure system transmitting to the user a high but misleading sense of security; here, the
unawareness of the risk puts the user in a vulnerable position.
Note that when we consider ai = goal, the previous properties provide insights about the usability
of the system, given the assumption that G expresses a security related aim.
Misaligned goal holds when the system’s and the user’s evaluations of all the ais coincide, except
for the one regarding the goal achievement, i.e., the user could not successfully notice when or if the
system reached a final state. The satisfaction of this property might be an indicator of shortcomings
in the user interface or in the user experience.
7.2.3 Formal verification of s-t transition systems
Satisfiability of misaligned-security properties can be automatically verified in s-t transition
systems by using tools for model checking [51], a verification technique that explores in a systematic
manner all the paths reachable from each state in a model, to determine whether a specified property
holds in the said model1.
Before performing the verification, the evaluation functions evSys and evUsr need to be defined.
The system assignments required to specify evSys might be obtained by analyzing traces or logs
recorded during the system’s execution. The evaluations concerning the user perspective, which
define evUsr, are obtained from the multi-layered user journey.
These functions could also be mappings of predetermined evaluations, prepared to obtain insights
1With the help of adequate data structures, state-of-the-art algorithms for model checking are able to handle models
with large state spaces (1020 up to even 10476 states), treating effectively the so called states explosion problem that is
intrinsic to model checking.
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on specific hypothetical settings. In such a case, selected values from the domain are assigned to the
variables, depending on the hypothesis. A posterior study with actual users would validate/invalidate
the hypothesis and consequently, the results obtained.
An analysis of the verification’s results pinpoints states of the system where certain security
aspects are potentially misunderstood by users. Detecting such states enables the improvement of
localized components of the system. Moreover, the identified situations are subject to other types of
analysis, such as those targeted at finding and fixing root causes of confusions related to deficiencies
in the interface design [61].
An ideal application of the technique consists on a constant iteration of the process: model-verify-
analyze-improve, until an adequate alignment between subjective and objective evaluation of security
is achieved.
7.3 Sense-of-Security Analysis of p≡p
We find a use case for the presented technique, in the analysis of socio-technical security aspects
of p≡p, which expands the findings of previous chapters.
There are opposed opinions with respect to whether hiding how a secure email system provides
security can lead users to a lack of trust in the system [158], or not [10]. Some works agree that the
security properties that encryption tools offer should be explained to the user so that they can evaluate
security trade-offs [14], along with adequate documentation regarding the tools[10]. Furthermore,
Lerner et al. [114] remark that encrypted email may have adverse effects, if it provides a false sense
of security to certain groups that have special requirements, such as journalists willing to protect
metadata about communication patterns.
With the analysis in this section, we want to learn whether the approach adopted by p≡p for
providing encryption and authentication is understood and properly performed by users, and what the
repercussions could be if this were not the case.
As a reminder, authentication in p≡p is achieved via a handshake (Chapter 6), after which, a
privacy rating is assigned to the recipient and then shown to the user in all future communications, to
indicate the level of privacy with which a message will be sent. These ratings (TRUSTED, SECURE,
MISTRUSTED and UNSECURE) are explained in Section 2.8.4; in the rest of this chapter, we will
respectively denote each of them as T, S, I and N.
7.3.1 MUJ for sending an encrypted and authenticated email
We based our formalization in the MUJ of Figure 7.1, presented originally in [168], where the
emotions in the first sub-layer hypothetically represent emotions that could be retrieved from non-
expert users; the system layers of the diagram are based on technical specifications that we extracted
by the technique in Chapter 3, along with the security protocols studied in the previous chapter.
Details regarding the construction of this representation can be consulted in the cited reference [168].
The user goal that the MUJ depicts is G : to send an e-mail whose content is confidential,
exclusively to a specific person.
7.3.2 Formalizing the MUJ and properties
Figure 7.2 shows our model of the MUJ described above, as an s-t transition system, Mp≡p. S
and
x−→ are respectively represented by the nodes and arrows in the diagram; the initial state is s0;
the green labels conform Act while the orange ones are elements in Cond. The propositions in Prop
are defined as follows: pepReceiver=“the recipient is user of p≡p”, handshake=“the authentication
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Figure 7.1: Multi-layered user journey depicting the process in p≡p of sending an e-mail whose content is
confidential, exclusively to a specific person. Originally from [168].
protocol has been performed”, trustwordsMatch=“the compared fingerprints are equal in reality” and
confirmedTrustwords=“the user has confirmed in the system that the fingerprints match".
We define the set of security related aspects in which we are interested as A = {privacy,goal},
where privacy represents the trust rating assigned to an email and goal captures the status of G , as
defined in Section 7.2.1. The set of p≡p’s trust ratings defines the domain Dprivacy = {⊥,N,I,S,T}.
In the graph, we use prvpEp and prvusr to model respectively privacysys and privacyusr in each state;
for example, evSys(privacy,s14) = S is represented in the model by adding prvpEp = S to the label
of s14. Similarly, goalpEp and goalusr express the evaluation of goal returned respectively by evSys
and evUsr.
The evaluation function evSys in each state is determined by the trust rating assignments as
shown in the system layers in Figure 7.1; this definition relies on the assumptions from Section 7.1.
Since our purpose here is to provide an analysis via the formal scheme presented, pragmatically, we
determined the value assignments of evUsr by mapping a subset of the emotional responses featured
in the USER layer of Fig. 7.1 into Dprivacy. The mapping, presented below, is subjective and merely
illustrative; its validation and improvement by means of proper usability and User Experience (UX)

















































































Figure 7.2: Model Mp≡p for the goal in p≡p: sending a confidential email exclusively to a specific peer. Where
not specified, the values of prvpEp and prvusr remain as in the previous state, and the value of goalpEp and
goalusr is ongoing.
related techniques would be insightful to validate the analysis.
Not reported by user⇒⊥
{doubt, confusion}⇒ N
{insecurity, worry, distrust}⇒ I
{security, reluctance, confidence}⇒ S
{trust, satisfaction}⇒ T
Then, to learn whether the user has an accurate understanding of the way in which the message
is sent and how the trust rating changes during the process until the system sends it out to the world,
we analyzed the misaligned-security properties:
P1. AG (goalusr ≤ goalsys)
P2. AG (privacyusr ≤ privacysys)
P3. E [(privacyusr ≤ privacysys) U (goalusr 6= goalsys)]
P4. AG
(
¬trustwordsMatch→ (AG privacysys 6= T)
)
P1, P2 and P3 are instances of the classes defined in Section 7.2.2. P4 is a property specifically
of p≡p and expresses that, if at any state the trustwords lists (to be) compared are different, then
p≡p’s trust rating is never T in any of the future reachable states. This property can be customized
to provide specific insights, for instance, to ensure that not only the system, but also the user never
assesses the trust rating with the highest value if the trustwords do not match in reality.
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7.3.3 Verification and Analysis
We used NuSMV [49], a model checker based on BDDs and SAT-solvers, to verify the misaligned-
security properties in our model, and we found that only P3 is satisfied. The encoding of the model is
included in Appendix A.3.
Mp≡p 6|= P1. P1 does not hold when the user follows the trace s0 → s1 → s5 → s6 → s9. This
reflects the case of a user A wanting to send a confidential email to another p≡p user B , yet, there
is no record in the system of these peers having verified their identities (s6).
As per p≡p’s specifications, the system assigns the trust rating S to the message, thus, if A
chooses to send the email (s9), the achievement of G fails for the system because, even if the content
is sent encrypted (confidentiality holds), p≡p does not have enough information to guarantee that
the key used to encrypt the email belongs to B (authentication fails).
On the contrary, A ’s positive evaluation of goal can be justified in several ways; for instance, B
might have succeeded in reading a previous encrypted email from A and they might have talked
about it; users might be reusing keys that they have authenticated somewhere else; or it could also
be that A simply does not consider impersonation of B as a plausible risk.
Mp≡p 6|= P2. P2 is not satisfied either, when the user goes through s0→ s1→ s5→ s6→ s12→ s13.
The result is interpreted as follows: after the user, A , selects to execute a handshake in s6, p≡p
shows the list of trustwords supposed to belong to the intended receiver B (s12), which ideally, A is
expected to validate with B through a second channel—e.g. via a phone call.
The state s13 represents the moment when the system generates for A the trustwords for a
correct key of B and the peers determine that the trustwords are the same; at that point A is certain
of being communicating with B , but the value in the system has not changed because A has not
pressed the confirmation button.
However, this violation to P2 occurs in a state that models a human action in the ceremony, where
the system expects feedback from the user, thus, it does not represent a security problem as long as
A submits the confirmation to p≡p in the next step (s10).
Mp≡p |= P3. For P3 to be satisfied there must exists a trace that satisfies the U condition. An
instance is indeed the same trace found for P1, i.e. s0→ s1→ s5→ s6→ s9, and the discussion for
P1 explains this case too.
Mp≡p 6|= P4. The satisfiability of P4 is falsified by the trace s0→ s1→ s5→ s6→ s12→ s14→ s15,
i.e., when the system generates for A a list of trustwords that differs from the list of B (s14), and
yet, A confirms the handshake in p≡p (s15). Since the system can only rely on A ’s input regarding
the words validation, it proceeds with the handshake, assigning the corresponding rating T to the
message.
Furthermore, the model in Figure 7.2 shows that A indeed evaluates the message as T too (s15).
One explanation could be that A only started the handshake process but actually did not contact B
to compare the words, and proceeded with the confirmation without noticing the disparity. A could
have also confirmed even knowing that the trustwords were different, perhaps thinking that it was a
minor mistake from p≡p.
In any case, the system and the user present an aligned assessment of privacy and goal (s16)
which however does not correspond to reality, and which is the cause of a security vulnerability as it
nullifies the out-of-band (OOB) authentication process.
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7.4 Contextualized Analysis and Related Work
The analysis shows that socio-technical vulnerabilities in p≡p are mostly related to the authenti-
cation process and confirms some known problems with the use of secure email identified by the
usable security community.
For example, non-expert users might not be aware of the privacy threats present when authenti-
cation is missing. Such a scenario has in fact been observed in a user study where journalists and
lawyers interact with a secure email solution [114]; the study reports only a few of the participants
being concerned about the authenticity of the contacts. In the case of P1, the fact that p≡p shows
SECURE as the trust rating for a particular message, might lead users to consider that they have
already achieved G , and hence, that performing the authentication step only provides some sort of
additional security.
Another known problem, highlighted by P4, regards users not performing correctly the ceremony
for authentication. This situation introduces a security weakness derived neither from an implementa-
tion problem nor from a misalignment, but from the authentication approach. From p≡p’s perspective,
authentication is reduced to users pressing a “confirm”/“reject” button; nonetheless, this decision is
determined purely by human interactions in the security ceremony. The lack of precise steps defining
the process for users gives them freedom to follow their own approach, according to which, their
perception of security would be determined and then communicated to the system. Thus, the user’s
assessment would be aligned with the system’s assessment, yet, they could both differ from reality.
7.4.1 Limitations
This formalization is designed to provide formal grounds to usability research, and therefore, the
relevance of an analysis via this technique is tightly coupled with the input regarding the user layer,
more precisely, the emotions and the extension at which the human behavior in the ceremony is
represented.
For an analysis to yield realistic conclusions, particular importance shall be given to the use
of a sound methodology to capture user’s perceptions, and to an appropriate mapping of those
perceptions into values comparable with the system’s evaluations. For this reason, the analysis of
p≡p that we provide requires to be validated by appropriate user studies, as the MUJ of p≡p for
goal G is not based on an extensive user study but rather on the input received during a focus group
session.
Selecting or developing appropriate techniques to gather the user’s perception pertains to the
field of usability and user experience (UX), and therefore is out of the scope of this chapter which is
rather focused in the formal modeling. The topic remains open for interested readers.
Another remark is that Mp≡p models mainly system states. This can be improved by enhancing
the MUJ, or alternative sources, with steps taken by users for performing tasks outside the system.
For instance, s13 could transition to a state s′13 when a proposition contactPeer, which is true when
the user contacts the peer to compare the trustwords, holds, and to s′′13 otherwise. Then s
′′
13 would





In this case, the evaluations of privacysys and goalsys in s′13 and s
′′
13 would remain as in the
previous state, while user assessments could enrich the model.
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Finally, note that a MUJ captures the journey of a specific user and so, for an insightful analysis
the verification would need to be executed for each observed participant in a user study, to then study
in detail the different causes of misaligned assessments. Alternatively, for a more comprehensive
analysis, the results from all the participants in the study could be considered to create a MUJ with
the average user behavior per state; the formalization and posterior analysis would then identify
common misaligned situations.
7.4.2 Related work
A closely related work which formalizes user interaction on a socio-technical level is by Deagni
and Heymann [61]. They create a formal model based on two transition systems: one capturing
user’s assumptions of the software’s state, based on a so called GOMS model of the user behavior,
and the other representing the software itself. The principal difference with the approach that we
covered in this chapter is that their verification concerns the correctness of the interaction in complex
automated control systems, while here we address security expressed in terms of the alignment of
the user’s perception with the implementation.
Another similar work is by Beckert and Beuster [24], who present a methodology for the formal
specification and verification of GOMS models of user behavior, under security aspects. Their
formalization focuses only on the user interface layer of a system as opposed to the one presented
here that runs across system and user layers.
7.5 Concluding Remarks and Further Directions
Recapitulating, in this chapter we introduced s-t transition systems to provide a mathematical
based technique for analyzing a new class of so called misaligned-security properties in socio-
technical systems. The formalization is suitable for automatic analysis, which is particularly advanta-
geous for large systems.
We also introduced the class of misaligned-security properties to identify discrepancies between
subjective user perceptions of security aspects in a system and the objective system assessment of
those aspects; a formal verification yields an analysis of the repercussion of such dissimilarities in
the socio-technical security of a system.
As mentioned Section 7.4, additional properties could be defined if the models are expanded
with states representing the actions of the users where the system is not involved. Remark though
that to obtain meaningful insights, this expansion would make sense if done in an interdisciplinary
manner, with basis on user studies that report how users actually perform the modeled process.
The presented approach allowed us to study p≡p from a different perspective which until the
previous chapter was purely technical. From this analysis, we identified potential socio-technical
issues related to the OOB authentication process.
There are several further directions from both, the formal methods and the usability perspectives,
some of which we discuss next.
With a regular interaction with a system, the perception of users is expected to change, as tasks
become familiar. The presented approach models a single observed run of a user, so, a refinement
of the approach would involve the dynamic assignment of user’s perceptions. An idea considers to
look into formalisms for modeling and analyzing uncertainty, such as subjective logic, which allows to
express beliefs about the truth of propositions at a specific moment, with some degree of uncertainty
modeled by probabilities.
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A more practical direction looks into ways to automate the generation of the formal model. This
would require developing tools that allow the representation of a multi-layer user journey, which
can then be parsed into a formal specification—for instance into the input language of NuSMV. The
process needs to consider also the automatic extraction of the system assignments regarding the
aspects to be evaluated.
From the p≡p analysis perspective, we could extend the verification by considering other user
goals within p≡p.
Finally an interesting direction from the UX perspective conjectures whether the user’s assessment
of certain aspects of a system is influenced by observing the evaluation of the system, such that they
rely more on the values shown by the system rather than on the real facts. For instance, considering
that a user confirms the trustwords of another user B without even contacting B , p≡p will show
messages from such contact as TRUSTED; so, we wonder if by constantly seeing this trust rating the
user starts to believe that the emails to and from B are authenticated, even being aware that the
handshake did not take place.
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PART II
Improvements to Secure Email and Secure
Messaging
82
8PROTECTING WEAK PASSWORDS IN
PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION
In Part I, we explored and applied formal techniques to verify properties related to privacy
(e.g. secrecy and authentication) and a class of misaligned-security properties regarding
socio-technical aspects of secure communication protocols. In this part we reflect further on
some of the findings and propose two approaches to deal with authentication-related problems:
the first one aims at dealing with the user’s selection of weak passwords; the second makes
an attempt at automating as much as possible the authentication of public keys and key
management in the context of secure email, to enable authenticated communication among
peers.
8.1 Weak passwords and cleartext login credentials
In Chapter 5, we presented a protocol for detecting a password database (password file) leakage,
under a compromised login server scenario, considering the architecture of the Honeywords System.
Our assumptions included an adversary who managed to obtain a password database whose content
was secured by some means, and who in addition could crack the content.
Yet, from a pragmatic angle, the Honeywords System is rarely implemented, and the ability to
retrieve all the passwords from a secure database defines a strong adversarial model. However,
there are situations that make password discovery easier, for instance, the use of weak passwords.
There are many interpretations for what a weak password implies. For instance, in [142] Pound
explains aspects to consider when selecting passwords—e.g minimal length of 8 characters, the
ineffectiveness of replacing letters by numbers; then, in [143] he shows a dictionary attack by which,
using a computer with 48 Gb of RAM split in 4 graphic cards, he easily retrieves a significant number
of passwords that fail to adhere to those mentioned guidelines. Here, we informally characterize
weak passwords as low-entropy strings, simply derivable or easily guessable, either by humans, or by
publicly available algorithms and tools that run in reasonable time.
Users selecting weak passwords for login is a well-known security problem (e.g., [40, 121, 188]),
largely due to the misunderstanding about what makes a password strong and to users’ unawareness
of attack scenarios [180]. Rather commonly, passwords are short strings, built either from predictable
combinations (e.g. “12345678”,”1q2w3e4r”) or from common words that additionally tend to be
semantically related (e.g. “lovelydog”), and often reused across different accounts [190].
Given the tendency of users to reuse passwords and the frequency of password databases
breaches (as discussed in Chapter 5), the attempt to protect passwords in storage is indeed important
for preventing the potential disclosure of a large number of user credentials and their posterior use
for accessing multiple systems.
Password storage techniques have notably improved over the years; nowadays, memory-hard
hashing schemes [95] are combined with a salt to make password-cracking computationally very
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hard. Nonetheless, despite state-of-the-art techniques, poorly chosen passwords are still subject to
be retrieved by offline dictionary attacks.
Another usually overlooked aspect that enables password discovery is that of users sending
their password every time that they want to login. Regardless of the technique adopted for storing
the passwords safe in the servers, the clients usually send the passwords in cleartext [34], perhaps
justified by the use of encrypted channels, such as TLS. Still, anyone having access to the server at
any time, can learn the passwords too; examples of this occurred in Twitter and Facebook, which
until recently were storing logs with passwords in plaintext [7, 110].
In this chapter, we develop further the idea of the protocol presented in Chapter 5, to address both
of these issues—i.e, weak passwords and passwords sent in cleartext—in the typical client-server
architecture setting. We propose a password-based authentication protocol which masks the pass-
words with a seed obtained from an OTP device, to generate unpredictable dynamic authentication
values.
We believe the usability of this protocol to be the same as in password-based methods with OTP;
yet, this approach has the advantage of strengthening the protection of passwords in storage, and of
preventing passwords from ever being sent in plaintext, thus eliminating weaknesses derived from
their exposure.
We start by providing some context and background in Section 8.2 and Section 8.3. Then, we
introduce the authentication scheme in Section 8.4 and provide an informal security analysis in
Section 8.5. We presented this proposal in [186], primarily aiming to share and open a discussion
on the idea. By now, we have investigated further and concluded that the security of the approach
resides mainly in that of embedded solutions; yet, this approach slightly increases the cost in practice.
We elaborate on this point in Section 8.6.
8.2 Related Approaches
Several academic and commercial approaches deal with the issue of users selecting weak
passwords.
Password vaults—e.g. “Password Safe”1 or “Password Gorilla”2—offer an option to deal with the
user’s selection of weak passwords. The software generates secure passwords on behalf of the user
and keeps them safe in an encrypted file on the device of the user, who can retrieve them at any
moment by entering a master password. A drawback of this approach is that, as now the vault is a
central repository, the risk associated to the user selecting an insecure password to access the vault,
or moreover, the master key getting compromised, is drastically higher than in the initial problem.
A physical solution is YubiKey3, a small USB-like stick that implements several protocols for strong
two-factor, multi-factor and passwordless authentication. The user authentication is via fingerprint or
by tapping. As in the case of password vaults, the main issue here is the centralized storage of keys,
so that losing the YubiKey, prevents the user from accessing all the accounts managed by the device.
A more common approach refers to the use of multi-factor authentication—e.g., Google 2-step
verification4—where in addition to the password, users are required to provide other values coming
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fingerprint). The access is granted only if each of the input values is equal to the value expected by
the login server. This technique certainly strengthens the authentication process, however, users can
still choose weak passwords and the leakage of a password file remains a serious issue.
Our solution remains within the context of password-based authentication. Similar to the use of a
second factor, the approach that we propose relies on users possessing a One-Time-Password (OTP)
device. Nevertheless, instead of merely considering such a device as a proof of possession,
we combine the numbers generated by the OTP with the password, to further create fresh and
unpredictable authentication values.
8.3 Cryptographic preliminaries
8.3.1 Securing passwords in storage
An approach used for a long time to protect passwords in storage consists in applying a hash
function h (e.g., SHA-512) to the password, pwd, concatenated with a random value known as
salt, i.e., h(pwd||salt). While this approach protects hashed passwords from attacks that use pre-
computed tables (e.g., lookup or rainbow tables), it is not effective neither against dictionary nor
brute-force attacks, since the algorithms to compute hash functions are relatively fast.
Key derivation functions (KDFs) are deterministic algorithms used to derive cryptographic keying
material from a possibly (but not necessarily) low-entropy secret value, such as a password. Password-
based KDFs (PBKDF) help mitigate dictionary or brute-force attacks on the passwords by forcing the
attacker to perform more computational work.
A PBKDF is defined by the choice of a pseudorandom function (PRF)—e.g., HMAC—and a fixed
number of iterations c. The input parameters include a password p, a salt s recommended to be
at least 128 bits, and the desired length in bit of the high-entropy output [176]. PKBDF algorithms
typically apply c times the PRF to the input parameters, requiring considerable use of memory, and
not allowing parallelization. Some examples are scrypt [139], argon2 [33] or bcrypt [149].
Note that, although PBKDFs make the execution of dictionary attacks expensive, the latter are
still possible and weak passwords are still vulnerable.
8.3.2 One-time Password
One-time password (OTP) algorithms generate strings meant to be valid only for one login session
or transaction on a system, which allows dealing with replay attacks.
An OTP algorithm is determined by a hash function, which produces a uniformly distributed
number based on the following input parameters: a random seed (usually 256 bits or 512 bits long),
a time-synched or an event-based parameter—e.g., a timestamp or a counter for time-based or
event-based OTPs respectively—and additional variables to add entropy.
The HMAC-based One-Time Password (HOTP) algorithm [129] is an event-based algorithm
which depends on an increasing counter value and a static symmetric key known only to the OTP
device and to the validation server. The IETF specifications suggest HMAC-SHA-15 to generate a
hash of the key and the counter. The 160-bits output is then truncated to a 32-bits value, and finally
converted to digits, for usability reasons.
5Note that SHA-1 is not considered secure to generate digital signatures given that it is not collision-resistant and digital
signatures are long-lasting values, thus, the adversary has the time-frame to forge them. However, collisions are not
relevant in the case of OTP values since the main concern is to generate a random one-time use output, hence, using
SHA-1 in OTP algorithms is still acceptable.
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U: u,w,OTP(·) LS: OTP(·)
1 : r1← OTP(1)
2 : x← f (H(w),r1)
3 : u,x
4 : r1← OTP(1)
5 : r2← OTP(2)
6 : x′← xr2/r1
7 : storePassword(u,H(x′))
8 : r← r2
Figure 8.1: Registration protocol
8.4 Proposed Password-based Authentication Protocols
Considering a client-server architecture, we refer to the client as the User Interface (U) and to the
server as Login Server (LS). Then, the authentication process requires two protocols: registration
and authentication.
Assumptions We assume that U and LS communicate through a secure channel, e.g., imple-
mented by TLS 1.3. As well, we assume that U holds an OTP device which has been delivered
securely; the device implements HOTP and its output is aligned with the output produced by a
corresponding OTP’s generator algorithm in the LS.
The protocols are described next, where OTP(n) is the number generated the nth time that the
device is used and H is a PBKDF. We omit implementation details, such as verifying that a given
username exists.
8.4.1 Registration
This protocol (Figure 8.1) allows a user to register to a service, with a username u and a password
w. The user operates the OTP device for the first time and gets a number OTP(1) which inputs into
the system (step 1). Then, U hashes w with H, and afterwards masks this value using OTP(1) as a
seed (step 2). The token obtained is sent to LS together with u (step 3). On reception, LS generates
the first two OTP numbers, r1 and r2, (steps 4, 5), and uses them to mask the identity token received
from U (step 6); for this step, LS does not need to know the password, as we explain below. The
new token is hashed once more with H, and then stored as u’s password (step 7). LS also stores r2
before concluding the protocol.
The masking function f is implemented by modular exponentiation, akin to the blinding in
Chapter 5: for each username, LS possesses g, a generator of a multiplicative subgroup G of order q,
such that, f (H(w),r) = gr·H(w), where r ∈ {1, · · · ,q−1} is a random number—here, synchronized
with the user’s OTP device. This definition allows f to be computed in terms of the current value
f (H(w),r), the current random exponent r, and a new random value r′:
f (H(w),r′) = gr
′·H(w) = gr·
r′
r ·H(w) = (gr·H(w))
r′




In the authentication phase (Figure 8.2), U submits a username u, and the hashed password w,
masked with the current OTP(n) (step 3). LS retrieves u’s authentication value from the password file
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U: u,w,OTP(·) LS: r,OTP(·)
1 : rn← OTP(n)
2 : x← f (H(w),rn)
3 : u,x
4 : y← getPwd(u)
5 : if y == H(x) then
6 : rn+1← OTP(n+1)
7 : x′← xrn+1/r
8 : updatePassword(u,H(x′))
9 : r← rn+1
10 : resp← true
11 : else
12 : resp← false
13 : resp
Figure 8.2: Authentication Protocol for n > 1
(step 4) and for authenticating, it applies H to the received token x, which must match the value stored
in the file (step 5). If the check succeeds, LS generates a new OTP which it uses to compute a new
authentication value for u (steps 6,7) as described by equation (1); then LS updates the password file
and r (steps 8,9). If the compared values are not equal, the access is denied (step 12). LS concludes
the protocol by sending a response to U (step 13).
8.4.3 Implementation
A way to perform the modular exponentiation for the masking function f is by elliptic curve (EC)
multiplication, for which there exist efficient implementations (e.g. [116] and references therein). As
we mentioned before, for H one can use hard-memory key stretching functions, such as the PBKDFs
mentioned in Section 9.1.
8.5 Informal Security Analysis
We discuss informally the security of the protocol with respect to the following scenarios, where
an adversary E :
(a) tries to guess the user’s password,
(b) has observed previous authentication values from the user,
(c) has stolen the password database,
(d) has stolen the OTP device and the password file, but not the password.
For case (a), E does not have any information, perhaps only social data if we consider a specific
user attack. In this case, the best adversarial strategy is an online guessing attack based on
dictionaries or personal information. However, even if E guesses a weak password within the number
of attempts allowed by the system, E still needs the OTP value for a successful authentication, and
therefore, to learn that the guess was correct.
In case (b), by learning the authentication values sent in previous sessions—possibly by accessing
a log file—E cannot do much better, as the values are one-time valid and new authentication values
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are independent from previous values. Even if E somehow learns the password, the only way to
obtain the OTP value is by brute-force, which is infeasible considering that systems restrict the
number of online attempts.
If E gets access to the password database, as in case (c), then an offline dictionary attack
is possible. Here however, the adversary would require to brute-force not only the password, but
also the OTP value. Considering that k is the size of the dictionary and that the standard for HOTP
defines the length of an OTP value to be 32 bits [129], the complexity of the brute-force algorithm
is O(k× 232) instead of O(k). Theoretically, the increment by a linear factor has no significance,
however, considering that databases are in the size of billions [88], this factor could make a difference
in runtime and resources needed. Moreover, the guessing cost can still be increased by an appropriate
selection of H.
Note also that a correct guess of the password and the OTP value serves to access the system
only once. So, although only finding the next OTP is easier, it still requires an active adversary
executing the attack for each login attempt.
Finally, a dictionary attack in case (d) is basically twice as hard as a dictionary attack to H plus
some δ. Given that E knows the required OTP value rt , for each guessing attempt with word w, E
needs to compute H( f (H(w),rt)).The δ is added by the calculations for the modular exponentiation,
which however can be efficiently executed by implementations based on elliptic curves (e.g. [43]).
8.6 Comparison with Techniques for Protecting Passwords
Our protocol has two main advantages: (1) it makes attacks more costly for adversaries trying
to retrieve weak passwords from a leaked password database, and (2) it prevents the exposure of
cleartext passwords at any moment. There are two close approaches that we consider meaningful to
discuss.
Password-based KDF. The use of PBKDF already offers a solution for the protection of weak
passwords. Yet, there are some advantages of combining it with the protocols presented here.
A first advantage regards the salt, which is a static value per user usually stored in the password
database, thus, a password database compromise leaks the salt values too. This allows the adversary
to fix the salt value when performing a dictionary attack. In the approach presented here, the database
does not need to store any information about the OTP value; one could for instance store only the
value n of the counter for the OTP generation algorithm and calculate rn at runtime. Even in the case
that the last OTP was stored, this value would only be useful to log in one time; further accesses
would require new cracking as discussed in Section 8.5.
Another advantage relates to the second problem that our protocol aims to address, i.e., sending
the passwords in plaintext. In our approach, there is no record of the password anywhere in the
protocol, as it is never seen in clear other than by U. This removes the possibility of learning
the passwords from other resources than the password database itself, e.g., login logs where the
passwords are shown in clear (as in the examples from Section 8.1). With this approach, if E gets
such logs, obtaining the passwords would amount to cracking strings of the form f (H(pwd),otpn),
which is as hard as cracking a password database.
Lamport’s approach. In an influential theoretical work, Lamport [112] proposed a solution for
preventing the impersonation of users by an adversary that has compromised the password file, and
that can intercept the communication between the login application and the system.
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To solve the storage of cleartext passwords, he proposed the use of one-way keyed functions,
where the key is the password itself; this is the underlying idea behind hashed password databases
and what we achieve here by the use of a PBKDF.
For solving the interception of messages in the insecure channel between the user and the
system6, Lamport’s idea roughly consists in pre-computing an authentication value by iteratively
applying k times a one-way function F to the password x, let us say Fk(x), which is stored by the
login server. Then, in the authentication process the user’s client sends each time xi = Fk−i(x),
hence, the server only needs to apply F to the received value in order to obtain the value stored; the
latter is possible because, after each successful authentication, the system updates the stored value
with the last xi received.
Nowadays, this idea is not scalable in our context, as it works on the premise of computing in
advance a value bounded by a fixed number of iterations, from which the rest of the authentication
values are computed “backwards”; then, when the first value of the chain is reached, a new boundary
should be computed and securely communicated to the system in order to keep the access. As
people log into some systems even more than once a day (e.g., to email), a very high number of
iterations should be selected, which would provide a big window of opportunity to crack a password
by brute-force or dictionary attacks; alternatively, requiring users to contact service providers very
often to generate new values poses usability-related concerns7. We approach the issue with the use
of an OTP device, which provides a random value for every authentication attempt, that allows to
execute a similar computation of new authentication values in terms of the previous ones.
OPAQUE. Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols are a cryptographic tool orig-
inally designed to allow two parties to agree on a cryptographic secret key using a low entropy
password and public key cryptography. However, they are suitable for user authentication and more-
over, they address the problem of sending passwords in cleartext. PAKE allows a client U and a
server LS to agree on a shared key, which is the same if and only if both parties derive it from the
same password; hence, the authentication consists on verifying that both parties have derived the
same key.
In particular, a recent PAKE protocol called OPAQUE [99], allows the server and client to jointly
compute the authentication value via a two-party protocol, called an oblivious PRF, in which the LS
knows only the salt and U knows only the password and neither party learns anything about the other
party’s input [87].
Roughly, to agree on a shared key, U generates b = H(p)r, where p is the password, r is a
random scalar value, and H : {0,1}∗→G is a hash function that hashes passwords into elements of
a cyclic prime-order group. Then, U sends b to LS, who generates a salt s, computes c = bs = H(p)rs
and sends c back to U. Finally, U computes k = c
1
r = H(p)s.
The idea is that upon registration, LS generates a public key pku and private key sku for the user,
and stores eu = encrypt(k,sku|pks), where pks is the public key of the server. Upon authentication,
LS sends eu to U, which can be decrypted if the user entered the correct password—since U can
derive k. Then, sku is used to run a standard key agreement protocol allowing LS to authenticate the
user.
While this technique seems to solve the problem quite nicely, it is still recent and mostly unknown,
6The first released version of SSL, SSL 2.0, became public in February 1995, and TLS 1.0 in January 1999.
7Lamport’s algorithm has some practical uses, e.g., for authenticating messages exchanged in the establishment of
sessions in distributed systems.
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perhaps also because it is an indirect approach for verifying passwords, in the sense that the
technique that was not originally designed for that. We explore further the use of PAKEs in the next
chapter, for peer-to-peer authentication and discuss further on the adoption issue.
8.7 Limitations and further directions
We discussed some practical advantages of the scheme presented here. Yet, from a theoretical
perspective it has some limitations derived from the fact that, even if the OTP value has a uniform
distribution, it is a 32-bits long value, hence, subject to brute-force attacks, and not suitable to provide
the high entropy required for the exponent in the function f .
We could obtain a high-entropy value if instead of the short-string shown in the device, we use
the digest of the hash function in the OTP generation algorithm—whose length depends on the hash
function selected, usually 160 bits—just before truncation. However, this solution has a significant
usability drawback: instead of an OTP device, the user would require for instance an application to
obtain each time a representation of the full value—e.g., shown a list of approximately 10 words as in
p≡p—which then would need to be input in order to log in. Alternatively, the user could input the
parameters that the OTP generation algorithm requires, i.e., a key shared with the server and the
counter, but again, this represents too much burden for the user given the size of the cryptographic
shared key.
Another option could rely on the client U implementing the OTP generation algorithm and a
user’s device d storing the input parameters that the algorithm needs. Roughly, upon registration
LS would communicate the symmetric shared key, k, to U; this can be done by showing a QR code
that encodes k, which will be stored in d (the device used for scanning the code), similar to Google
authenticator’s approach8. To generate the high-entropy tokens, the user is asked to confirm each
login attempt; this confirmation triggers d sending k and the counter to U, who then can run the OTP
algorithm, and subsequently the protocols as presented in Section 8.4.
As with the OTP device, the difference of the scheme just described with Google authenticator
resides in the use of the random tokens for masking the passwords and not only for authentication;
and the advantage this time is that we get high-entropy values. Clearly this idea still requires to be
carefully developed, and we believe that this is a direction worth pursuing.
8.8 Concluding remarks
Users selecting weak passwords will be a persistent issue as long as password-based authenti-
cation exists. While current techniques make it increasingly costly and inefficient for an adversary to
retrieve weak passwords, perhaps the advent of new technologies capable of replacing password-
based authentication is the only real solution for solving the continuous challenges associated to the
dependency on users being responsible for the pivotal element in the achievement of authentication:
the password.
8https://github.com/google/google-authenticator
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9AUTOMATING ENTITY AUTHENTICATION
FROM LOW-ENTROPY SECRETS
As we have seen along this thesis, entity authentication, consisting in users validating each other’s
public key (key validation, key verification), is an essential process which secure email solutions
should implement.
Over the years, several methods for accomplishing key validation have been established; known
examples include: manual validation of fingerprints—in diverse representations, e.g., hexadecimal
numbers, or trustwords as in p≡p—web of trust, public key infrastructure (PKI) and hierarchical
validation, public key directories, keys generated by trusted-servers (as in identity-based encryption),
and more recently transparent logs. Some of this approaches were introduced in Section 2.5.
The set of techniques available becomes much smaller when we consider a decentralized
scenario, where neither a PKI nor a trusted third party (TTP) are used.
Approaches based on the use of out-of-band (OOB) channels for dealing with decentralized key
validation have received much attention from the research community (see a survey by Nguyen and
Roscoe [134] and references therein). Considered first by Rivest [153], many of such approaches
are inspired by the work of Vaudenay [181] based on short authentication string (SAS) comparisons.
SAS-based schemes have been recently formally analyzed in the symbolic model [62] .
Due to the involvement of the user required in most of these approaches—e.g., to manually com-
pare two strings representing fingerprints—usability of the solution is a key factor for the successful
achievement of entity authentication, since as we discussed in Chapter 7, users failing to correctly
execute the process (in particular due to the lack of understanding about the steps or difficulty to
follow them) can cause the introduction of security flaws. Therefore, reducing the gap between
security and usability by finding optimal trade-offs has been a central theme of research for decades,
with a plethora of long-standing open problems [179, 50].
Attempting to improve usability in the entity authentication process, Alexander and Goldberg [9]
proposed an improvement to the Off-the-record Messaging (OTR) protocol [42]. Assuming that users
share a low-entropy secret, they modify a solution to the socialist millionaires’ problem (SMP) [44] to
determine if the shared secret is equal, authenticating the peers in an affirmative case. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the only approach for key validation based on pre-sharing a secret; the solution
is mainly suitable for online (synchronous) settings.
In this chapter we propose a user-friendly solution, based on password-authenticated key ex-
change (PAKE) protocols, for the authentication of public keys in a decentralized setting. Similar to
the OTR solution, our approach assumes that users pre-share low-entropy secrets. These secrets
are not expected to be sampled from a large, uniformly distributed space, but rather from a small set
of values, e.g., typical human-memorable passwords, pin numbers or even natural words that answer
specific questions. Our solution is suitable for online and offline settings, being thus compatible with
the inherently asynchronous nature of email and modern messaging systems.
After motivating the use of PAKE for this problem, we start by reviewing a few vulnerabilities of
voice-based out-of-band authentication in Section 9.2; in particular, we study a combinatorial attack
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against lazy users, which we analyze in the context of p≡p. Then, in Section 9.3 we describe how a
secure equality test can be solved using PAKE, consequently achieving entity authentication and
establishing a shared high-entropy secret key. We also discuss security and usability properties,
along with enhancements that could be implemented thanks to the derived cryptographic shared
secret key. We conclude in Section 9.6 with remarks and future work.
PAKE protocols for entity authentication Secure email and messaging solutions in general do
not consider the authentication step as mandatory for the communication, but rather only to upgrade
its security; furthermore, this feature tends to be unnoticeable—e.g., to access the authentication
screen in Signal and Whatsapp, users need to (1) enter a chat, (2) click on the contact’s name, (3)
select “View safety number/Encryption” respectively—which might cause users to neglect this step.
As in the case of p≡p, solutions that do consider the entity authentication problem in decentralized
non-PKI environments, typically rely on users correctly executing a manual comparison. Hence, our
first goal is to replace OOB authentication with a cryptographic protocol, to reduce the impact on
security of failures derived from the high dependency on user behavior.
We propose using PAKE protocols to solve the problem treated in this chapter, primarily for two
reasons: because they are independent from PKIs and TTPs, which conforms with a decentralized
trust model, and because they provide a zero-knowledge (ZK) solution for the secure equality test
problem using a low number of rounds, which allows to effectively send messages over the network
without the need of several responses from users, making them compatible with asynchronous
settings.
By solving SMP via PAKE, we additionally establish a shared cryptographically-strong secret key;
this key enables the achievement of further cryptographic properties that neither OOB approaches
nor other known solutions to SMP can provide. In addition, this approach does not require any
understanding of cryptographic concepts from the user, such as public-keys and fingerprints.
The use of PAKE protocols in this context also addresses two open problems in secure email and
messaging [179, 50]: bridging the gap between known theoretical results and real-world solutions,
and the need for more robust authentication methods that also improve the trade-off between security
and usability in secure solutions.
9.1 Framework and Preliminaries
For the rest of the chapter, we use A and B to refer to honest parties Alice and Bob, and E for
the adversary, Eve. We use ←$ to denote an element sampled uniformly at random, and ‖ to denote
concatenation. We denote low-entropy secrets provided by users with π.
Security model We consider the standard Dolev-Yao model, as defined in Chapter 4. Regarding
PAKE protocols (a.k.a. PAKEs), we will discuss various constructions in Section 9.3, largely proven
secure in the so-called BPR model [26] under various hardness assumptions. We do not assume any
trusted infrastructure. We also assume candidate implementations of our solution to be correct and
trusted (not corrupted).
System requirements Our proposal does not require any format modifications for the transmission
of messages and preserves compatibility among existing email clients and servers; therefore, we
assume the standard requirements for email transfer. As for secure messaging, we do not introduce
any extra trust assumptions and no additional infrastructure would be required. In one of the
proposed methods for transport mechanism, we assume the existence of untrusted buffer/relay
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servers, somewhat akin to the ones used in the design of Signal or OTR4 (see Section 9.3.4).
9.1.1 Cryptographic background
In future sections, we will refer to the computational hardness assumptions, mostly Diffie-Hellman
(DH)-based, and models in which PAKEs have been proved to be secure. Roughly, given a cyclic
group G of prime order q, a generator g of G, and two elements gx1 ,gx2 sampled from a uniform
distribution, with x1,x2 ∈ {0, . . . ,q−1} secret exponents, the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
problem assumed to be computationally intractable is to compute the value gx1·x2 . In turn, the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem underlying the DDH hardness assumption consists in
distinguishing the tuple (gx1 ,gx2 ,gx1·x2) from the tuple (gx1 ,gx2 ,gx3), where gx3 is a group element
chosen from a uniform distribution. Detailed explanation on these assumptions can be consulted in
books of cryptography, for instance [106].
We also discuss schemes based on the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem [119]. This is
a special case of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem [150] whose security may be reducible to
the hardness of solving the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) in lattices, for which no efficient quantum
algorithms are known; thus RLWE is conjectured to be quantum-secure.
We use KDF(s) to denote a key derivation function that takes a source s of keying material,
typically with a fair amount of entropy but not uniformly distributed, and produces one or more
cryptographically strong secret keys; interested readers can refer to [109] for details. We denote with
MAC(k,m) a keyed message authentication code scheme that computes a tag on the message m
under the key k (see Section 2.4 for a review).
We refer to zero-knowledge proofs, which allow Alice to demonstrate the correctness of a certain
fact to Bob without revealing any additional information. For example, in the context of SMP, Alice
can demonstrate via a zero-knowledge proof that a certain exponent used in her calculations has not
changed throughout the protocol, without revealing the value of the exponent itself.
Intuitively, the notion of forward secrecy (FS) captures the requirement that a long-term secret
compromise should not result in prior session keys getting compromised and consequently the
corresponding exchanges. Weak FS (wFS) refers to those schemes satisfying FS against passive
adversaries who did not interfere in the previous sessions and perfect forward secrecy (PFS) to those
achieving the same against active adversaries. We will come back to this notions in Section 9.4.2.
Post-quantum (PQ) cryptography encompasses schemes that are considered to be safe against
adversaries equipped with scalable, cryptographically relevant quantum computers.
9.1.2 PAKE
Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols allow two parties who share only a
low-entropy secret, hereafter password, to agree on a cryptographically strong shared secret key,
using the password for authenticating each other. Thus, these protocols allow to establish secure
channels without the need for a PKI, TTPs or empirical OOB alternatives.
Since their introduction by Bellovin and Merritt [27], numerous PAKE protocols have been
proposed; we will review some in Section 9.3.3. They largely fall into the two categories of balanced
(symmetric), which allow parties that use the same password to negotiate and authenticate a shared
key, and augmented (asymmetric or aPAKE), which store one-way mappings of passwords on the
server side in client-server scenarios.
PAKE protocols present interesting security properties; among them, a run of the protocol should
not leak any information related to the password, they should be resistant to offline dictionary attacks,
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and an online guessing attack with at most one test per run should be the optimal attack strategy for
an active adversary E interacting with a party. As it occurs with the SMP protocol, E can mask failed
password guessing attempts as network failures, thus allowing numerous attempts without raising
suspicion. This is in general unavoidable, however, we will see in Section 9.3 how a recent work [156]
can mitigate this attack.
Regardless of its features, PAKE is a method that does not seem to have enjoyed enough recog-
nition. Possible reasons include a lack of mature implementations, reluctance towards implementing
cryptography in browsers, patent-encumbered designs and even unawareness of its usefulness.
There are some exceptions though. Secure Remote Password (SRP) 1 for instance is an augmented
PAKE protocol designed for securely authenticating clients to servers. SRP was created to work
around the patents issue and has been standardized for secure mutual password authentication in
TLS. Open source implementations are available, e.g., as part of OpenSSL2. Although it has some
drawbacks compared to other PAKE protocols, it is presumably the most widely-deployed protocol.
A more recent protocol that solves some of the issues with SRP is OPAQUE (referred later in this
chapter), however, robust and mature implementations are still required.
Note that the problem that we treat here with PAKEs differs from the client-server password
authentication treated in previous chapters (Chapter 8), since in the latter, the server and client code
are controlled by the same entity and authentication is required only in one direction.
9.1.3 Socialist Millionaires’ Problem
Yao’s millionaires’ problem [195] is a famous secure multi-party computation problem in which
two millionaires want to find out whose input is greater without revealing any additional information on
the actual value. SMP (a.k.a secure equality test) is a variant of Yao’s problem with the difference
that the parties only wish to know whether their inputs are equal. Then, SMP reduces to two parties
A and B verifying equality of their inputs πA and πB in a zero-knowledge manner such that by the
end they learn nothing but the boolean result of the equality test.
A series of works have been dedicated to solving SMP, including a well-known protocol by Boudot
et al. [44] (known as the SMP protocol) that provides, under the DDH assumption, a fair and efficient
protocol, where fairness roughly means that no party can evaluate the function and walk away with
the result without the other party learning the output.
Garay et al. [82] showed that the fairness and the security definition of Boudot et al. are not
compatible with security definitions in the simulation paradigm, and that their solution would not be
secure when composed concurrently. They present a construction that can be composed arbitrarily,
with similar complexity results.
9.1.4 The Off-the-record Messaging (OTR) authentication protocol
Off-the-record Messaging (OTR) [42] is a cryptographic protocol originally designed by Goldberg
and Borisov to enable encrypted, authenticated and deniable instant messaging conversations, which
also provides forward secrecy. OTR was proposed as an alternative to PGP for “casual” conversations.
Plugins implementing the protocol and related software are provided in the OTR’s website [171].
To improve usability of the original process for authenticating public keys, which was assumed to
be OOB, Alexander and Goldberg [9] proposed a variant of Boudot et al.’s SMP protocol. Assuming
that A and B share a low-entropy secret—e.g. a password, common knowledge of a certain event,
1http://srp.stanford.edu/
2https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man1/openssl-srp.html
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etc—each party derives a value sA and sB from three elements: a SHA-256 hash of the session
ID, the two parties’ fingerprints, and the shared low-entropy secret. The goal of the protocol is to
determine equality between sA and sB .
The protocol starts with g a generator of a group G of large prime order q, which A and B use to
jointly compute two more group generators through DH exchanges. Then the parties use these three
generators, their respective secret, and each party a chosen element in Zq, to calculate blind terms
that would serve as input for the equality test, and a new exchange has place. All the values passed
between Alice and Bob are accompanied by a zero-knowledge proof. The equation to test equality
is of the form R = x ·wsA−sB , where x and R are known to each, A and B ; hence, to determine if
sA = sB , they only need to check whether R = x, or alternatively, whether R/x = 1. For a detailed
description and security analysis of the protocol, we refer the reader to sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the
original paper [9].
This protocol prevents man-in-the-middle (MITM) and replay attacks, however, it does not enforce
fairness as the original SMP protocol. In addition, the process requires A and B to be online at the
moment of authentication, to enter the secret and for the messages to be exchanged.
9.2 Pitfalls in OOB Authentication
In out-of-band (OOB) authentication, users compare some representation of a cryptographic
hash—fingerprint—of their partners’ public keys via a separate authenticated channel. This represen-
tation is typically presented as a list of words, numbers, or images, although some applications have
managed to simplify fingerprint comparison to users scanning QR codes.
Strong security and usability properties can be achieved if users execute the manual verification
correctly. Yet, the difficulty of having users do the corresponding tasks correctly while finding the right
balance between usability and security is the root cause of security drawbacks, which have been
amply discussed by research on fingerprint and SAS comparison via OOB channels (e.g., [105, 103,
170]). Not surprisingly then, usability studies encourage the replacement of manual comparisons by
automated software whenever possible [170].
Some of the problems with OOB authentication are the following.
Selection of an adequate OOB channel. OOB (a.k.a. empirical) channels that provide authenticity
and data integrity (but not confidentiality) can be classified according to the assumptions made about
the adversary. Here we consider Nguyen and Roscoe’s classification [134].
While face-to-face conversations provide a strong authenticated channel—where messages
cannot be forged, delayed, removed or blocked by the intruder—they are often impractical or not
viable, especially if we consider the ubiquitous nature of email. This situation is disadvantageous
for instance for authentication methods that depend on users interacting with their devices, such as
scanning a QR code from the peer’s screen.
A more common selection involves the use of voice-based channels, e.g. a phone call. This
instances provide a weak empirical channel, where messages cannot be forged, but they can
be blocked, overheard, delayed or replayed. However, some already consider voice-based SAS
comparison to be obsolete from a security perspective [179] as nowadays messages can be forged
by voice synthesizers with a small sample of the victim’s voice. Indeed, a study regarding a voice
impersonation attack executed on users comparing PGP words reported that users were not able to
distinguish the fake voice in about 50% of the cases [162].
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Social engineering attacks. Although there are multiple options for users to interact via OOB, little
effort has been put in designing precise protocols for humans to carry out the authentication process
in privacy-preserving and fair ways. This situation offers the opportunity to break down a secure
communication by misleading users rather than by finding technical vulnerabilities. For instance,
assuming that A and B use p≡p, E could have A trusting E ’s own public key under the identity of B
with a simple attack, even without knowing the trustwords to be compared: (1) E calls A pretending
to be B and asks A to read her words, (2) A reads the complete list, (3) E says that the words
match, (4) A confirms to the system the match and in consequence (5) B appears from now on as
an authenticated contact for A but the trusted key is the public key of E .
Indifferent users. Here we refer to users that confirm an OOB successful authentication to the
system without actually carrying out the process. A noted reason for users to skip contacting their
peers for fingerprint verification, is that they cannot think why anyone would impersonate their
communication partners [167]. Fully disregarding the authentication could in fact be preferable
to users neglecting authentication steps or performing them wrongly, as the partner would not
inaccurately appear authenticated in the system. These situations could be studied further within the
framework discussed in Chapter 7.
Inattentive and lazy users. Users misreading the authentication value (inattentive) or comparing
only parts of it (lazy). In a recent paper, Naor et al. [131] analyzed approaches based on SAS
authentication and identified vulnerabilities associated with a lazy user behavior. For example,
WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram construct the authentication string by concatenating the two peer’s
fingerprints, thus, their approach would be subject to MITM attacks if users compared only either the
first or the second half, given that the comparison would be verifying only the fingerprint of one of the
peers. To fix this situations, the authors propose an influence spreading technique in which every bit
of the values to be authenticated—in this case, each peer’s fingerprint—influences the generation of
each element of the SAS value—the string shown to the user, which combines both fingerprints.
Partial preimage attack. Studied by Dechand et al. [60], this attack aims at finding a partial
preimage for a fingerprint assumed to be verified by lazy users. They estimate the number of brute-
force steps that an adversary would have to carry out to find, with more than 50% success probability,
an input such that the output would match with the user’s fingerprint only in a subset of the totality of
bits. Based on several studies, they assume that users always check the bits at the boundaries, plus
variations of subsets in the middle of the SAS. We explain next the argument behind the estimation.
Let p denote the probability of finding a partial preimage for a given fingerprint f and q its
complementary event. To calculate p = 1−q, we work out q (i.e., the absence of partial preimages
for a specific bit permutation). Let b be the length of the fingerprint f and assuming that r consecutive
boundary bits are fixed (checked by the user), in this case, the leftmost and rightmost bits of f , we let
` denote the number of remaining bits in the middle from which a possible variation of u bits could be
fixed, i.e., checked by the user. Thus, we have 2 · r+u fixed bits that the adversary cannot invert
without the user noticing. Valid preimages can thus be obtained by flipping up to t = `−u bits within
the middle bits; by removing these from the total space of size 2b, we obtain the number of invalid
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Expressing p as a function of the computational effort in terms of x brute-force attempts, we have
p = 1−qx. Thus, to estimate the number of steps needed for finding partial preimages with a success
probability ≥ p, we simply compute
x = logq(1− p). (2)
Expressing x in base 2 gives results comparable to those in [60].
9.2.1 Analyzing OOB authentication in p≡p
The authentication method based in comparing either fingerprints or words, implemented in p≡p,
suffers from most of the vulnerabilities discussed above. We will elaborate on the partial preimage
attack as it is the only one requiring further explanation.
Recall that p≡p’s trustwords are generated by a deterministic algorithm that runs locally taking
as input the public key of a peer—obtained by email—and the user’s own public key (see Section 6.4).
Roughly, the algorithm performs an XOR over the PGP fingerprints of each of the input keys, and
then maps each block of 16 bits from the resulting 160-bit long string to a word in a predefined
dictionary of size 216, thus yielding a list of ten words.
To encourage users to perform the OOB authentication, p≡p shows by default only five out
of the ten words3; this means that the peers compare at most the first 80 out of the 160 bits of a
fingerprint, assuming that they check all the words. Since an “influence spreading” property, similar to
that proposed by Naor et al., is already present, the best adversarial strategy is a brute-force attack




steps to find a key k such that the
first 80 bits of fpr(k) are equal to those of fpr(pkB), with pkB being the public key of B and fpr(·) the
fingerprint function.
However, the complexity of the attack decreases significantly when we consider lazy users and
compute estimates for partial preimage attacks according to Equation (2). We consider the two cases
where, out of five words, the user verifies:
(i) the first and last words as well as two from the middle
(ii) the first and last words, along with one of the three in the middle.
Then, with b = 80 and `= 48, for (i) we have u = 32 and we get x ≈ 238; for (ii) we have u = 16
and we get x≈ 232. These results show that E would succeed with costs equal to and lower than the
computational power estimated for an average adversary [60].
Were an OOB comparison approach to be kept for authentication, this analysis urges to reconsider
the decision of showing five words instead of ten by default. Although users might feel less annoyed
by having to compare fewer words, its adverse effect on security is considerable as it practically
renders brute-force attacks viable.
3Alternative options for comparing the full list of words and the fingerprint are also available.
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9.3 Authentication in Email and Messaging via PAKEs
By using PAKE protocols for user authentication in secure email and messaging, one can relax
the assumption regarding the existence of OOB channels that voice-based fingerprint comparisons
need, and replace their ad-hoc properties with concrete cryptographic guarantees.
In this section we show how PAKE can be used to perform a secure equality test and thereby
authentication, and why the PAKE-based approach yields a more efficient solution than the OTR
protocol, with better security guarantees, and enables further cryptographic features.
For now, we assume that A and B share a low-entropy secret—e.g., a short phrase, a password—
either agreed upon beforehand or decided by posing and answering a question at the beginning of
the mutual authentication. Intuitively, A and B want to authenticate their public keys via a secure
equality test of their secrets, πA and πB, without revealing any information about them, such that,
upon termination of the protocol, A and B would only learn whether or not their respective secrets
were the same, authenticating each other on the basis of knowing the same secret. Therefore, a
zero-knowledge protocol is needed to guarantee that the resulting transcript of their exchanges
does not leak any information on πA and πB. Also, it should not be possible for E to brute-force
the password via offline dictionary attacks; thus, E ’s only strategy would amount to making online
attempts.
9.3.1 Validation of public keys via PAKE
Once A and B have entered their secrets, a PAKE protocol is executed. To determine whether the
user secrets πA and πB are equal at the end of the run, without revealing anything else, we suggest
the enforcement of explicit authentication using key confirmation (KC) after the key establishment
phase. While this step may be optional in the general case for PAKE protocols, here it would be
necessary in order to bind the cryptographic material with an identity. The information that A and
B wish to authenticate—e.g., public keys for email addresses in p≡p or key fingerprints for phone
numbers in Signal—can be incorporated either into the KC phase or into the initial user secrets.
Next, we exemplify with a concrete PAKE protocol how this can be constructed. For the moment
we do not focus on engineering aspects related to (a)synchronicity and message transport mecha-
nisms, but we will come back to these in Section 9.3.4. The literature contains several well-studied
instances of PAKE, therefore, we first pick a candidate to demonstrate how it can be used to validate
public keys, and then compare a few prominent schemes according to specific properties of interest.
9.3.2 Entity authentication based on SPAKE2
We propose an extension of the one-round protocol SPAKE2 [4] with a KC step, to achieve explicit
authentication, thus binding a public key to an entity. This yields a 2-round scheme, which is the
minimum when KC is enforced (see [107] for optimal-round PAKEs). For KC we can use the generic
refresh-then-MAC transformation—despite its long history and popularity, this transform was only
recently proved secure [78].
The scheme works as follows. With G being a finite cyclic group of prime order p, generated
by an element g, let G,g, p,M←$G,N←$G and a hash function H(·) denote public parameters
and π ∈ Zp the private low-entropy secret, with the user password assumed to be appropriately
mapped to an element in Zp4. The parties perform the key exchange phase as shown in Figure 9.1,
which concludes with the generation of a symmetric key, skA and skB for A and B respectively.
4E.g., by hashing the password to get the appropriate number of bits, and then getting the remainder modulo p.
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Upon termination of the key establishment, A and B each use the symmetric key to carry out a
key-refreshing step via a key derivation function KDF in order to generate fresh MAC keys (for both
parties), along with a new session key, K, which will be the secret shared key. Next, under the freshly
generated keys, they each compute a MAC on the fingerprints of both parties’ public keys and a
session id. The authentication now amounts to exchanging and verifying the obtained tags, τa and τb,
match with the corresponding self generated tags.
Public parameters: G,g, p,M←$G,N←$G,H; private parameter: π ∈ Zp the low-entropy secret.
Alice Bob
x←$ Zp;X ← gx y←$ Zp;Y ← gy
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Abort if τb invalid; else output key K Abort if τa invalid; else output key K
Figure 9.1: Public key authentication using SPAKE2 with refresh-then-MAC key confirmation for entity binding.
Alternatively, the public key fingerprints can be embedded in the secret π, but note that even so,
the KC step cannot be skipped as an explicit authentication of the public keys would still be needed.
In that case, we would let π = π′‖fpr(pkA)‖fpr(pkB), where π′ denotes the original secret provided
by the user, and we would compute the tags as τx ←MAC(kxMAC,sid), where x ∈ {a,b} and the
identifier sid is computed over the transcrip. Similar one round KC methods for explicit authentication
can be found in IETF internet-drafts for SPAKE25 and J-PAKE6.
The addition of the KC step increases the number of rounds and flows to 2 and 4, respectively.
Note that this is merely an illustrative example and as already mentioned, other possibilities for KC
do exist, some of which offer additional properties. For instance, Becerra et al. [21] showed that a
modified version of SPAKE2, called PFS-SPAKE2, coupled with a KC step can achieve PFS at the
cost of increasing the number of rounds from 1 to 3. More recently, Abdalla and Barbosa [3] showed
that SPAKE2 does indeed satisfy PFS even without KC under a different hardness assumption. They
also prove a version with a KC step (yielding a better bound) almost identical to the one given in
Figure 9.1, except that the protocol has one less flow. We elaborate on PAKE protocols and their
properties in the next section.
5https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-08.html
6https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8236
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SPAKE2 1/2 7 X ROM CDH
PFS-SPAKE2 3/3 X X ROM CDH
OPAQUE 2/3 X X ROM OMDH
J-PAKE 2/4 7 X ROM-AAM DSDH
KV-SPOKE 1/2 7 - CRS DDH
RLWE-PAK 3/3 X X ROM RLWE
RLWE-PPK 2/2 7 X ROM RLWE
ROM: Random Oracle Model; AAM: Algebraic Adversary Model; CRS:
Common Reference String
DH: Diffie-Hellman; CDH: Computational DH; DDH: Decisional DH;
DSDH: Decision Square DH; OMDH: One-More DH; RLWE: Ring
Learning With Errors
9.3.3 Selecting a PAKE protocol
PAKEs are typically evaluated according to the security model in which they are proven secure,
the number of rounds required, whether they support forward secrecy, and their communication
and computational complexity. The complexity related aspects are more relevant in a client-server
setting wherein a server has to process a high number of requests and sessions; in a decentralized
peer-to-peer setting such properties no longer play a major role.
Conversely, minimizing the number of rounds becomes important in the asynchronous setting
of email, as it is a strong factor in the selection of the transport mechanism. This might be equally
relevant for secure messaging solutions that do not operate in a purely decentralized and peer-to-peer
setting (e.g., Signal or OTR4) in which one may wish to reduce the load on relay or buffer servers; but
the number of rounds would in general be arguably less of a concern than in email. As for KC, remark
that this step can be added to schemes that do not have it by default at the cost of an extra round.
In Table 9.1, we compare relevant properties of a number of representative PAKE protocols:
SPAKE2 [4], PFS-SPAKE2 [21], OPAQUE [99], J-PAKE [93], KV-SPOKE [107], RLWE-PAK and
RLWE-PPK [67]. Note that except for RLWE-PAK and RLWE-PPK that make use of lattice-based
cryptography, all the other referred schemes are Diffie-Hellman-based. In terms of post-quantum (PQ)
security, an immediate implication of this observation is that the latter cases would not be safe against
quantum adversaries, whereas the first two would provide conjectured quantum-security given that,
until now, there is no knowledge of an efficient quantum algorithm for solving the RLWE problem
underlying their hardness assumption.
Regarding the security models, in the random oracle model (ROM), an ideal truly random function
being accessible to the parties through oracle calls is typically instantiated using cryptographic
hash functions. The common reference string (CRS) model implies the accessibility of a random
string, generated in a trusted way, to all parties; due to the constraints of decentralization in our
case, relying on a TTP for this task is not an option; however, there are approaches, e.g. based on
secure multi-party computation protocols [160], for CRS generation in a decentralized setting. As for
RLWE-based schemes, their proofs are unfortunately in the ROM, as opposed to the quantum ROM
(QROM), and therefore the capabilities of a truly quantum adversary are not captured.
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9.3.4 Transport Mechanism
We consider two feasible ways for implementing the exchange of protocol messages.
Email-based approach. Given the small number of rounds required by PAKE protocols, in the case
of email we can afford to use standard attachments as messages’ carriers, or alternatively, designated
emails with a special format. In both cases, the delivered message would be automatically processed
by the email client in the background.
For the case of attachments, a PAKE-based implementation could give A the option to enter her
secret πA upon sending her first email to B , allowing thus the first flow of the protocol to occur via
an attachment; similarly, when B replies, if he opts for entering his secret πB , the initial PAKE round
would be completed. The subsequent exchange for the KC step can be done automatically by the
implementation.
Alternatively, when resorting to a specific-email transport model—such as the one used by p≡p for
multi-device key synchronization—the implementations would encapsulate cryptographic messages
in specially crafted emails, kept hidden from the user (e.g., archived separately) and processed
automatically. Since we primarily deal with authentication, our proposal would have minimal impact in
terms of communication and computational complexity as it would have to take place only once.
Untrusted server approach. Although early instant messaging tools were entirely online services
that maintained an active session for each conversation, modern messaging tools are in fact quite
similar to email in that the underlying system follows an asynchronous model. Both Signal and the
latest version of OTR [136] achieve offline messaging by using “buffer servers” for hosting pre-key
bundles that can be fetched without the other party being online.
We can use a similar mechanism to overcome transport engineering obstacles in email more elegantly,
since all aspects related to the exchange of emails remain unchanged and thus interoperable. In fact,
the use of an intermediate server would not introduce additional trust assumptions as the transcript of
a PAKE protocol does not leak useful information to the adversary; such a server would be untrusted
and any entity would be able to set up their own instance.
9.4 Enhancements to Secure Email and Messaging by PAKE
Authentication via PAKE satisfies and improves a number of key properties related to security
and usability that have been identified in the literature [179]. We first show how these properties are
satisfied and then introduce novel uses of PAKEs in secure email and messaging.
While we primarily focus on enhancements for existing paradigms that depend on public-keys to
secure email and messaging—e.g. PGP-based or OTR-inspired systems such as Signal—we also
consider possibilities for shifting to entirely symmetric-key solutions. Note that once a PAKE-generated
key is established, subsequent PAKE instances can be run automatically via a chaining self-sustaining
mechanism. Indeed, once a PAKE-generated shared symmetric key has been established, not only a
wide range of well-understood techniques become possible, but one could also consider the benefits
of transitioning to symmetric-key constructions, e.g., MAC-based authentication and symmetric-key
encryption schemes.
9.4.1 Usability enhancements
These improvements are mostly related to key management automation and error resilience.
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Automation of future key pair authentications. This feature facilitates the achievement of some
of the subsequent properties. Once authentication between A and B is bootstrapped from an initial
PAKE, the authentication of new key pairs from either A or B can be automated using as input the
PAKE-generated shared key without prompting the users to yet again enter new secrets.
Authentication due to key pair generations can be triggered for instance when keys expire, as a
new key pair needs to be associated with an existing identity. Furthermore, new email accounts
that A adds to the PAKE-based solution, and the corresponding key pairs, could be automatically
authenticated to B by running a PAKE with the stored shared symmetric key as input. Note that each
future execution of a PAKE refreshes the stored PAKE-generated symmetric keys.
Immediate enrolment. This property refers to a user’s keys being reinitialized in such a way that
other parties can verify and use them immediately. The PAKE-generated key allows to automate the
new key exchange and the corresponding authentication as explained above.
Alert-less key renewal. Complementing the previous property, this one refers to users not receiving
alerts or warnings prompting them to take action when other parties renew their public keys. This
would be automated similarly to immediate enrollment.
Low key maintenance. This property pertains to the amount of user effort required for maintaining
keys, e.g., tasks such as signing keys, renewing expired keys. For instance, while the p≡p client
does automate key generation and renewal, the established trust level disappears with every key
refreshment; key maintenance can be improved with PAKEs as explained above.
Inattentive user resistance. As discussed earlier, manual OOB key/fingerprint verification methods
are susceptible to human error and inattentiveness. In the PAKE-based approach, even if the users
enter the wrong value, the result would not be as catastrophic as trusting a key prepared by the
adversary. At worst, it would be inconvenient as the authentication would fail prompting the user to
eventually repeat the process.
9.4.2 Security enhancements
These refer to cryptographic properties that are mainly enabled by the derived symmetric key.
Perfect forward secrecy (PFS). In the context of authentication, PFS means that in the event of
a password disclosure, previously derived cryptographic keys remain secure. In other words, an
adversary learning the low-entropy password cannot use it to compute high-entropy shared keys
derived before the password compromise.
In the case of a symmetric key disclosure, an idea for minimizing the impact of such a compromise
consists in implementing a PAKE-chaining mechanism to automatically perform key rotations and
periodically refresh the symmetric key; this would provide limited time-windows for E to compromise
the channel, at the end of which, the key would be refreshed and secure again, leaving E with an
expired key. If there is evidence that E has corrupted the channel, the cryptographic key would
have to be discarded and replaced via a PAKE executed with a low-entropy secret. This refreshing
paradigm might be expensive, however it would be relevant when PAKE-based approaches are used
for synchronization purposes, either device-to-device or device-to-server, where PAKE can be used
to both authenticate and establish a secure channel, thus providing PFS for the session keys used
for syncing.
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Several PAKE constructions provide PFS by default, some of which are listed in Table 9.1; moreover,
PFS can be obtained by adding explicit authentication via a KC step to constructions that do not have
this property [26]. Alternatively, to improve efficiency we could resort to symmetric-key schemes that
provide PFS, e.g. SAKE [12]. In this case, a PAKE can be used once to bootstrap authentication
via a low-entropy secret and to generate the initial symmetric high-entropy key—known as master
key—required by SAKE.
The use of PAKEs could for instance improve the approach based on regular sub-key rotations,
adopted by the Sequoia-PGP project for adding FS to OpenPGP-based solutions; a PAKE-based
solution could automate authentication in case that the master key, certifying the short-term sub-keys,
needs to be refreshed. For additional security, with slightly hampered usability, a separation of
storage can be enforced by for example storing such PAKE long-term keys in dedicated hardware,
e.g., hardware security modules or smart key storage devices such as YubiKey or Nitrokey, to protect
against a device compromise; see Section 9.4.4 for more details on this.
Deniability. This is another subtle and fundamental property that has been of particular interest in
recent secure messaging systems such as Signal and OTR. Deniable exchange, applied to tasks
ranging from authentication to encryption, has a long and somewhat controversial history due to the
subtleties in various existing security definitions. We limit ourselves to the case of key exchange
and the seminal framework of Di Raimondo et al. [63], which provides security definitions in the
simulation paradigm for deniable key exchange and authentication, where message and participation
repudiation are considered as requirements.
We conjecture that sender/receiver deniability for non-augmented (symmetric) PAKE—e.g., where
E wants to deny having sent a message to B—would satisfy the said definition of deniability in
the symmetric-key setting: in a two-party setup, a malicious party E would not be able to produce
binding cryptographic proofs from communication transcripts, associating another party (here B)
with a particular exchange, as all exchanges could have been simulated by the accusing party E .
More specifically, a simulator in Di Raimondo’s framework can be constructed given that π is the only
private input shared by both parties and all other parameters are public and drawn at random.
Finally, assuming composability, using the PAKE-generated key with symmetric ciphers and MAC-
based authentication would preserve deniability. Clearly, this and other forms of deniability for PAKE
need to be studied rigorously in future work.
Post-quantum security. As pointed out in Section 9.3.3, in the event that secure messaging and
email tools transition to PQ cryptography, there are already candidate PAKE constructions that provide
conjectured PQ security (e.g. in Table 9.1). Moreover, the recent symmetric-key authenticated key
exchange (SAKE) by Avoine et al.[12] is conjectured to be PQ-secure due to its use of symmetric-key
primitives. Thus, a quantum-resistant PAKE can be combined with SAKE, to obtain a low cost and
efficient PQ-AKE with PFS suitable for settings with limited computational power.
As a remark, the OTR application provides deniability of messages and FS, however, such
features are independent from the SMP solution for authentication; they are implemented separately
by constructions such as MAC tags in the messages. In the case of PAKEs, these properties are
inherent to the schemes.
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Table 9.2: Comparison of trust establishment approaches.

























































































































































































































Web of Trust PGP    G# G# 7 7 - 7 7 7 G# G# 7 7 7 7 7    
KD + SaL CONIKS  7 G#    7 - 7             
OE + TOFU TextSecure G# G# G# G# 7  - - -       7  7   7
OE + TOFU + OOB p≡p G# G# G# G# G#  - - -  G#  G# 7  7 7 7  7 7
OE + TOFU + SMP OTR G# G# G# G#   - - 7 7  7 7 G# G# 7  7  7  
OE + TOFU + PAKE - G# G#   G#          7       
KFV: OOB SilentText     G#  - - - 7 7 7 7 7  7 7 7  7 7
KFV: PAKE -     G#          7       
Paradigm property is:  = satisfied; G#= partially satisfied; 7 = not satisfied; = implementation dependent; - = N/A
KD = Key directory; KFV = Key fingerprint verification; OE = Opportunistic encryption; SaL = Self-auditable logs; TOFU =
Trust-on-first-use
9.4.3 PAKE-based security and usability compared to the state-of-the-art
Table 9.2 shows a comparison of our proposal with a select set of approaches for trust estab-
lishment, extracted from Unger et al.’s survey on secure messaging [179]. We limit our analysis of
Table 9.2 to relevant aspects for the comparison and refer the reader to the cited source for a more
detailed explanation of the approaches and their properties. If the reason behind a given evaluation
is not specified in [179], we provide our own interpretation and evaluate our approach accordingly.
Most of the properties have self-explanatory names, except perhaps operator accountability,
which is considered to be satisfied if the paradigm provides support for verifying the correct behavior
of service providers during the trust establishment process, when a centralized infrastructure is
required. The network and operator attackers considered for MITM refer respectively to adversaries
controlling large segments of the internet and infrastructure operators (service providers).
PAKE-based approaches are privacy preserving as the transcript of a PAKE execution does not
leak information. Deniability facilitated, FS facilitated and post-quantum security are subject to the
selection and exact usage of the PAKE scheme.
Approaches built upon opportunistic encryption (OE) partially provide MITM prevention because
an attack can be successful during the initial communication round, before a key is authenticated.
When OE is combined with SMP, operator accountability and MITM detection are also partially
satisfied given that if the execution of the SMP protocol fails, the users do not learn whether the
failure was due to mismatching passwords or an adversarial attempt at compromising the channel.
However, when it comes to our PAKE-based approach, these last two properties could be potentially
satisfied with the use of auditable PAKEs (see section 9.4.4), mainly in the context of messaging.
It is somewhat ambiguous as to why the authors of [179] consider key revocation—users being
able to revoke and renew keys—to be fully satisfied for SMP applied to OE. While revocation is
possible, the process would still suffer from the known limitations of a truly decentralized setting, e.g.,
informing all users of an expired key. The latter is indeed stated to be the reason for considering KFV
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approaches to only partially satisfy this property. Under this interpretation, PAKE applied to OE would
also partially satisfy key revocation. Thanks to the derived cryptographic key, the main advantages of
OE with PAKE can be observed at the level of usability related properties, e.g., automation of tasks.
In key fingerprint verification (KFV) approaches, the verification is considered to occur before
using the public keys, which leads to achieving most of the security properties. The evaluations for
the OOB approach assume that the manual comparison is executed correctly; this assumption is
not needed for SMP or PAKE. As we can observe, PAKE-based KFV significantly improves usability
compared to OOB and SMP fingerprint verification.
Key directory combined with self-auditable logs (KD+SaL) is arguably the most promising ap-
proach identified by Unger et al. due to the wide range of properties that it provides. It allows users to
efficiently verify the consistency of their own entry in a central key directory (which can be self-hosted)
and therefore to detect and expose misbehavior of a trusted third party. The set of properties that
KD+SaL and KFV:PAKE can achieve is similar, yet, the latter has the advantage of enhancing security
with the properties discussed in Section 9.4.2.
Overall, PAKE-based key fingerprint verification offers the most complete set of properties with
reasonable trade-offs between security and usability in a purely decentralized setting.
Clark et al. [50] present a similar table evaluating primitives used to enhance email security.
Considering end-to-end encryption as a baseline, PAKE-based key verification/management would
perform as shared secret key verification (R14 in [50]), except that, additionally, our PAKE-based
approach partially satisfies the property that refers to providing support for server-side content
processing (P12) as this can be enabled without exposing the encrypted content, e.g., via secure
secret retrieval (see section 9.4.4).
9.4.4 Additional novel enhancements
The uses of PAKEs for securing email and messaging go beyond entity authentication. Here, we
discuss some areas that could benefit from the use of these schemes.
Multi-device synchronization
A quite natural application of PAKE is in the realm of device pairing and multi-device synchronization,
where the goal is to create an authenticated and private channel between devices, usually from the
same user, for transferring information securely.
Although typical solutions rely on a human interactive security protocol (HISP) and OOB channels,
thus requiring manual intervention (which can give rise to new and subtle attacks), the application
of PAKEs for device pairing in other contexts has been considered before [111]; it is thus natural to
consider its use in multi-device syncing of email and secure messaging systems, for instance, to
synchronize the user’s keys for encryption and keys of trusted contacts.
A secure email solution can display a screen in each of A ’s devices to be paired, D1 and D2, so
that after A enters a password in both, a PAKE protocol that establishes a secure channel between
them for synchronization is triggered. Alternatively, this process can even be done asynchronously,
i.e., without the two devices being online: D1 pushes its state (e.g., key store, chat or email archive)
to a server in encrypted form and later D2 retrieves the secrets stored on the server in an oblivious
manner w.r.t. the server. We discuss this further in the following part regarding secure secret retrieval.
The application of such a PAKE-based solution could for instance bring benefits to the current
implementation of p≡p, which resorts to an ad-hoc pairing technique for key synchronization based
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on OOB comparison of SAS. The established trusted channel could be used not only for sharing key
material but also contact lists, calendars, etc.
Secure Secret Sharing and Retrieval
OPAQUE is a recent construction that, among other things, serves as an aPAKE to offer protection
against breaches and server password file compromises. It also offers a secret retrieval mechanism
based on oblivious pseudo-random functions, to fetch from a server a secret stored in encrypted
form, using only a low-entropy password.
This feature is inspired by the notion of password-protected secret sharing (PPSS) schemes
formalized by Bagherzandi et al. [13], which are (t,n)-threshold constructions wherein security is
preserved against an adversary controlling up to t servers out of n. A problem that PPSS addresses
is protecting A ’s secret data d (e.g., a secret key used for decryption, authentication credentials,
crypto-currency wallet key, etc) in the event of a device compromise or failure.
An implementation of PPSS would secret-share d among a set of n entities so that only a collusion
of more than t corrupt ones would compromise the data. A password-based mechanism would allow
the authentication of the owner of d to the secret-share holders in order to trigger a reconstruction
protocol and then retrieve the secret. The private storage of d can be shared among n external
network entities; alternatively, if A does not trust external entities, her device can instead partake in
the secret-sharing by storing multiple shares, thus preventing online dictionary attacks by a network
attacker and not allowing E to learn anything about the secret without corrupting A ’s device.
Secret retrieval would have several use cases in secure messaging. For instance, a general
anonymity/privacy related criticism directed at messaging services has to do with the identification
of users via their phone numbers. This can be dealt with by securely storing long-term identities in
encrypted form on the server, accessible only to the users. Servers could also store per user lists
of contacts in encrypted form; this would enable asynchronous syncing of contacts across multiple
devices without the service provider learning the content.
Another use case would be to secret-share user data among several of their own devices, e.g.,
smartphone, laptop and tablet, so that a device compromise would not provide any useful information
to an attacker; this can also be used for performing key synchronization among multiple devices.
All these mechanisms would work in a similar manner from the user’s point of view, i.e., simply by
providing a password.
Recently, Signal was enriched with a functionality referred to as “Secure Value Recovery” [163].
Among other things, the design involves a key stretching of a user’s PIN along with a master key
derivation using the stretched key and a piece of server-side stored randomness. The same core
functionality can be achieved with the use of either PPSS or PAKE constructions such as OPAQUE
for secure secret storage and retrieval. Signal’s developers also mention secret sharing and oblivious
pseudo-random functions as future possibilities [164], both of which can be achieved using existing
cryptographic primitives, as explained in this section.
Auditable PAKEs for Thwarting Online Guessing Attacks
Online guessing attacks are unavoidable when using password-based authentication. This is usually
dealt with by fixing a limit on the number of failed attempts that can be tolerated before invalidating a
password.
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However, resorting to guess and abort style attack, an adversary could sidestep the (at most) one
online test per run: E intercepts a message at a crucial step of a protocol run—e.g., in Figure 9.1, any
of the messages with the MAC-tags τ in the KC step; then E uses the information to verify a chosen
guess at the password; in case of an incorrect guess, E drops the intercepted message to disguise
the guessing attempt as a network communication failure. This can be done in both directions to
double the chance of discovering the password, or in parallel against many network nodes depending
on the setting. Such an attack can be carried out repeatedly without raising an alarm as the honest
parties may simply view this as a network failure.
The modified version of SMP in OTR (Section 9.1.4) is vulnerable to this attack: just before
the last phase where the parties perform their secure equality test, when A and E exchange





could make a guessing attempt at πA and in case of obtaining a value other than 1 (which reflects
equality) in the verification, drop the message and force an abort. Note that the non-interactive
zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs that are attached to the messages at every exchange are not meant to
protect against this type of attack.
In a relatively recent work [155], Roscoe developed a mechanism based on commitment schemes
and delay functions (e.g., timed-release encryption) for protecting against online attacks in HISPs.
Later, Roscoe and Ryan [156] combined this idea with a new technique that achieves a so called
stochastic fair exchange, for making PAKEs auditable, i.e., such that legitimate participants of the
protocol can distinguish online guessing attacks from network failures.
Roughly speaking, they propose a transformation in the KC phase of a PAKE, which combines
blinding, randomization, commitments and delay functions; the transformation is such that a series of
messages consisting of fake ones and the real intended message are exchanged and the parties
will only get to know which is the right one until their exchange is complete. In a follow-up work [55],
Couteau and the previous authors generalize this result to achieve ε-fair exchange using oblivious
transfer and timed-release encryption.
The discussed transformation can be used to enhance any PAKE with auditability, hence, allowing
the authentication process to achieve such a property. An important limitation here is that, due to the
highly interactive design of the solution, it would be more suitable to the setting of secure messaging
than to email, unless a given email solution were to opt for untrusted buffer servers for transport, as
described in Section 9.3.4.
Finally, note that some of the ideas in this transformation, specifically those related to enforcing
fairness, have common elements with the original SMP solution [44] aimed at providing fairness, a
property that was removed from the modified version of SMP used in OTR on account of achieving
efficiency.
9.5 Security and Low-Entropy Secrets
The schemes considered thus far have been proven secure under different models and assump-
tions (see Table 9.1). The security properties that they grant can be traced back to the core properties
of PAKEs:
• they fulfill the role of ZK proof of knowledge schemes, and so, a run of the protocol does not
leak any information on the password and upon termination only reveals whether the secrets
were equal
• they resist offline dictionary attacks, and online ones typically by limiting active adversarial
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attempts to one password per run
• compromised session keys will not compromise the security of other session keys
• depending on the choice of PAKE, FS would ensure that past session keys remain secure if
the password is leaked.
A way for E to gain knowledge about the secret would be by managing to increase the number
of active online guessing attempts. We discussed how making PAKEs auditable can be used to
mitigate this class of attacks by distinguishing between failed adversarial attempts and network
failures, minimizing the adversary’s tries to one, under the assumption of correct input entry by honest
users.
A disadvantage of the use of PAKEs in client-server scenarios concerns the need to store plaintext
passwords in the server. This issue is irrelevant here since the passwords are used just once to
bootstrap authentication and security of the system, after which they can be discarded.
9.5.1 Low-entropy secret agreement.
From a practical perspective, we need to think further about the assumption of A and B sharing
a low-entropy secret. As already discussed by Alexander and Goldberg [9], the users can either
share a secret over a secure channel, e.g. OOB, or agree on one via an in-band functionality without
revealing sensitive information about the secret itself, for instance, A could ask B to use the nickname
of a friend in common.
Note that in the case of in-band agreement, although the question itself could serve to authenticate
both parties, this is not necessarily the case and therefore, instead of mutual authentication, only B
should be authenticated to A when A poses a question and vice versa. Concretely, let us assume
that Eve is a common friend of A and B , and that A asks B : “What is the nickname of Eve?”. This
question already implies that the one asking knows Eve and her nickname, so it is likely to come from
A ; but it is also likely for Eve to know this information, so by B posing an adequate question to A , B
could detect a MITM.
Another possibility to agree on a secret would be to use an already authenticated and secure
channel. For instance, given the widespread use of messaging tools such as Signal, the parties could
use it to agree on a secret for a one-time entity authentication of their secure email solution. While
this might be futile from a theoretical point of view, due to the assumption of there being an already
authenticated and secure channel, practically speaking, this approach would in fact provide a realistic
and usable solution since email and messaging have different use cases.
Usability considerations. Providing users with an adequate interface for entering the low-entropy
secret is essential for solutions implementing the PAKE-based approach, in addition to documentation
with accessible explanations for users.
A lesson learned from a usability study on the OTR/SMP tool [167] stresses the need for further
research on how to guide users towards establishing a secure shared human-memorable secret.
Here we briefly discuss some ideas.
Primarily, the interface could warn users not to include the secret itself; this could work similar to
standard warnings in many email clients, that remind users to attach documents when they have not
done so, and attempt to send a message in whose body the intention is mentioned.
For the in-band agreement, adding a list pre-populated with questions might serve as a guide for
users to conceive similar questions, or reduce their effort by allowing them to choose one from the
list; the questions should not lead to evident answers or to answers belonging to very small known
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sets, such as “yes/no” or colors, as such cases increase the probability of the adversary to guess
successfully.
A measure aimed at dealing with disparities due to letter cases would be to just convert the secret
to upper-case, at the cost of reducing entropy. To minimize mismatch due to typos, we could resort to
comparing the homomorphic distance of words.
Finally, recall that the in-band agreement in principle could be a solution for people that do not
know each other. But as mentioned before, defining ways for users to achieve an adequate password
selection is clearly a required line of work which we leave as an open question.
9.6 Concluding Remarks and Further Directions
In this chapter, we presented a PAKE-based solution to bootstrap peer-to-peer authentication,
which would equally work in the context of secure messaging and in the inherently asynchronous
setting of email. Apart from nullifying a bunch of vulnerabilities present in OOB-based protocols,
PAKE-based authentication improves both, security and usability properties, maximizing the trade-off
between them; furthermore, the PAKE-generated symmetric key can be used to introduce a series of
enhancements in secure email and messaging.
From this point there are several research directions. We believe that a natural next step involves
developing a formally verified implementation, with respect to specific security properties. This can
be achieved for instance with the use of dedicated languages such as F* [151], which has been used,
among others, for verifying a reference implementation of TLS 1.2 [29].
Since we primarily deal with authentication, implementing a PAKE-based solution would have
minimal impact in terms of communication and computational complexity considering that authentica-
tion takes place only once per contact, as opposed to email encryption where protocol executions are
required for every email exchange.
As previously mentioned, research on usability dedicated to assisting users for deriving low-
entropy secrets while reducing the mental effort and the likelihood of mistakes, is also encouraged.
Besides, there is large room for follow-up regarding theoretical work on all the suggested cryptographic
enhancements and implementations thereof.
Other interesting directions include the application of PAKEs for authentication on encrypted
mailing lists, and studying the possibility of sharing/synchronizing the trust in contacts across different
services—e.g., from Signal to p≡p or vice versa. In the latter, once an entity is trusted in one
application, all other applications that recognize this entity could inherit the trust which is stored in the
user’s device; evidently privacy plays a major role here and one would need to enforce the policies of
the service with the strongest requirements.
Finally, although the assumption of users sharing a secret might seem restrictive, we believe that
similar limitations occur when using OOB channels. For instance, parties that do not know each other
might not have any other contact information than the email address itself, hence making difficult the
establishment of a secure second channel. Moreover, one can argue that users verifying a secret gets
closer to the idea behind entity authentication than them comparing meaningless strings, as these
last ones are not linked to the users in any evident way. This, we reckon, affects the way in which the
result of the authentication process is interpreted; after comparing words that match A might believe:
“Ok, B and I have the same words”, while when a secret matches: “Ok, I am communicating with B”.
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10CONCLUSIONS
Considerable effort has been put into securing email, the main means of modern communication, in
the last decades. In particular, important advances have been made for preserving the privacy of
the message exchanges over the internet using an intricate combination of public-key and private-
key cryptography. Various solutions exist for centralized settings, wherein trusted authorities are
responsible for certifying public-keys. However, PGP is the pervasive solution when it comes to
decentralized settings; and due to fundamental complications rooted in poor key management and
the process that ultimately allows users to authenticate each other, it has found limited adoption.
Thus, in the current landscape, the vast majority of people, outside institutional environments,
do not use secure email solutions at all. Yet, the exchange of sensitive information via email, and
the compromise of information exchanged, keep taking place as you read these lines. Therefore,
developing usable, decentralized end-to-end secure email solutions, with proofs of security and
potential for being widely adopted, is an evident necessity of significant importance.
In this thesis, we have designed and analyzed cryptographic protocols aimed at securing email
communications, introduced formal frameworks and properties that allow a human-inclusive security
analysis, and proposed cryptographic solutions for replacing the prevailing manual entity authentica-
tion approach, and for strengthening the protection of passwords in password-based authentication
schemes, as they play a key role by enabling access to a user’s mailbox.
Regarding end-to-end secure email protocols, we performed a symbolic formal analysis of the key
distribution and the handshake protocols (p≡p protocol) underlying secrecy and authentication in
p≡p, a software solution aimed at providing privacy mainly in email communication. In the process of
achieving this objective, we were first confronted with the need for obtaining a precise specification of
the protocols, implemented in a library programmed in C. Indeed, we realized that reverse-engineering
code is rather frequently needed when modeling security protocols, mostly caused by the lack of
documented protocol specifications. We worked out a method, documented in Chapter 3 along with
a compilation of relevant state-of-the-art tools, for specifying the p≡p protocol; the technique is
semi-automated and provides general guidelines specially for formal security analysts who might not
necessarily be familiar with software engineering techniques.
At this point, we would like to stress the importance of documenting large scale software projects;
in particular, documenting open source implementations could be beneficial for simplifying adoption
and auditability, which is an important factor that contributes for finding flaws in security protocols.
Indeed, the lack of auditability for proprietary solutions (e.g. Apple’s protocols) has presumably raised
concerns in the community; as the implementations are rarely disclosed, the alternative for the user
is to trust in the security of the deployed products.
Based on the abstracted specifications, we modeled the p≡p protocol in the applied pi calculus
and used ProVerif to execute a formal verification in the Dolev-Yao adversarial model. The analysis
confirmed that the model satisfies six security properties: full agreement, trust-by-handshake, privacy-
from-trusted, integrity-from-trusted, MITM-detection and confidentiality (Chapter 6). This result
implies that exchanges between two p≡p users that have completed a successful handshake, are
111
private, authenticated and integral, as long as the authenticated public keys remain valid and are not
compromised. The ProVerif code of our analysis is provided in the appendix.
Furthermore, we proved correctness and security of the trustwords generation algorithm (Sec-
tion 6.4), which maps a fingerprint into a list of words shown to the user during the handshake process,
so that the peers compare them through a secure out-of-band channel. A relevant characteristic of
the mapping is its bijectivity, which eliminates collisions.
This part of the research largely answers our initial question, Q1, regarding whether decentralized
implementations of end-to-end secure email solutions provide the essential security properties. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first proof of security that addresses a deployed secure email
solution. This result enables “verified security”, under the specific adversarial model and assumptions,
to become an aspect to be considered when selecting a secure email tool, along with the usual ones:
popularity and functionality.
To provide answers for Q2, regarding whether the interaction of a human with a system has an
effect on the security of the latter and how one could study those situations, we defined a formal
framework, which allows to model the path that a user follows to achieve a security goal in a system,
together with the user’s assessment and the system’s assessment of predetermined security aspects
at each stage. A model in this formalism is a variant of a transition system, which we call s-t transition
system.
We selected Computation Tree Logic (CTL) to formalize a family of novel security properties,
that we call misaligned-security properties, in terms of the discrepancy or agreement between the
previously mentioned assessments. These properties: Aligned-AoS (aligned assesment of security),
Lower-AoS, Higher-AoS and Misaligned goal, are representatives of classes that can be customized
to study each specific system. The introduction of misaligned-security properties addresses Q3,
which considers the definition of novel security properties, and enables a security analysis from a
socio-technical perspective, shedding some light on vulnerabilities that emerge when a user has an
inaccurate assessment of the degree of security that a system has.
Misaligned-security properties can be automatically verified in s-t transition systems by a model
checker, NuSMV in our case. In particular, we identified a case where Aligned-AoS does not hold in
p≡p; the root cause of the discrepancy is the use of an out-of-band channel for authentication and
the absence of a rigorously defined procedure for carrying out the comparison process.
The whole formalism provides an approach for reasoning about security ceremonies depending
on user beliefs, and enables the detection of vulnerabilities derived from sources other than purely
technical ones. Since there are certainly many other ways for studying the human interaction in a
security protocol, we consider our approach to be a possible answer to Q2.
A security analysis in this framework might be of special interest for other communities, in
particular, usability and user experience (UX), as it might promote developments in their area of
research. In fact, the analysis yields meaningful results when it is carried out in an interdisciplinary
setting, as the usability techniques bring accuracy to the inputs regarding the user’s perceptions and
our framework provides the mathematical formalism and a technique for reasoning with them.
The computational, symbolic, and socio-technical security analyses mentioned above, comple-
ment each other, providing a framework for performing a multifaceted security analysis of crypto-
graphic protocols, which in this case we carried out on the p≡p software.
We covered Q4 by addressing three problems related to authentication that directly or indirectly
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undermine the security of email:
1. An incredibly large number of credentials (in the order of billions) to access all kinds of web
services (Yahoo being one of the most affected ones) has been leaked after password database
breaches occurred in the last decade. This information has been freely distributed over the
internet, and the corpus keeps becoming richer as database breaches keep taking place. So
that users can at least change their passwords, to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing
their account, a timely detection of a database leakage is imperative. The Honeywords System
achieves such a goal. We designed and formally verified a security protocol that makes a
Honeywords System resilient to malicious modification of the code that implements the role of
the Login Server (LS) in the authentication protocol. The protocol assumes that the user has a
One-Time-Password (OTP) device, however, alternatively to existing multi-factor authentication
solutions, in our proposal a random factor that could serve as a second factor authentication, is
also used to protect the passwords at rest. Then, even if the password is leaked, the adversary
would need to guess this other factor as well in order to gain access to the system.
2. Along with the previous problem, users selecting weak passwords and reusing them on
multiple sites is a well-known standard behavior that has made it relatively easy for attackers
to retrieve them, and thereby, gain access to all the services for which the user is registered
with those credentials. Moreover, adversaries can retrieve the passwords in transit, as they
are usually sent in plaintext from the user’s client to the password-based authentication server.
To strengthen the protection of weak passwords during and after the authentication process,
we designed an authentication protocol that works together with an OTP value. The protocol
has some limitations due to the low entropy of OTP values displayed in a device, however we
already envision potential directions for increasing the entropy (discussed in Chapter 8), one of
which consists in using the values generated by the OTP algorithm before they are truncated
(to appear in a user device).
3. Finally, we proposed a replacement for the use of out-of-band (OOB)-based entity authenti-
cation with a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)-based approach; this approach
gives provable security guarantees to the process and provides the required cryptographic
elements (a shared high-entropy key) to implement additional and more sophisticated security
properties, such as perfect forward secrecy (PFS), deniability and post-quantum security,
along with usability properties such as automation of future key pair authentication, immediate
enrolment, alert-less key renewal and inattentive user resistance.
The implementation of this approach represents an important step towards improving the
overall security and usability of current decentralized end-to-end secure solutions, as the
dependence on users for correctly carrying out authentication tasks, would be minimized.
Furthermore, this result can be equally applied to email and messaging solutions as in both
cases, the prevailing method of authentication in decentralized settings is based on OOB
approaches.
Note that end-to-end secure email solutions could still be of help in the case of an adversary
having access to a user’s mailbox, as depending on the email client settings, a passphrase is usually
required for decrypting emails. Nonetheless, recalling the issues that we have highlighted throughout
this thesis and considering that users have difficulties already selecting adequate passwords, it is
very optimistic to expect the average user to use an end-to-end secure email solution. Hence the
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importance of pursuing research in both directions.
Based on the results of this thesis, we conclude that the design of p≡p’s security protocols
provides privacy-by-default in email communications; p≡ p also achieves many of the usability
features identified in the literature as relevant for secure email solutions: automatic key initialization,
easy key discovery, no need for shared secrets, and partially low key maintenance, given that by
design, users need to perform the authentication every time a key is updated. The set of security and
usability properties could be extended by the implementation of the technique proposed in Chapter 9.
In addition, p≡p preserves the interoperability and openness features characteristic of email
communication, and is a solution for decentralized settings.
We would like to recall the fact that authentication techniques are heavily dependent on users,
who play a decisive role in the successful achievement of the security goals; therefore, the human
component should not be neglected in the study and development of secure email solutions. At the
same time, efforts are worth investing in the research of ways to shift the assignment of completing
critical security tasks (such as comparing fingerprints or choosing passwords with an adequate level
of security) from the user, to automated methods preferably with provable security.
Limitations
The formal verification and proofs provided in this thesis are based on an abstraction of the
protocols implemented in p≡p, which like all mathematical models, are approximations to reality;
we did not verify the actual implementation. While our proofs support the protocol design behind
p≡p, formal verification of the deployed protocols is still missing. As discussed at the beginning of
this work, formal verification of implementations is an active growing area of research, with major
challenges regarding the development of a fully automated process that would allow automated
formal verification, as is the case in the symbolic model.
To verify the p≡p implementation, one could follow an approach similar to that used by Bhargavan
et al. [29] to verify TLS, which roughly consists in creating a reference implementation of the software
to be verified, in a language that allows verification of the code, such as F*. Following this approach,
however, requires dedicated human resources, who as a team have the required knowledge in formal
verification, software development and in the implementation of p≡p. The problem remains open.
10.1 Open questions and further directions
Throughout this work, we have indicated several open problems in different areas of research.
For instance, the lack of software solutions for reverse engineering static C code, the need for finding
adequate cryptographic techniques for dealing with the strong adversarial model of code-corruption
in the Honeywords system, how to design and enhance theoretical schemes for a human-inclusive
analysis of security protocols, and in general, how certain cryptographic schemes can be applied to
the development of a usable secure email solution. We invite the reader to review the “Concluding
remarks and further directions” section in each chapter for detailed explanations of these and other
open problems, related to the specific topics discussed in each chapter.
Instead, we comment on specific directions in which we have work in progress:
Secure device pairing protocols for email Secure device pairing aims at establishing a secure
communication channel between two unlinked devices, usually owned by the same user, without
relying on trusted infrastructure; for instance, the Simple Secure Pairing protocol for Bluetooth.
Our interest lies in secure device pairing for enabling private email communication; thus, the goal
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is to establish an authenticated channel ch between (initially) two devices d1, d2, from which a user
accesses the same mailbox. Once established, d1 and d2 can use ch to share secret data that would
allow the user to consistently encrypt and decrypt emails in both devices. In particular, we have
already started to study the Key Synchronization (KeySync) protocol [30] of p≡p, whose purpose is
to carry out an authenticated device pairing, using a common-access resource (the mailbox) as a
channel to synchronize the devices.
We aim at providing a formal analysis of the p≡p’s KeySync protocol, specially considering the
identity misbinding attack [65], which has been pointed out to affect most of the secure device pairing
protocols [161]. We also intend to study the approaches that WhatsApp and Signal use to make
messages accessible from the mobile device and from the web/desktop application, and compare
them with KeySync. Although they work in different trust settings (centralized and decentralized), we
could get insights into whether some aspects are worth being carried over from one model to another.
Implementation of PAKE-based authentication The research in Chapter 9 left many open re-
search questions, one of which has to do with the implementation of the proposed technique, i.e., the
implementation of an authentication module which asks the user to enter a password shared with the
authentication peer, and uses this input to run a PAKE protocol with the corresponding peer, who is
also asked to enter the shared password; the algorithm should generate a cryptographic key and
then use it to determine whether the passwords are equal, in which case, the peer’s authenticity is
validated.
The implementation should be interoperable and portable, so that it can be integrated with secure
email solutions and used regardless of the platform. For the moment we intend to develop a prototype
implementation, using adequate cryptographic libraries, to assess and benchmark our hypothesis.
Verified PAKE implementation As a follow up of the previous point, once we have a prototype
with a functional PAKE implementation, a direction that we (or being fair, “I”) look forward to following
is the development of an implementation of the selected PAKE protocol in F*, with the final purpose
of generating a verified implementation. This seems indeed to be a natural direction; first, because
it is consistent with what we encouraged in the thesis, i.e., that cryptographic libraries are delicate
elements underlying omnipresent protocols, which call for strict proofs of their correctness and
security; second, because there is already a lack of robust PAKE implementations, and in fact, to the
best of our knowledge, there are no verified ones.
Another intriguing aspect that we started considering concerns the recently developed proximity
tracing apps, designed during the COVID-19 health crisis for assisting in the detection of potentially
infected contacts of a confirmed case. In particular, further studies on the techniques used for
preserving anonymity of users, could provide new ideas for implementing such a property in secure
email and messaging, which is currently achieved mostly in the transport layer, e.g., by using the
Tor’s anonymity network [68], or the recently proposed anonymity system Loopix [140].
To conclude, we hope to have planted in the reader’s mind at least a small seed of curiosity
for any of the topics addressed in this thesis, which along with the right questions, can lead one to
challenging paths and unexplored domains.
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(* The file containing the user and the row of sweetwords *)
table file(bitstring,rowHw).
(* The index of a sweetword (blinded) in a row of sweetwords (rowHw) *)
fun indexOfHw(blinded,rowHw): index[private].
(* The blinding of the word in the 1st arg, using the OTP given as 2nd arg *)
fun blindWord(bitstring,bitstring): blinded[private].
(* An OTP generated with a given seed (counter) *)
fun getOTP(counter): bitstring[private].
(* Increases the seed of the OTP *)
fun next(counter): counter[private].
(* A rowHw shuffled and blinded for the user in 1st arg, using the seed in 2nd arg *)
fun shuffleNblind(bitstring,counter):rowHw[private].
(* Comparison of indexes in the honeychecker *)
fun checkEqual(index, index): bool
reduc
forall u:bitstring, w:bitstring, n:counter;
checkEqual( indexOfHw(blindWord(w,getOTP(n)),shuffleNblind(u,n)),
indexOfHw(blindWord(w,getOTP(n)),shuffleNblind(u,n)) ) = true
otherwise forall x:index, y:index; checkEqual(x, y) = false[private].
(* Reshuffles and blinds the row corresponding to a given index
* and returns the corresponding new index in the updated row *)
fun reshuffledNblinded(index):index
reduc




(* Obtains the user out of an index term *)
reduc
forall un:bitstring, pwd:blinded, x:counter;
getUser(indexOfHw(pwd,shuffleNblind(un,x))) = un[private].
(* Obtains the seed out of an index term *)
reduc
forall z:rowHw, y:bitstring, n:counter;
getCounter(indexOfHw(blindWord(y,getOTP(n)),z)) = n[private].
(* The given index matches with the one in the HC db for the corresponding user *)
event correctIndex(index).
(* ‘blinded’ has index ‘index’ in ‘rowHw’ *)
event indexFound(index,blinded,rowHw).
(* The user in the 1st arg logs in using the word in the 2nd arg *)
event usrLogged(bitstring,bitstring).
(* Marks a point not expected to be reached in the analysis *)
event unreachable.
(*--- Properties ---*)
query u:bitstring, j:index, p:bitstring, x:bitstring, y:counter;




let user(u:bitstring, p:bitstring, n:counter) =
let hshp = blindWord(p,getOTP(n)) in
event usrLogged(u,p);










(* The honeychecker keeps running with the updated index. A ‘true‘answer
from the checkEqual function is not expected.*)
let honeychecker1(c:index) =
in(lhc, y:index);





128 Chapter A Formal Models for Verification Tools
in(lhc, (y:index));
















A.2 Key distribution and authentication protocol of p≡p
This model addresses the key distribution and the posterior trustwords comparison processes,
along with the consequent association of a privacy level to a peer.
Assumptions: (i) the attacker has no access to the user’s device; (ii) the second channel for the





(*--- Var, const, events ---*)
channel outlook, internetAB, internetBA.
free phoneA, phoneB: channel[private].
free mssg: bitstring[private].
































reduc forall s:skey; pkUser(id(s)) = pubKey(s).
fun aenc(bitstring, pkey): bitstring.
reduc forall m:bitstring, sk:skey; adec(aenc(m,pubKey(sk)),sk) = m.
fun sign(bitstring, skey): bitstring.
reduc forall m:bitstring, sk:skey; getMssg(sign(m,sk)) = m.
reduc forall m:bitstring, sk:skey; verifSign(sign(m,sk),pubKey(sk)) = m.
(* Trustwords string generated for the 2 given pEp identities *)
fun trustwords(pkey,pkey): bitstring.
(* p11=p21 & p12=p22 | p11=p22 & p12=p21 *)
fun trustwordsMatch(bitstring, bitstring): bool
reduc
forall pk1:pkey, pk2:pkey;
trustwordsMatch(trustwords(pk1,pk2), trustwords(pk1,pk2)) = true
otherwise forall pk1:pkey, pk2:pkey;
trustwordsMatch(trustwords(pk1,pk2), trustwords(pk2,pk1)) = true
otherwise forall w1:bitstring, w2:bitstring;
trustwordsMatch(w1,w2) = false.
(*--- Properties ---*)
(* Full agreement *)
query a:userId, b:userId, ka:pkey, kb:pkey;
event(endHandshakeOk(a,b,ka,kb)) ==> inj-event(startHndshkS(a,b)) && inj-event(startHndshkR(b,a))
&& inj-event(senderKey(a,ka)) && inj-event(receiverKey(b,kb))
&& inj-event(senderTrustsR(a,b)) && inj-event(receiverTrustsS(b,a)).
(* Trust by Handshake:
* If r decrypts from s, then r previously marked a successful matching with s’s trstwds *)
query r:userId, s:userId, m:bitstring;
event(receiveGreen(r,s,m)) ==> event(receiverTrustsS(r,s)).
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(* Privacy from Trusted Peer *)
(* Whenever a message from a trusted peer s is received unencrypted, then s did not send it.
* We are assuming that pEp is by default enabled *)
query r:userId, s:userId, m:bitstring;
event(decryptionFails(r,s,m)) && event(sendGreen(s,r,m)) ==> false.
(* Conversely, whenever r receives a message m from a trusted peer s,
*then m is encrypted with his pk and s sent him m *)
query b:userId, a:userId, m:bitstring, pkB:pkey, z:bitstring;
event(receiveGreen(b,a,z)) ==> event(sendGreen(a,b,z)) && z=aenc(m,pkB)
&& event(receiverKey(b,pkB)).
(* Integrity from Trusted Peer *)
(* Whenever a message from a trusted peer A is received unsigned, then A did not send it.
* We are assuming that pEp is by default enabled *)
query r:userId, s:userId, m:bitstring;
event(signVerifFails(r,s,m)) && event(sendGreen(s,r,m)) ==> false.
(* Conversely, whenever r receives a message m from a trusted peer s,
* then m is encrypted with his pk and s sent him m *)
query b:userId, a:userId, m:bitstring, pkB:pkey, z:bitstring, skA:skey;
event(receiveGreen(b,a,z)) ==> event(sendGreen(a,b,z)) && z=aenc(sign(m,skA),pkB)
&& event(senderPkey(a,skA)).
(* MITM Detection *)
(* Fake keys sent during the key exchange phase are detected *)
query a:userId, b:userId, ka:pkey, kb:pkey, pkA:pkey, pkB:pkey;
event(endHandshakeUnsucc(a,b,ka,kb)) ==> (event(senderKey(a,pkA)) && pkA<>ka) ||






let receiveEmailT(r:userId, skR:skey, trustedPeer:userId, trstdKey:pkey) =
in (outlook, (s:userId, m: bitstring));
if s = trustedPeer then (
let d = adec(m, skR) in (
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(* receive message from peer not trusted *)
event receivedFromNotTrusted(r,s).
(* A is a new pEp user *)
let senderA(idB:userId) =
(* Key exchange *)
new skA: skey;
new m: bitstring;
let idA = id(skA) in (
event senderKey(idA,pubKey(skA));
event senderPkey(idA,skA);
out( internetAB, (idA,pubKey(skA),m) );




let sgndm = adec(res,skA) in (
let (t:bitstring, key:pkey) = getMssg(sgndm) in (
let x = verifSign(sgndm,key) in (




let twds = trustwords(pubKey(skA),key) in





(* to mark the end of the protocol between the 2 pep identities *)
if prtnr=idB && trustwordsMatch(twds,peertwd) then
(* set idA trusts prtnr*)
event senderTrustsR(idA,idB);
event endHandshakeOk(idA,idB,pubKey(skA),key);
(* from this point A can send any number of emails to B, secure and trusted *)
!(event sendGreen(idA,idB,aenc(sign(mssg,skA), key));








(* by default pEp peers send signed and encrypted emails *)
event signVerifFailed
)else
(* by default pEp peers send signed and encrypted emails *)





let receiverB(idB:userId, skB:skey) =
(* Key exchange *)
in(internetAB, (sndr:userId, pkSndr:pkey, text:bitstring));
(* store the public key ’pkSndr’ of the sender ’sndr’ as SECURE *)
event bAddsAsec(idB,sndr,pkSndr);
new resp:bitstring;
let txt = sign( (resp,pubKey(skB)), skB ) in (
(* B sends his public key signed and encrypted *)
event receiverKey(idB,pubKey(skB));




if peer <> sndr then
event unknownPeer
else
(* Compare with the stored pk *)













(* B is an old pEp user, thus he has already a key pair *)
new skB : skey;
( (!senderA(id(skB))) | (!receiverB(id(skB),skB)) )




-- to be able to compare the trust level values, we map the domain into integers as follows:
-- i=0, n=1, s=2, st=3 , where 0 indicates the less secure and 3 the most secure
prvcS: 0..3;
prvcU: 0..3;
-- to compare the goal we will assign: fail=-1, ongoing=0, done=1
A.3 Model for an aligned sense-of-security analysis of pEp 133
goal: {-1,0,1};
goalU: {-1,0,1};
userAction: {new_email, input_data, enable_pep, disable_pep, do_handshake,







--toFinalState := (state=3 & userAction=confirm) | (state=6 & sendEmail);




state=0 & userAction=new_email : 1;
state=1 & userAction=input_data : 5;
state=1 & userAction=disable_pep : 2;
state=2 & userAction=enable_pep : 1;
state=2 & sendEmail : 3;
state=3 & userAction=confirm : 4;
state=3 & userAction=cancel : 2;
state=5 & pepReceiver & !handshake : 6;
state=5 & pepReceiver & handshake : 7;
state=5 & !pepReceiver : 8;
state=6 & sendEmail : 9;
state=6 & userAction=do_handshake : 12;
state=7 & !confirmedTrustwords : 8;
state=7 & confirmedTrustwords : 10;
state=8 & sendEmail: 4;
state=10 & sendEmail : 11;
state=10 & userAction=stop_trusting : 6;
state=12 & userAction=cancel : 6;
state=12 & trustwordsMatch : 13;
state=12 & !trustwordsMatch : 14;
state=13 & userAction=confirm : 10;
state=13 & userAction=mistrust : 17;
state=14 & userAction=confirm : 15;
state=14 & userAction=mistrust : 8;
state=15 & sendEmail : 16;
state=17 & sendEmail : 18;
-- in the model of the system the final states go back to 0, which simulates that
-- the system can run again; since here we are analysing a single execution,





next(state)=2 | next(state)=3 | next(state)=4 | next(state)=8 | next(state)=17 | next(state)=18: 0;
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next(state)=6 | next(state)=9 | next(state)=12 | next(state)=13 | next(state)=14: 2;





next(state)=2 | next(state)=3 | next(state)=4 | next(state)=8 | next(state)=17
| next(state)=18: 0;
next(state)=6 | next(state)=9 : 2;




















(state=6 | state=15 | state=17) & sendEmail : -1;






(state=6 | state=15 | state=10) & sendEmail : 1;



























------ Check correctness of the model -----
-- No other state is reachable from a final state apart from itself
--SPEC AG (goal!=0 -> (AG goal!=0))
-- There is always a way for the user to determine if the goal is reached or failed
--SPEC AG EF goalU!=0
------- Alignment in Security goals ---------
-- The belief of the user about the accomplishment of the goal is always either accurate
-- or less optimistic than the reality
--SPEC AG goalU <= goal
-- In every state, the security implemented is higher or equal than the user’s evaluation
--SPEC AG prvcS = prvcU
--SPEC AG prvcU <= prvcS
-- Even if the evaluation of the aspects is aligned all the time, the understanding of the
-- achievement of the goal can be misaligned.
-- Note that this property is false already if AG goal=goalU is true
--SPEC E [prvcU<=prvcS U goalU!=goal]
-- If the trustwords do not match
--SPEC AG (!trustwordsMatch -> !(EF goalU=reached))
--SPEC AG (!trustwordsMatch -> AG goalU!=1)
SPEC AG (!trustwordsMatch -> AG prvcU!=3)
SPEC AG (!trustwordsMatch -> AG prvcS!=3)
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